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My thesis critically examines whether Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights are 
harmonious with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (Women’s Convention). I argue that the interpretation of ‘equality’ is the 
key to constructing the possibilities of harmonisation. In my conceptual analysis of rights 
in Islamic and international legal jurisdictions and declarations and in feminist discourse, I 
argue that both Islamic and international legal jurisprudences present rights as an 
instrument for equality among human beings. I argue that the principles of equality 
according to the Islamic jurisprudence and feminists’ standpoint are harmonious. I argue 
that Malaysia has taken appropriate measures, including laws, policies, administrative 
decisions and programmes, to eliminate women’s disadvantages based on the principal 
areas of concern and recommendations made by the CEDAW in its Thirty-Fifth Session. 
However, there are a few areas that need specific improvement for the betterment of the 
laws, policies, administrative decisions and programmes in securing Muslim women’s 
equality rights. I explore whether reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g), 
pertaining to different entitlements to rights for women and men in Muslim marriage and 
family relations entered by the Malaysian Government to ensure the prevalence of Shariah 
practised in Malaysia, renders Malaysian Muslim women’s rights laws irreconcilable with 
the principle of equality underpinning the Women’s Convention. I argue that Malaysian 
laws may become harmonious with the Women’s Convention through a womanist 
interpretation of Shariah, and the empowerment of the rights-bearer within the Women’s 
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 acceded to the United Nations (UN)
2
 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (Women’s Convention)3 on 5 July 1995 with 
reservations
4
 of Article 2 (f), Article 5 (a), Article 7 (b), Article 9 and Article 16. In the 
Conference on ‘Human Rights in Malaysia: The Last 10 Years5’ in 2009, recommendations 
were made to the Government of Malaysia to discuss the reservations, improve 
enforcement of laws, enact laws for prevention of infringement of Muslim women’s rights 
and amend relevant inequality laws. Even though the Government withdrew a few 
reservations on 6 February 1998 (Article 2 (f), Article 9 (1), Article 16 (b), (d), (c) and (h)) 
and on 19 July 2010 (Article 5 (a), Article 7 (b) and Article 16 (2)), it did not consider it 
necessary to withdraw a reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g). I note that after 
                                                 
1
 Malaysia was originally known as Malaya until 1963 when the Peninsular, Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore 
merged to form a single nation. However, Singapore left in 1965 
2
 The United Nations (hereinafter UN) is an international organization whose stated aims are facilitating 
cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human rights 
and the achieving of world peace. The UN was founded in 1945 after World War II to replace the League of 
Nations, to stop wars between countries and to provide a platform for dialogue. It contains multiple 
subsidiary organizations to carry out its missions. Online: http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.html. 
Retrieved on 12/03/2009 
3
 Adopted at New York on December 18, 1979; entered into force on 3 September 1981. GA Res. 34/180, 34 
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 710.46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979). Online: http://www.un.org/women 
watch/daw/cedaw/. Retrieved on 12/03/2009 (hereinafter Women’s Convention) 
4
 Reservations are declarations made by State Parties to a treaty, certain provisions of which, they do not 
accept as binding on them. The meaning of reservation may be found in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties 1969 which states: ‘reservation’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made 
by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’ (Article 
2 (1) (d).   Reservations are allowed so long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty. Incompatible reservations may be challenged by other State Parties. Online: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch /daw/cedaw/reservations.htm.  Retrieved on 12/03/2009 
5




the first withdrawal of reservations in 1998 and the second in 2010, it seems that the 
Government is still unable to tolerate the withdrawal of reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), 
(c), (f) and (g) concerning marriage and family relations of Muslims. This situation has 
inspired me to study whether this reservation, in actual fact, produces gender inequality 
between Muslim women and men.   
 
Kamal Malhotra, the United Nations Resident Coordinator, in his opening remarks of the 
2010 UN Development Programme (UNDP) Asia-Pacific Human Development Report on 
Gender, has promised that the UN in Malaysia will continue advocating the withdrawal of 
all Malaysia’s reservations to the Women’s Convention. Malhotra also proposed legal 
reforms to reduce or eliminate the number of contradictions existing between the civil and 
Shariah
6
 legal systems in Malaysia. This contradiction, according to him, ‘hampers 
progress on gender equality achievement in the country’ (Malhotra, 2010: 4). However, 
Malhotra’s allegation that Shariah practised in Malaysia causes gender inequality might be 
due to his lack of understanding of how substantive equality works for Muslim women’s 
rights in the Malaysian local context, a theme I thoroughly examine in this thesis. The 
Retired Chief Judge of Malaya, the Honourable Tan Sri Siti Norma Yaakob, underlined in 
her opening address the relationship between Islam, justice and equality;  
 
‘It is my belief that Islam accords women equal rights with men. …… like many Muslims, I 
do not believe that Islam, which abhors injustices, treats women any less than it treats 
men. Women, like men are vice-gerents on earth, equal in the eyes of Allah and it is our 




                                                 
6
 Shariah means ‘way’ or ‘path’, which refers to the sacred law of Islam   
7
 Opening speech at the International Conference on ‘Legislations and Mechanisms to Promote Gender 
Equality’, Kuala Lumpur, 28 August 2006 
3 
 
Musawah’s8 Statement to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) has submitted that the Quran, Islamic-based laws’ objectives, human 
rights standard and gender relations are governed by equality principles (Musawah, 2009). 
Therefore, according to Musawah, all laws must be changed to ensure equality, a 
suggestion I found similar to the view of Malhotra. Musawah also understand the value of 
rights, the concept and principle of equality according to Islam and the Women’s 
Convention differently. Musawah has claimed that ‘religious-based law’, referring to 
Shariah for Islamic family laws in Muslim countries, cannot justify inequality (Musawah, 
2009: 7). This is indicative of Musawah’s lack of understanding that Shariah differs from 
state to state and that it is problematic to argue that Shariah renders gender inequality 
between Muslim women and men in all Muslim states. By correlating inequality with the 
notion of equality equating to differences and substantive equality in marriage and family 
relations of Muslims, Musawah has also limited its interpretation of equality.       
 
Likewise, the CEDAW, after considering Malaysia’s combined initial and second periodic 
reports, was also of the opinion that Malaysia needs laws directed specifically at reflecting 
substantive equality of women with men because current laws did not sufficiently protect 
women’s rights (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 8). The Committee 
proposed that all provisions in the Women’s Convention be incorporated into Malaysian 
laws and that the Government ensure that the laws are fully enforced. This is among the 
reasons why Sisters in Islam (SIS)
9
, the independent non-governmental organisation which 
believes that Islam upholds the principles of equality, justice, freedom and dignity, insists 
                                                 
8
 Musawah is a global movement of women and men who believed that equality and justice in the Muslim 
family are necessary and possible. It was launched at a Global Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 
February 2009, bringing together over 250 participants from 47 countries including 32 countries that are 
members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). See Online: http://www.musawah.org. Retrieved 
on 04/05/2009 
9




on new Islamic family laws based on female-male equality, and it explains why they are 
accused of trying to interpret Islam according to Western norms. Othman’s (1997) idea of 
‘cultural mediation10’ in Malaysia, to be achieved by revisiting and reinterpreting Islamic 
teachings and texts that are authentic and locally persuasive, might address SIS’s 
suggestion. However, even though my thesis offers a way of mediating the Malaysian laws 
on Muslim women’s rights with the Women’s Convention, I shall not engage with the 
theory of reinterpreting Islamic teachings and texts.   
  
My thesis will contribute to an understanding of the principles of equality from the 
Women’s Convention and Malaysian laws. I will argue that reservation entered by the 
Government of Malaysia will not disadvantage Muslim women if the reservation does not 
have an effect or purpose of denying women’s exercise and enjoyment of all rights to the 
same extent as men. I argue that different entitlements to rights for women and men are not 
necessarily a distinction that amounts to discrimination, because equality is not only about 
sameness. I analyse whether Muslim women’s rights are protected according to the 
interpretation and practice of gender equality in the Malaysian local context which is 
harmonious with the Women’s Convention. Calling for cultural eradication of any practice 
without fully understanding how the practice enhances gender identity in some cultures 
could lead to the violation of other people’s valued way of life (Sachedina, 2009: 138). 
Indeed, reservations do not necessarily mean the rejection of women’s rights protection 
and equality; however, understanding the principles of equality under the Women’s 
Convention is important in order to accommodate the practices of other traditions and 
those of the West. 
 
                                                 
10
 This term was coined by An-Naim. See An-Naim, Abdullahi. 1999. ‘The Cultural Mediation of Human 
Rights’ in: Bauer J. R./Bell D. A. (ed.), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. Cambridge 
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This analysis seeks to highlight the issue that dissimilar entitlements to rights for Muslim 
women and men in Malaysia pertaining to their personal laws, which are rights to enter 
into marriage, maintenance, polygamous marriage, dissolution of marriage, guardianship 
of children and rights to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation, have 
become subsumed under the notion of inequality for women. It also highlights the need to 
unravel this allegation by justifying these formal and substantive equalities from the 
Malaysian Muslim women’s rights laws’ perspective. In my thesis, I draw upon Jaising 
(1996) to define personal laws, which refer to particular laws governing people because 
they belong to a particular religion, race, caste, sect or tribe. It is important to emphasise 
here that, even though dignity and justice are considered integral parts of human life, 
people still differ on what constitutes equal dignity and justice. Even between Muslims, 
there are different views on how to administer and achieve equal dignity and justice (Mir-
Hosseini, 2003: 34).   
  
Hence, my core analysis in this study is to examine whether Malaysian laws on Muslim 
women’s rights are harmonious with the Women’s Convention. According to Ahmad 
(2005: 9), there are two ways of resolving this conflict: one can either make the national 
laws comply with the international laws or redefine cultural understandings that would 
mirror compatibility. In this analysis, I will demonstrate that the Malaysian laws affecting 
Muslim women’s rights are partially compliant with the principle of equality espoused by 
the Women’s Convention. At the same time, I will attempt to prove that religious and 
cultural understandings of equality are crucial for the purpose of constructing 
harmonisation between national and international legal regimes. First, I analyse whether 
Malaysia has taken all appropriate measures, including laws, policies, administrative 
decisions and programmes, to eliminate Muslim women’s disadvantages based on the 
6 
 
principal areas of concern and recommendations of the CEDAW in the concluding 
comments made against Malaysia following the Thirty-Fifth Session in New York from 15 
May to 2 June, 2006, and based on the application of equality informed by the Women’s 
Convention. I consider whether, in the Malaysian Shariah local context, the reservation of 
Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) is against the object and purpose of the Women’s 
Convention. This is important considering that Shariah has been alleged to be a tool 
justifying gender inequalities in Malaysia. I examine the application of Muslim personal 
laws and their implications for Muslim women’s rights in Malaysia.     
 
Second, I argue that the lack of understanding of the equality principle from the Islamic 
perspective and the Women’s Convention’s standpoint among the CEDAW and women’s 
movements in Malaysia is the reason why the reservation to Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and 
(g) of the Women’s Convention has been posited as the main cause of gender inequality. I 
argue that Mayer’s imputation that the application of Shariah leads to serious breaches of 
international human rights (Mayer, 1995: 64-65) was based on a lack of understanding of 
the concept of equality in Islam. Though formal equality is important, I argue that it is 
essential to guarantee that the effect of its implementation will avoid inequalities.  
 
The problem in examining whether Malaysia’s reservations are incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention is that there is no single objective criterion to 
determine whether any reservations are compatible with the object and purpose or not. 
Thus, I argue that substantive equality is the principle of the Women’s Convention that 
State Parties must uphold in all legislations concerning rights and equality. Based on the 
conception of equality that will be discussed in Chapter Three, I answer the question of 
whether the particular reservation entered by the Government of Malaysia makes Muslim 
7 
 
women’s rights laws in Malaysia incompatible with the Women’s Convention. I argue that 
different entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men in marriage and family 
relations’ laws do not necessarily render Muslim women unequal because this approach of 
divergence of rights entitlements may have been conducted purposely to uphold equal 
dignity and justice between sexes. I argue that, by reinterpreting the concepts of rights and 
equality, Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights are capable of harmonisation with the 
Women’s Convention.  
  
In terms of family laws for Muslims, Malaysia applies a plural legal system in which no 
single family law system applies to the whole country (Abdullah, 2007: 514). As Malaysia 
has 14 states, there are 14 different Islamic Family Law Enactments; however, the basic 
principle of all Enactments is almost the same in all states within the Federation, with a 
few differences in the wordings and practices as well as the implementation. In this thesis, 
I will mention the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984 (the IFLA) 
specifically wherever there is a reference to such legal provisions, as well as comparing it 
with the other State Enactments (laws that are passed by State Authorities) whenever 
necessary.  
 
1.1.1 Malaysian Shariah: A Distinct Character 
In this thesis, it is important to understand that Malaysian laws are mainly based on the 
common laws, as a result of the colonisation by Britain, and rights enshrined in the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution reflect a heavy Western influence (Tan and Thio, 1997: 
514). Shariah plays a small role in the country and has jurisdiction in Muslim personal 
matters only. As well as having a limited jurisdiction, Shariah practised in Malaysia has, in 
fact, absorbed the principles of English common laws that are reconcilable with Islamic 
8 
 
principles (Mohamad, 2008: 6), and both have more commonalities than differences, which 
has given Malaysian Islamic-based laws a distinct character. The Former Chief Justice of 
Malaysia, Dato’ Abdul Hamid, stressed that, even were Shariah to be implemented as the 
only legal system in Malaysia, a majority of the existing laws would remain
11
. This 
presents an opportunity to develop a common understanding of the principle of gender 
equality concerning Muslim women’s rights, despite different provisions being applied in 
Malaysian statutes compared to those of the Women’s Convention. 
 
I trace that, rather than trying to understand how Muslim countries or countries with 
majority Muslim populations interpret equality in gender, or how different entitlements to 
rights between sexes in Islam could result in equal outcomes in terms of dignity for women 
and men, the human rights actors are more likely to critique the practices themselves, such 
as polygamous marriage, dissimilar entitlements to rights to enter into marriage and 
dissimilar roles and duties in marriage and family relations. This is what has been claimed 
by Sally Engle Merry (2004: 14) as a reason for ‘resistant ethnic nationalism that 
attributes its problems to human rights’.     
  
Thus, my contribution to this critique is to explore how equality informs Malaysian 
Muslim women’s rights laws and compare this with the principle of equality underpinning 
the Women’s Convention. In this thesis, I argue that, even though the Malaysian 
Government entered reservation to Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the Women’s 
Convention, the Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights are capable of harmonisation 
                                                 
11
 Dato’ Abdul Hamid demonstrated that Shariah and civil laws are complementary by giving the example of 
the Chapter on Introduction in the book ‘Napoleon and Islam’ written by David Moussa, that 97 per cent of 
the Code Napoleon was taken from the rulings of Imam Malik and that a study made in Pakistan some time 
ago has shown that only about 10 per cent of the laws then in force in Pakistan which were based on English 
common laws contradict Shariah. See Mohamad, Abdul Hamid. 2003. ‘Harmonisation of Shariah and Civil 
Law in Malaysia: Present Reality and Future Actions’. Paper presented at the International Conference on 
Harmonisation of Shariah and Law. 20-21 October 2003. Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur 
9 
 
with the Women’s Convention. I argue that the harmonisation is not solely based on full 
incorporation of the Women’s Convention’s provisions into the state laws but might be 
possible even if several reservations are entered, provided that women are secured equal 
rights with men. Through this thesis, I will answer the following questions: 
i) Does the concept of ‘rights’ exist in Islam? Do international and Islamic human 
rights jurisprudence and declarations share similar meanings and principles of 
rights? What are the feminist critiques of the theory of rights? In what ways 
might rights inform gender equality? How do the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)
12
, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights 
(UIDHR)
13
 and the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI)
14
 
address rights?    
ii) How do Islamic jurists and feminists address equality? Are the concepts of 
equality informed by the Islamic jurists and by feminists harmonious? In what 
ways do the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI differ regarding the application of 
gender equality? How has the feminist standpoint on equality informed the 
Women’s Convention? 
iii) Is woman a legal subject in Malaysia? How is equality recognised and 
constructed? Does this create formal and substantive equality? How do 
                                                 
12
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter UDHR) was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in its resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. See Online: http://www1.umn.edu 
/humanrts/instree/b1 udhr.htm. Retrieved on 11/12/2009 
13
 The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter UIDHR) was adopted on 19 September 
1981 by the Islamic Council in Paris. See Online: http://www.alhewar. com / ISLAMDECL.html. Retrieved 
on 03/12/2009. The UIDHR was written by representatives from various Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Pakistan under the auspices of the London-based Islamic Council, a private organisation affiliated 
with the Muslim World League. See Mayer, A. E. 2007. Islam and Human Rights. 4th. Ed. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press 
14
 The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (hereinafter CDHRI) is a Declaration of the Member 
States of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) adopted in Cairo in 1990, which provides an 
overview of the Islamic perspective on human rights and affirms Islamic Shariah as its sole source. Its 
purpose is to be ‘general guidance for Member States [of the OIC] in the field of human rights’. This 
Declaration is usually seen as an Islamic response to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
See Online: http://www.arabhumanrights.org/publications/regional/islamic/cairo-declaration-islam-93e.pdf. 
Retrieved on 03/12/2009 
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Malaysian laws, policies, administrative decisions and programmes enhance 
and empower women’s rights to equality? How does Malaysia respond to the 
concluding comments made against Malaysia by the CEDAW in its Thirty-Fifth 
Session in New York? 
iv) Is the reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) against the object and 
purpose of the Women’s Convention? How do different entitlements to rights to 
enter into marriage, rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its 
dissolution, right to guardianship and personal rights between sexes inform 
equality of outcomes?  
 
The idea is that, were the Malaysian laws and the Women’s Convention to be harmonised, 
this conflict between international and Malaysian domestic laws could be resolved. 
Moreover, the constructive harmonisation of the Malaysian laws with the Women’s 
Convention would be a progressive move towards the harmonisation of Shariah and civil 
laws in Malaysia.  
  
The first set of questions is addressed in Chapter Two. I engage in a conceptual analysis of 
rights in international and Islamic human rights jurisprudences and apply this analytical 
debate to explore the ideals of gender equality rights and Muslim women’s rights laws in 
Malaysia in Chapters Four, Five and Six. First, I apply the introductory concept of ‘rights’ 
from Mohammad (2003) to argue that ‘rights’ exists in Islam and that the notion of ‘rights’ 
is not a foreign concept in the Islamic tradition. Next, I draw upon Lacey’s (2004) and 
Mohammad’s (2003) understanding of ‘rights’ to argue that international and Islamic 
human rights jurisprudences share similar meanings and principles of rights. I explore 
feminist critiques of the theory of rights in international jurisprudence. From the theory 
11 
 
that rights are individual entitlements, I consider the critique that individual entitlements 
are not absolute (Lacey, 2004). Through my analysis of the subject of the image of rights, I 
argue that the framework of non-absolute individual entitlements constructs a value of 
interest, rights as a neutral product and wider coverage of rights, which limits the gendered 
nature of rights. Therefore, I argue that rights could inform gender equality should rights 
reflect the protection of both individual and collective interest, constitute an unbiased legal 
product, and cover public and private spheres. I explore how the UDHR, the UIDHR and 
the CDHRI address rights of human beings in an attempt to grasp an idea that is capable of 
reconciling international and Islamic human rights instruments on the notion of rights. My 
intention is to critically review existing formulations of the principles of rights in the 
Western-based
15
 and Islamic-based traditions as they have important implications when 
applied to Muslim women’s rights in Malaysia. I argue that both jurisprudences present 
rights as an instrument for equality among human beings.  
 
My second set of questions is addressed in Chapter Three, which explores how Islamic 
jurists and feminists address equality. I draw upon the feminist idea that ‘equality should 
not be reduced to sameness’ (Fletcher, 2002: 149) and relate it to Islamic jurists’ 
understanding of equality as a ‘matter in its proper and valid context’ (Bakar, 2003: 4). I 
argue that these principles of equality according to Islamic jurisprudence and feminists’ 
standpoint are harmonious. Equality is guaranteed by laws, not necessarily just by securing 
similar rights for women and men, but also by taking into consideration whether the 
disadvantaged groups will be the beneficiaries of affirmative actions and special measures 
which could guarantee equal outcomes. However, by focusing on the application of gender 
equality in the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI, I show that the Western-based and Islamic-
                                                 
15
 Modern human rights laws derive primarily from Western philosophical thought. See Charlesworth, Hilary 
and Chinkin, Christine. 2000. The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis. Juris Publishing 
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based Declarations are congruent in privileging the male as a legal subject but differ 
regarding women’s and men’s rights in marriage and family relations.   
 
My third set of questions is considered in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, which explore 
the notion and application of equality under the Malaysian laws, policies, administrative 
decisions and programmes. I study the Malaysian laws on human rights and Muslim 
women’s rights in order to analyse how rights and equality inform the laws. I argue that 
according to the Malaysian laws, woman is a legal subject. I note that various policies 
should supplement legislations to secure gender equality and protect disadvantaged groups. 
I argue that the interpretation of ‘equality’ is the key to constructing the possibilities of 
harmonisation between the Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights and the Women’s 
Convention. I argue that the laws governing the rights of Malaysian Muslim women apply 
the same principles of equality as those rooted in the Women’s Convention.  I will consider 
whether Malaysia has taken all appropriate measures in securing gender equality and 
empowering Muslim women based on the concluding comments of the CEDAW made 
against Malaysia in its Thirty-Fifth Session in New York, which could make it congruous 
with the tenet of the Women’s Convention.  
  
My final set of questions is addressed in Chapter Six, which analyses whether reservation 
of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) pertaining to different entitlements to rights for women 
and men in Muslim marriage and family relations entered by the Malaysian Government to 
ensure the prevalence of Shariah practised in Malaysia renders Malaysian Muslim 
women’s rights laws irreconcilable with the Women’s Convention. I argue that different 
entitlements to rights for women and men in Muslim marriage and family relations in 
Malaysia do not necessarily render women unequal to men, because this divergence of 
13 
 
rights entitlements might be made purposely to uphold equal dignity and justice between 
sexes.     
 
In this thesis, my key argument is that withdrawal of the reservations is not the only 
solution for harmonisation if formal equality or similar entitlements to rights between 
sexes will not guarantee gender equality. I argue that the women’s rights (or gender rights) 
claims made in Muslim communities must take religious, social and economic relations 
into consideration. Attempts at understanding the conceptualisation of women’s rights in 
Muslim communities must therefore be a holistic analysis which resists the essentialising 
and imposing of predetermined interests on actors. While agreeing that Islamic textual 
sources are flexible, I locate my idea on the contention that changing them is not the only 
way to reconcile the Women’s Convention with Malaysian Islamic-based laws. In other 
words, even though textual sources may be reinterpreted, they do not necessarily have to 
be subjected to change to fulfil current demands on rights.  
 
Analysing the extent of consistencies of Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights with 
the Women’s Convention is important to ascertain whether the Malaysian domestic laws 
provide parallel legal protection for Muslim women in Malaysia as the Women’s 
Convention does for women globally. It is significant to show that, in Islam, the concept of 
women’s rights as understood in the modern paradigm is not a foreign notion. This 
research justifies the need for reservation entered upon provisions related to marriage and 
family relations of Muslims to ensure gender equality based on the interpretation of 





1.2 HARMONISATION: FORM OR SUBSTANCE? 
 
In order to draw out the harmonisation of Malaysian laws with the Women’s Convention, I 
explore the meaning of harmonisation as that term has been used in relation to laws. 
Generally, in my research, I describe harmonisation as an engagement or method of 
complementing which brings about an agreement and reconciliation. An attempt at 
harmonising the different concepts to achieve or develop ‘common universal 
understanding that ensures the full guarantee of human rights for every human being 
everywhere’ is still a demanding enterprise given the complexity and diversity of human 
society (Baderin, 2003: 2). The Former Chief Justice of Malaysia, Dato’ Abdul Hamid 
Mohamad, revealed in his paper on ‘Harmonisation of Shariah and Civil Law in Malaysia: 
Present Reality and Future Actions’ that to harmonise laws, attention must be paid to the 
substance of the laws, rather than just the form. In other words, different laws or legal 
systems might be harmonised if they operate coherently and do not generate inconsistent 
outcomes. Islamic criminal laws in Malaysia, for instance, might be harmonious with civil 
criminal laws even though the two systems introduce different kinds of punishment to 
prevent criminal activities, since they are both protecting society’s peace and harmony16. 
Dato’ Abdul Hamid’s conception of harmonisation is particularly helpful in developing my 
argument in this thesis in the context of ensuring consistent principles of laws rather than 
their provisions.        
 
The most important notion is that the principles of justice and fairness should be the basis 
for any laws to achieve harmony (Abdul Rashid, 2003: 3). In a theory of justice, Rawls 
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 See detailed discussion on harmonisation of Islamic and civil criminal laws in Malaysia in Awang, Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamad Yunus, Mohamad Ismail. 2003. ‘Harmonisation of Shariah and Civil Law: A Special 
Reference to the Concept of Punishment’. Paper presented at the International Conference on Harmonisation 
of Shariah and Law. 20-21 October. Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur 
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(1972: 4) emphasised justice as the first value of social institutions, which provides a way 
of assigning rights and duties and defines the appropriate distribution of the benefits and 
burdens in the basic institutions of society. In Islam, too, both textual sources of Shariah, 
which are the Quran and the Prophetic tradition, have stressed the adherence to justice and 
fairness (Bakar, 2003: 4). This means that, to be harmonised, laws do not necessarily have 
to be uniform, a point addressed by Sir Anthony Mason, the Former Chief Justice of the 
High Court of Australia: ‘harmonisation of rules does not necessarily mean uniformity of 
rules’ (Mason, 1999: 3). Mason explained that the most common method of harmonising 
rules is by drafting an international treaty (convention) at a diplomatic conference. The 
convention is then opened to accession by nation states, though accession may be subject 
to reservations. There are two ways of harmonising rules. First, as Mason explains, one can 
harmonise by changing the treaty. Second, one can harmonise by interpreting rules that 
appear to conflict in light of each other. This second form of harmonisation usually 
requires appealing to the values which inform the rules.   
 
In this study, I explicitly conceptualise harmonisation as a compatible objective or 
outcome which implies a high level of mutuality between both legal instruments, 
regardless of different perspectives and viewpoints. My approach adopts the equality 
principles of the Women’s Convention and compares it with the Malaysian understanding 
of equality. Even though the Women’s Convention and Malaysian laws on Muslim 
women’s rights might be different on the surface, I will show that they share similar 
principles of equality, which could implies a high level of mutuality between both legal 
instruments. In constructing harmonisation between Shariah and other laws, identification 
of the existing laws which are said to be contrary to Shariah must be carried out first 
(Mohamad, 2003: 9). By observing contrasting provisions stipulated in the international 
16 
 
and Islamic declarations of human rights and women’s rights, I am able to ascertain 
whether the differences could be harmonised based on their interpretations and principles. 
This is important for the study of Muslim women’s rights in the Women’s Convention and 
Malaysian laws, prior to establishing commonalities between the two legal dogmas. 
 
1.2.1 Constructing Harmonisation between the Women’s Convention and the 
Malaysian Laws on Muslim Women’s Rights: A Literature Review 
Throughout my study of various literatures on gender and human rights in Islam and 
international law
17
, I have discovered that some of these have been confined to case-studies 




 and secular countries 
such as India
20
. To date, there has been no research exploring the possibility of 
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 Some works on women’s rights in Islam and international law include Venkatraman, Bharati Anandhi. 
1995. ‘Islamic States and the United Nation Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women: Are the Shariah and the Convention Compatible?’ in the American University Law Review. 
Vol. 44; Ali, Shaheen Sardar. 1998. Equal before Allah, Unequal before Men? Negotiating Gender 
Hierarchies in Islam and International Law. Ph.D Thesis. University of Hull, UK; Ali, Shaheen Sardar. 
2000. ‘Development of the International Norm of Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Sex: An Evaluation of 
Women’s Human Rights in Islam and International Law’ in A. Stewart (eds.) Gender, Law and Social 
Justice. London: Blackstone; Hamid, Abdul Ghafur. 2006. ‘Reservations to CEDAW and the Implementation 
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Elizabeth A. 2006. ‘Islam in the Context of the Contentious Politics of Women’s Rights in Contemporary 
Middle Eastern and North African Societies’. Draft paper presented at the Meeting of International Experts 
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Laws: In Search of Common Ground. Sisters in Islam 
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harmonising the Malaysian Muslim women’s rights laws with the Women’s Convention. 
The existing literature has concentrated on areas of discrimination and its proposed 
solution which related to the denial of women’s equal rights with men due to several 
reservations entered upon the Women’s Convention by the Government of Malaysia. 
However, there was a study on the compatibility of the general Shariah with the Women’s 
Convention by Venkatraman in 1995. In his research on ‘Islamic States and the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: 
Are the Shariah and the Convention Compatible?’, Venkatraman discovered that Shariah 
practised in majority Muslim states and the Women’s Convention were not compatible and 
claimed that Islamic countries have entered into substantive reservations to the Women’s 
Convention on the grounds that ‘religion only served to perpetuate the stereotype that 
Islam institutionally subjugates women’ (Venkatraman, 1995: 2011). This application of 
Islamic principles, according to Venkatraman, overshadowed the quality of Islam. 
Venkatraman suggested that reserving countries should work towards compliance with the 
Women’s Convention. On the other hand, the Convention must also divest itself of 
‘culturally insensitive or unworkable language’. However, this research is specific to the 
practice of Shariah in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Pakistan.   
 
Hamid (2006: 154-155), in his paper on ‘Reservations to CEDAW21 and the 
Implementation of Islamic Family Law: Issues and Challenges’, has drawn a conclusion 
that constructing harmonisation of the Women’s Convention with Shariah is totally 
dependent on the extent to which the Women’s Convention can accommodate the Shariah 
applied in Muslim countries and to what extent Muslim countries are prepared to accept 
the liberal interpretation of the Islamic family law. This means that the difficulty of 
                                                                                                                                                    
Conceptualising Islamic Law, CEDAW and Women’s Human Rights in Plural Legal Settings: A Comparative 
Analysis of CEDAW in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. UNIFEM 
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 The term ‘CEDAW’ applied in this paper was referred to the Women’s Convention 
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harmonising the two could be solved either by withdrawing all reservations to show the 
acceptance of the liberal interpretation of Islamic textual sources or by modifying the 
Women’s Convention so that it complied with Islamic principles. Hamid did not pay 
attention to the principle of the Women’s Convention; he only looked at the extent of the 
reservations entered, and whether or not they contradict the object and purpose of the 
Convention. Similar to Hamid’s finding, Islam (2006), who analysed the possibilities of 
full implementation of the Women’s Convention in Bangladesh, argued that withdrawal of 
reservations could create an ‘enabling environment’ of possibilities of full ratification of 
the Convention by the Government of Bangladesh.  
 
I trace that the findings accorded by Venkatraman, Hamid and Islam were based on their 
research methodology which is rooted in the provision per se; however, their work lacks an 
analysis of the meanings and principles of equality in both the international and the states’ 
local contexts, which might be able to harmonise the differences. My argument is that 
neither of the solutions would be the better choice, since harmonisation can be achieved 
not necessarily by forcing one party to accommodate another, or vice versa, but by 
synchronising both of them to achieve one consensus standard. This could be done by 
matching up their concepts, nature or principles even though they provisionally differ.  
 
Conversely, Ali (2000), in her research on ‘Gender and Human Rights in Islam and 
International Law’ which used the example of Pakistan to demonstrate the discrepancy 
between theory and practice of Islam and its laws, has drawn a conclusion that women’s 
rights in Islam could be brought into line with the Women’s Convention. Ali (2006: 277) 
wrote: ‘women’s rights in Islam are not entirely irreconcilable with current provision of 
international human rights instruments emanating from the UN’. However, according to 
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Ali (1998 and 2000), the monumental entity of the Islamic legal tradition must be fully 
utilised. Therefore, the textual foundations could be reinterpreted to accommodate current 
needs and standards and remain up to date (Zafrullah Khan, 1967: 14). The divergence of 
gender and human rights in Islam and international laws, according to Ali (2006: 281), 
pertains to the privileges of men in family matters concerning the rights to divorce and 
polygamous marriage and the right to chastise a disobedient wife. However, Ali has 
marked that these men’s privileges could be easily taken away from them because the 
rights are dependent on generous limitation. Interestingly, apart from the idea that the 
struggle for equality within Islam needs an in-built dynamism in the basic sources of 
Shariah to evolve an interpretation of the Quran and the Prophetic tradition compatible 
with gender equality, Ali has contributed the idea that the struggle for equality in Muslim 
societies must come from within those societies. However, I argue that, without 
understanding the notion and principles of equality according to the Women’s Convention 
and comparing its conception with any particular local context or societies to explore their 
divergence or convergence, the endeavour for equality would be meaningless, because, as 
stressed by Abdul Aziz (2005: 3), equality is a value system regulated by a society. 
 
Mayer (2006), who has compared the perspectives of different Muslim countries based on 
political make-up in terms of national interpretations of how Muslim women’s rights are 
translated into government policies, seems to support the earlier argument that Islamic 
textual sources are flexible. She expressed various reservations about the process of 
interpreting the Islamic sources undertaken when the Muslim countries entered into the 
Women’s Convention. Mayer has noted the direction of reassertion of Muslim support for 
women’s rights, for instance political change in Morocco which proposed legal reform to 
meet the standard of international human rights laws, treating the values of international 
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human rights and Islam as essentially harmonious. This argument was based on the fact 
that Morocco had withdrawn all the reservations entered earlier.  
  
I have noticed that the similarity between studies on Malaysia and those on other Muslim 
countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh concerns the legal systems, which Ali (2006: 
267) described as three fragile layers that regulate Muslim women domestically. The first 
layer is the Federal Constitution, followed by state enactments and, thirdly, custom, culture 
and tradition. The difference, which I categorised into three aspects, is that, firstly, while 
Ali (2006: 267) has found that these layers of legal systems undermine women in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, Malaysia has proved otherwise. In my analysis of Muslim women’s rights 
under the Women’s Convention and Malaysian laws and policies in Chapter Four, Chapter 
Five and Chapter Six, I trace that the Federal Constitution, state enactments and custom are 
not the instruments being used by the Government of Malaysia to undermine Muslim 
women. The Malaysian Federal Constitution formally guarantees equal rights and freedom 
irrespective of gender, whereas Acts, Enactments and Government policies guarantee the 
substantive equality of women. Not only have these policies and appropriate measures, 
including administrative decisions and programmes, empowered Muslim women by giving 
them equal outcomes for justice and dignity, but custom, culture and tradition, which are 
incorporated in Islamic Family Law Enactments of all states, also empower women, for 
instance the right of a wife to jointly acquire property. 
 
Secondly, while a common finding in Pakistan and Bangladesh is the states’ distance from 
the familial sphere of life (Ali, 2006: 268), I argue in Chapters Five and Six that, in 
Malaysia, the state intervenes in private spheres, notably passing laws which prohibit 
domestic violence. For instance, the Domestic Violence Act (Act 521) (DVA) was 
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enforced in 1994 to provide protection for battered wives and other victims of domestic 
violence
22
 (Official Portals of the Attorney General’s Chambers of Malaysia). Finally, let 
us consider the progressive interpretation of Islamic textual sources. I note that, in regard 
to the appointment of Muslim women as Shariah Court Judges, the prohibition of forced 
marriage, the age limit to enter into marriage contract and women’s rights to dissolve 
marriage as explored in Chapter Six, Malaysia favours Ijtihad
23
, as stressed by Ismail, Abd 
Rahim and Mohd Dahlal, (2009). Pakistan also gives preference to Ijtihad, although 
Bangladesh does not favour Ijtihad (Ali, 2006: 269-270).  
 
Kamaruddin (2006), who studied Muslim women’s rights laws in Malaysia and the 
Women’s Convention from an Islamic perspective, did not thoroughly analyse the standard 
of legal protection and government policies to compare them with the international 
standard. Therefore, the purpose of ascertaining the level of implementation of the 
international convention in the context of Muslim society in Malaysia seemed 
unachievable. Kamaruddin has concluded that, as a result of the amendment of Article 8 
(2) of the Federal Constitution in 2001, ‘all existing laws are being reviewed to ensure 
gender equality’ (Kamaruddin, 2006: 12). However, until 2010, few legal efforts had been 
made to ensure gender equality. Regarding the issue of harmonisation of the Malaysian 
laws on Muslim women’s rights with the Women’s Convention, Kamaruddin considered 
that legislation and amendment of various laws synchronises Malaysian laws with the 
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Women’s Convention, at the same time defending Malaysia’s reservations24 to the Articles 
that are in consonance with Shariah practised in Malaysia (Kamaruddin, 2006: 26). She 
proposed further examination of the reservations premised on Shariah to ascertain the 
rationale behind them and suggested comparative studies on other Muslim countries which 
do not enter reservation to learn the best practice of the countries concerned.    
 
While examining the Malaysian Government’s sensitivity to gender equality, Siraj (2009) 
suggested that many amendments made to the Islamic family laws so far have guaranteed 
equal rights for Muslim women and men and are in line with the Women’s Convention’s 
requirement for gender equality (Siraj, 2009: 9). I, however, am dissatisfied with this 
opinion, as Siraj did not set out in detail which amendments she was referring to (or all of 
them) and did not justify why Islamic-based Malaysian laws need to be amended to render 
them fully harmonised with the Women’s Convention and not otherwise. On the other 
hand, I agree with Siraj that proper understanding by the authorities of the sources of 
Shariah is needed to justify the view that Islam promotes substantive equality between the 
sexes (Siraj, 2009: 15).  
 
Recently, Musawah (2011) has searched for common ground between the Women’s 
Convention and Islamic family laws by exploring how Muslim countries and countries 
with significant Muslim minorities engaged with the Convention’s process and how the 
CEDAW addressed issues of Islamic family laws and practices. Musawah reported on 
research into State Parties’ justification for their failure to implement the Women’s 
Convention with regard to family laws and practices. The research reviewed 44 countries 
with Muslim majorities or significant Muslim minority populations that reported to the 
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CEDAW from 2005 to 2010, including Malaysia. Musawah and Venkatraman (1995) note 
that many State Parties justified their law and practices by claiming that they are based on 
unchangeable Islamic textual sources. On the other hand, Musawah recognised the 
compatibility between the concepts of equality and justice in Islam and those of the 
Women’s Convention (Musawah, 2011: 1). Interestingly, I trace that Musawah was 
intending to rethink the relationships between equality, human rights, justice and Islam and 
was attempting to open a new, constructive dialogue where religion is no longer an 
obstacle to gender equality. 
 
However, in Musawah’s idea for a proposal to promote in-depth engagement in search of 
common ground between the Women’s Convention and the Muslim family laws, no 
recommendations were made to demonstrably understand the meanings and principles of 
equality from the Women’s Convention’s perspective and compare them with the 
understanding and practice of equality in Muslim countries even though, as mentioned 
earlier by Ali (2006) and Abdul Aziz (2005), the struggle for equality must come from 
within those societies. In the absence of detailed historical knowledge of social conditions 
of each country, Sally Engle Merry (2006: 132) has claimed that the CEDAW treats all 
countries more or less the same, thus creating a fundamental dilemma for human rights 
practice. In analysing the ‘disjunctures between global law and local justice’ and taking 
India and Fiji as case-studies, Merry found that the different global visions of justice and 
specific visions in local contexts cannot be reconciled unless the CEDAW recognises the 
alternative conception of social justice and accepts ways in which local arrangements can 
promote human rights, particularly those relating to gender equality rights. I find that 
Merry’s vision of reconciliation is parallel with Mohamad’s (2008: 6) idea for 
harmonisation of laws; i.e., to construct harmonisation, uniformity of legal substance is 
24 
 
more important than similarity of form.  Having said that, I argue in my thesis that 
understanding equality and how it works in upholding justice for women and men from the 
Women’s Convention’s perspective and in Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights 
might be one way of accommodating the tensions between global and local justice for 
women in Malaysia.  
 
1.3 THEORY OF RIGHTS AND EQUALITY IN THE JURISDICTION AND 
THE UDHR, UIDHR AND CDHRI   
  
In view of the endeavour to explore the inconsistencies of the Malaysian laws on Muslim 
women’s rights with the Women’s Convention and how to harmonise them, I engage in a 
conceptual analysis of rights in international and Islamic human rights jurisprudences in 
Chapter Two and apply this analytical discourse to explore the ideals of gender equality 
and Muslim women’s rights in Malaysia in this thesis. I analyse primary and secondary 
documents and materials. I apply the introductory concept of ‘rights’ from Mohammad 
(2003) to argue that the notion of ‘rights’ is not a foreign concept in the Islamic tradition. 
Within the analysis of whether rights in Islam are harmonious with rights derived from 
Western thought, I draw upon Lacey’s (2004) and Mohammad’s (2003) ideas of rights to 
argue that international and Islamic human rights jurisprudences share similar meanings 
and principles of rights.  
 
I study feminist critiques of the theory of rights in international jurisprudence in an attempt 
to explore a wider understanding of this concept from women’s perspective and how their 
critiques informed the Women’s Convention. Through my analysis of the image of rights’ 
subject, I argue that the framework of non-absolute individual entitlements constructs 
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values of interest, rights as neutral product and wider coverage of rights, which limits the 
gendered nature of rights. I argue that the concept of rights is not a gendered product 
biased in favour of men or only covering the public sphere if the idea of rights is 
constructed to consider the collective interest which stresses the correlative relationship 
between rights and duties and non-absolute rights. This is to ensure that the rights of all 
human beings are equally distributed.  
 
I explore how the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI address rights of human beings in an 
attempt to grasp an idea that reconciles international and Islamic human rights instruments 
on the notion of rights. The analysis method adopted in this study aimed at understanding 
the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI more clearly according to the UN reports, written books, 
journal articles, paper presentations and other written sources by international and Western 
scholars and, in some cases, other scholars whose works were related to this study. My 
intention is to critically review existing formulations of rights in the Western-based and 
Islamic-based instruments as they have important implications when applied to Muslim 
women’s human rights in Malaysia. I argue that both jurisprudences present rights as an 
instrument for equality among human beings.  
 
For that reason, I argue that the notion of equality of rights which considers substantive 
equality rather than merely formal equality must be properly understood and applied to 
ensure that all human beings are guaranteed equal access to justice. In Chapter Three, I 
analyse the idea of equality which will be employed in this thesis. I trace whether Islamic 
human rights jurisprudence shares similar meanings and principles of equality with 
feminists’ standpoint. I argue that both traditions’ notion of equality, that equality should 
not be reduced to sameness (Fletcher, 2002) is harmonious. The basic premise of the 
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argument is based on the similar discourses of formal and substantive equality, and that 
similarity of legal treatment does not necessarily denote equality: if a woman is in a 
different position from a man to begin with, then treating them with total similarity will 
simply perpetuate the differences between them. Therefore, I argue that an extended 
equality model which focuses on the subordinated group is rather significant in this 
analysis of gender equality. The central inquest of this model is into the ‘disadvantage’, i.e. 
whether the laws contribute to the subordination of women (disadvantaged group).      
 
Anirudhan and Siva (2007) demonstrated that gender discrimination arose from the 
inequalities faced by women by reason of their gender. That is why Anirudhan and Siva 
proposed gender-sensitivity, abolishing all discriminatory practices against women by 
guaranteeing equal access and equal opportunities on the political, social, economic, civil 
and cultural fronts and recognising physical, biological and physiological differences 
between women and men to overcome this problem. Here, Anirudhan and Siva also 
stressed both formal and substantive equality, considering that equality could also be 
achieved by treating women and men according to their differences, not just their 
sameness. This is similar to what Zaitoon Othman, the President of the Malaysian Muslim 
Lawyers' Association, pointed out earlier, i.e. that women and men have different roles and 
responsibilities, and their entitlements in laws reflect that. Because Islam treats women and 
men differently but equally, Zaitoon admitted that, ‘in some ways, Islamic law is even 
more advantageous than civil law’ (Hong, 2006).   
 
Through my focus on the application of gender equality in the UDHR, UIDHR and 
CDHRI, I argue that the Western-based and Islamic-based Declarations are congruent in 
privileging the male as a legal subject, but they differ pertaining to the entitlements to 
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rights for women and men in marriage and family relations. I explore how feminists’ 
standpoint on equality has informed the Women’s Convention and analyse whether the 
application of equality in the UIDHR and CDHRI is harmonious with the principle of 
equality under the Women’s Convention. I argue that the application of equality in the 
sense that ‘a situation is unequal if like situations are treated differently or different 
situations are treated similarly’ (Smith, 2003: 185) in the UIDHR and CDHRI is 
concordant with the principle of equality under the Women’s Convention. Based on the 
conception that different entitlements to rights for women and men might result in equal 
dignity and justice, I define equality, which refers to formal and substantive equality, to 
mean ‘equal in accessing formal opportunity to achieve fundamental interest in living a 
life for individual and community and equal in securing and achieving the greatest 
happiness in life for individual and community ending up with equal dignity and justice for 
all as the outcome’, not ‘putting things in the same place’ or ‘giving something of the same 
amount to different people’. Because the above-mentioned notion of rights and principles 
of gender equality in Islam underpinning the UIDHR and CDHRI is reconcilable with the 
Women’s Convention, one might ask whether the equality rights of Muslim women in 
Malaysia are concordant with the Women’s Convention.  
 
1.4 POSITIVE ATTENTION TO WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN MALAYSIA25 
 
In this section, I introduce my study on the positive attention to women’s rights in 
Malaysia. Feminists’ writings are relevant and applicable in Malaysia (Ahmad and Baljit, 
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1989; Stivens, 2003: 128-130); however, even though the idiom ‘feminism26’ is not 
necessarily synonymous with ‘Western Feminism27’, there has been a prevalent avoidance 
of the term ‘feminism’ (Mohamad and Koon, 1994). In a study of inter-related historical, 
legal and practical issues regarding gender and justice from the transmission of Egyptian 
reformism to Malaysia through the Azharites
28
, I have found not a single instance of the 
word ‘feminism’ being used. The reason for this was that the influence of Western 
Women’s Liberation which was synonymous with ‘Western Feminism’ has developed 
Malaysian women’s movements which carried a similar message and theme to Western’s 
women’s rights (Abd. Rahim, 2001: 7), which was not totally acceptable in the Malaysian 
Muslim local context. Stivens (2003: 129) has also found several reasons for this 
distancing, which vary from the avoidance of a ‘Western’ agenda to libertarianism.  
 
Moreover, Muslims regarded the feminist approach as distorting Islam. According to 
Ahmad (2007: 4), a Malaysian feminist and lawyer, many Muslims regarded the feminist 
approach as ‘an attempt to discredit and misrepresent Islam or that it stands for enmity 
between women and men’. Feminists’ idea of gender equality has been mistakenly 
understood as trying to develop prejudice among women and men (Abd. Rashid, 1998: 10-
11). That is why women’s movements in Malaysia were more comfortable using the word 
‘womanism’ instead of feminism. This is supported by Ng, Mohamad and Hui’s (2006) 
study on women’s movements in Malaysia in which they explained the reasons for the 
inability of feminism to play a key role in reforming society in Malaysia. According to 
                                                 
26
 ‘Feminism’ refers to the struggles of the women’s movement in Europe, United States and the colonised 
countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries. See Ng, Cecilia, Mohammad, Maznah and Hui, Tan Beng. 
2006. Feminism and the Women’s Movement in Malaysia: An Unsung (R) evolution. London and New York: 
Routledge 
27
 The concept of feminism was neither originated, imported nor imposed by the West on the Third World 
Countries, as debates on women’s rights were held as early as the 18th century in China and later in India, 
Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Japan and Malaysia. See Jayawardeena, Kumari. 1986. Feminism and Nationalism in 
the Third World. London: Zed Press  
28
 See Noor, Zanariah. 2007. ‘Gender Justice and Islamic Family Law Reform in Malaysia’ in Kajian 
Malaysia. Jil. XXV. No. 2 
29 
 
them, one of the reasons for the distancing from feminism was that feminist movements in 
Malaysia did not engage with Islam and Islamic intellectuals regarding women’s rights 
until the late 1980s. Also, feminist organisations did not incorporate the Islamic paradigm 
in their early incarnations. In fact, until the early 1990s, feminist projects remained 
unapproachable and untouched by Muslim professionals. This cannot be totally ignored as 
there are bases and reasons why the public at large reject the notions of feminism. 
 
Therefore, as rightly opined by Ong (1996), the strategy of pursuing women’s rights 
through a process of cultural dialogue is one of the best ways of working in the local 
context. Margot Badran wrote in 2002 that feminisms are produced in particular places and 
are articulated in local terms. According to Badran, feminisms are scattered globally and 
the claim that feminism is Western is essentialist in nature. Martha Nussbaum (2000: 7) 
has correctly proposed a course of feminist practice that is ‘strongly universal, committed 
to cross-cultural norms of justice, equality, and rights, and at the same time sensitive to 
local particularity, and to the many ways in which circumstances shape not only options 
but also beliefs and practice,’, similar to Venkatraman’s (1995) idea that I mentioned 
earlier.  Othman (1998: 176) stressed further that to even define Malaysian Muslim 
women’s rights and freedom, one needs to consider a cultural and political battlefield of 
modern Islamisation and cultural relativism. As Malaysia has 14 states with different 
administrations of Islamic family laws, thus, not only cross-cultural approaches, but, 
state’s inter-cultural engagement with different Islamic jurisprudential views as a means of 
addressing some of the areas of tensions on Muslim women’s rights in Malaysia is 




I trace that Malaysian women scholar activists have progressively explored the 
relationships between feminist theory and practice. There was only one publication on 
feminism and women’s rights before 1970, but this figure increased to three between 1970 
and 1980 and eight between 1981 and 1989 (Ngah, 2007: 388). Ngah found that higher 
awareness of women’s rights in the post-1990s era resulted in a huge body of writings on 
this subject, with 81 publications between 1990 and 2004, which was equivalent to 2.2 per 
cent of the total publication productivity between 1970 and 2004. Even though studies on 
equality only started after 1990, women’s rights and feminism have been the subjects of 
research since 1970 (Ngah, 2008: 7). The range of literature on women’s studies (Muslim 
and non-Muslim) in Malaysia denotes that women’s situation in Malaysia is receiving 
active and positive attention from scholars and women’s movements, to study their rights 
and protection. However, there is a lack of research about the legal protection of women in 
Malaysia apart from a few studies on family, criminal and employment laws
29
.     
 
1.4.1 Legal Protection of Women in Malaysia: New Law for Equality? 
I trace that interest in the study of equality and the Women’s Convention increased the 
number of publications only after 2005
30
. In Malaysia, until 2005, while formal equality or 
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de jure equality could be created by the laws and constitutional reforms, the issue of de 
facto equality or substantive rights still lagged behind (Bhatt, 2005) among women’s 
movements and, according to Ahmad (2005), remained unexplored. Moreover, the specific 
content of ‘equality’ is not properly defined in the Malaysian Federal Constitution 
(Ahmad, 2005: 4) except for what has been understood from Article 8 (1) of the Federal 
Constitution that ‘all persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection of 
the law’. From the feminist viewpoint as discussed earlier, the legal response to gender 
discrimination has to promote substantive equality (Amirthalingam, 2003: 7).  
 
Later, Abdul Aziz (2008), who has taken a close look at the interpretation, application and 
adjudication of gender equality in Malaysia, offered a view of equality that is compatible 
with Islamic ideas and the Women’s Convention’s principle on equality; she stated that 
substantive equality is as important as formal equality (Abdul Aziz, 2005: 2; 2008: 80-81), 
the principle of equality which I shall draw upon in my analysis of equality as adopted in 
Malaysia in Chapter Four. Abdul Aziz explained that, ‘in addressing the issue of equality, 
the Women’s Convention firstly addressed formal legal equality by requiring equal 
treatment of men and women. However, if equal treatment yields disparate results, then the 
law should look at ensuring equality of opportunity and removing barriers to women’s 
advancement’ (Abdul Aziz, 2008: 81).          
 
Based on this conception of equality, my central argument in this research is that, 
according to Islam and the Women’s Convention, gender equality laws might be the first 
recourse to ensure equal treatment of women and men; however, if equal treatment brings 
unequal results, then the laws should play their role to ensure equal outcomes and remove 
barriers to the advancement of either women or men. I consider substantive equality and 
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the accommodation of differences to be just as important as formal equality and the 
recognition of sameness. Substantive equality pertains to all rights of Malaysian Muslim 
women, especially rights to enter into marriage, maintenance, polygamous marriage, 
dissolution of marriage, guardianship of children and rights to choose a family name, a 
profession and an occupation will be explored in Chapter Six. 
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
 
Chapter One introduces this research as based upon the critiques of the Government of 
Malaysia’s standpoint in reserving Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the Women’s 
Convention, which is related to marriage and family relations of Muslims. The discussion 
indicates how understanding the principle of equality underpinning the Women’s 
Convention and Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights could be a basis for 
constructing harmonisation between the Women’s Convention and Malaysian laws. I 
provide the general themes and background to the discussion, as well as the issues and the 
conceptual framework of the study. I explore the method of research regarding the 
harmonisation of laws and indicate the importance of synchronising the substance of the 
laws, rather than just the form. I highlight the purpose, literature review, objective, 
significance, scope, outline and methodology of the research.  
  
Chapter Two discusses the jurisdictional background of rights in international and Islamic 
human rights jurisprudences and deliberates conceptual analysis of rights in the 
international and Islamic human rights instruments underpinned by the UDHR, UIDHR 
and CDHRI. I discuss feminist viewpoints of rights in an attempt to explore a wider 
understanding of this concept from women’s perspective and how their critiques informed 
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the Women’s Convention. The Chapter aims to critically review existing formulations of 
rights in these diverse traditions to prove that Islamic human rights jurisprudence and 
feminist discourse share similar meanings and principles of rights. I trace how the concept 
of rights is not a gendered product biased in favour of men or only covering the public 
sphere if the idea of rights is constructed to consider the collective interest which stresses 
the correlative relationship between rights and duties and non-absolute rights. I explore 
how the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI address rights of human beings in an attempt to grasp 
an idea that might reconcile international and Islamic human rights legal instruments on 
the notion of rights.    
 
In Chapter Three I examine the jurisdictional background of equality in Islamic human 
rights and feminist debates and reflect on the conceptual analysis of gender equality in the 
international and Islamic human rights instruments underpinned by the UDHR, UIDHR, 
CDHRI and the Women’s Convention. I aim to review existing formulations of the term 
‘equality’ in these diverse traditions and to trace how the notion of equality is shared in the 
international, Islamic human rights and feminist points of view. I argue that similarity of 
legal treatment does not necessarily denote equality because, if a woman occupies a 
different position from a man to begin with, treating them with total similarity will simply 
perpetuate the differences between them. I then trace how an extended equality model 
which focuses on the subordinated group is rather significant in this analysis of gender 
equality. The central inquest of this model is into the ‘disadvantage’, and whether the law 
contributes to the subordination of women (disadvantaged group). I consider how the 
UIDHR and CDHRI are irreconcilable with the UDHR pertaining to the different 
entitlements to rights in marriage and family relations between Muslim women and men. I 
then trace how the Women’s Convention addresses gender equality. I argue that, even 
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though the UIDHR and CDHRI are not entirely harmonious with the UDHR on the 
application of equality (that equality should not be reduced to sameness), the UIDHR and 
CDHRI are reconcilable with the Women’s Convention. 
 
I consider the historical background of the Malaysian legal system and Malaysian laws on 
human rights in Chapter Four. I trace how Islamic textual sources have been part of the 
Malaysian legal system. I present an analysis of equality in Malaysia, as provided under 
the Federal Constitution and reinforced by statutes and Government policies, to determine 
a clear method of analysis in exploring whether Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights 
can be harmonised with the Women’s Convention. I examine whether woman in Malaysia 
is a legal subject. I explore the development of Muslim women’s rights in Malaysia in an 
attempt to trace whether Malaysia has been committed to gender equality as informed by 
global standards underpinning the Women’s Convention. I argue that the interpretation of 
‘equality’ is a key to construct the possibilities of harmonisation between the Malaysian 
laws on Muslim women’s rights and the Women’s Convention. I configure that Malaysian 
laws provide and secure equal dignity and justice for Muslim women’s rights and that 
equality is not only formal but also substantive. I examine how Muslim women’s 
disadvantages are taken into consideration while securing their equal dignity and justice.  
 
Next, in Chapter Five, I consider the extent to which the Government of Malaysian takes 
into consideration or responds to the concluding comments made against Malaysia by the 
CEDAW in its Thirty-Fifth Session in New York. I examine whether Malaysia is taking all 
appropriate measures, including laws, policies and administrative decisions and 
programmes, to uphold equality for women. The main documents related to the CEDAW 
processes were studied for approaches and arguments used by the three main entities 
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involved in the reporting process: the CEDAW, the Government of Malaysia and non-
governmental organisations. The documents studied were as follows: general 
recommendations of the CEDAW; Malaysia’s introductory statement to the CEDAW; 
Malaysia’s combined initial and second periodic reports; the CEDAW’s list of issues and 
questions and Malaysia’s responses to the list; the summary records of the constructive 
dialogue between the CEDAW and Malaysia; the CEDAW’s concluding observations; and 
the shadow report and the oral statements of non-governmental organisations and women’s 
groups. This Chapter also adopted an analysis of the fundamental liberties of Muslim 
women in Malaysia by virtue of its Constitution and statutes and women’s rights in Islam 
according to Islamic Family Law Enactments and the written sources of respected scholars. 
I argue that the Government of Malaysia has taken positive steps to empower Muslim 
women, and has legislated and emended laws to secure gender equality. However, to 
achieve congruity with the tenet of the Women’s Convention, there are a few areas that 
need specific improvement for the betterment of the laws, policies, administrative 
decisions and programmes in securing Muslim women’s equality rights.     
 
Furthermore, the Malaysian government reserved Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) 
pertaining to different entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men in marriage and 
family relations in order to ensure the prevalence of Shariah practised in Malaysia. But 
does this render Malaysian Muslim women’s rights laws irreconcilable with the Women’s 
Convention? In Chapter Six, I analyse whether, in the Malaysian Shariah local context, the 
reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) goes against the object and purpose of the 
Women’s Convention. I argue that it is difficult to determine whether Malaysia’s 
reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention because there 
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is no single objective criterion to determine the matter
31
. I argue that justice for women 
must not only be secured by laws, but must also be seen in equality of outcome. I argue 
that the reservation pertaining to marriage and family relations in Malaysia will not render 
Muslim women’s rights laws in Malaysia incompatible with the Women’s Convention 
provided that a few areas which treat women ‘less favourably’ are improved.           
  
In the final Chapter, I conclude by explaining how an understanding of the substance and 
principle of gender equality may contribute to the constructive harmonisation between 
‘local and international’ and ‘Western-based and Islamic-based’ legal standards of 
Muslim women’s rights protection. I suggest that the notion of equality must be understood 
from its substance, not its form. I propose that the meaning, concept and principle of 
equality according to the Women’s Convention and Shariah practised in Malaysia must be 
widely understood by and conveyed to people. I argue that the application of different 
entitlements to rights due to gender in marriage and family relations of Muslims in the 
Malaysian local context is to uphold equality by allocating and securing special measures 
for women as a disadvantaged group. I recommend that Malaysian feminists avoid the 
reflection of Western attributes attached to them by engaging Islamic organisations and 
individuals with their ideas and projects. I suggest that Malaysian society should be aware 
of any kind of gender inequalities that have been occurring or might occur. The most 
important point is that Muslim women themselves are able to differentiate between 
objective and patriarchal or impartial and male-biased laws, regulations or even social 
structures. Through this analysis I propose that the theory of feminisms in Malaysia is as 
important as it has been valued in other countries. It has been proved throughout the world 
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as well as in Malaysia that legal reforms and women’s empowerments have been 
underpinned by feminists’ struggles towards equality.       
 
I offer the view that the wording of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the Women’s 
Convention must be amended from ‘same rights’ to ‘equal rights’ to synchronize it with 
the principle of equality under the Convention itself. Having acknowledged that the 
principle of equality in the Women’s Convention is harmonious with the application of 
equality in the UIDHR and CDHRI and the principle of equality in Islam informed by 
human rights scholars, one might ask why the majority of Islamic nations reserve this 
Article. The answer is that the wordings used in this Article are not consistent with the 
Convention’s principle of equality. ‘Same rights’ is not similar in wording and meaning to 
‘equal rights’. As I argue throughout this thesis, similar is not necessary equal; therefore, 
women might be disadvantaged in the marriage and family domain should they be given 
similar entitlements to rights as men.     
 
 




The very nature of this enquiry places it in the genre of doctrinal research, as it seeks to 
know and understand the legal position of Muslim women’s rights in Malaysia and how 
Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights might be harmonised with the Women’s 
Convention. The first step was to conduct a literature review to establish the existing state 
of knowledge, set out the research questions and undertake a library-based data collection; 
in order to observe the application of the concepts in theory and practice, the textual 
research was compiled before any documents were analysed. In trying to provide answers 
to the pertinent research question on the legal protection of Muslim women’s rights in 
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international and Malaysian laws, the ‘studying up’ approach was beneficial. ‘Studying up’ 
means studying the powerful, their institutions, policies and practices rather than focusing 
only on those whom the powerful govern (Harding and Norberg, 2005).    
 
The literature review, books, periodicals and articles in the bibliography, form a part of the 
academic writing into which they were absorbed. Some of these were available in the 
Keele University library. Interlibrary loans were used to acquire books from other libraries 
in the United Kingdom. Much Malaysian literature was accessed from the Malayan Law 
Journal (MLJ) and Current Law Journal (CLJ) websites, although I also visited the law 
libraries in Malaysia, especially the International Islamic University of Malaysia Library, 
the Islamic Science University of Malaysia Library, the Malaysian National Archives 
Library, the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Library and the Official Portals of 
Attorney General Chambers of Malaysia to gather the information needed for the study.    
 
The scope of this study provides for an analysis of the complementary and contrasting 
jurisprudence of Malaysian Muslim women’s rights laws (underpinned by Islamic textual 
sources and common laws) and the Women’s Convention. Apart from the Malaysian 
Federal Constitution and the Women’s Convention, this research is limited to an 
exploration of the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI and Malaysian statutes. Recent 
developments in discourses of Malaysian Muslim women’s rights, constitutional studies, 
Shariah governing women and the international covenant on Muslim women’s rights have 
all influenced this study. Because the study is trying to concentrate on Islamic parameters 
on marriage and family relations in Malaysia, and as Malaysia’s reservation of Article 16 
(1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the Women’s Convention is due to the inconsistencies of 
marriage and family relations with Shariah, it is important to examine in depth the rights 
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provided for Muslim women in the Malaysian statutes and the Women’s Convention, 
which will involve the analysis of Islamic legal principles and the situation of Muslim 
women in Malaysia. Government policies, country reports, non-governmental 
organisations’ (NGOs) reports and women groups’ reports as well as the relevant 
government documents are thoroughly examined; all of them have been analysed in order 
to understand the issues related to Muslim women’s rights protection in Malaysia and the 
Women’s Convention.    
 
An inherent difficulty in collecting information about the Malaysian law’s agenda to 
protect women was that the legal information on some websites had not been updated and I 
faced difficulties in accessing some websites. I overcame this problem by contacting 
persons from whom the information could be acquired via emails and telephone, and dealt 
with them personally. They were the Director of Corporate and User Services Division, 
Department of Statistics, Malaysia and Madam Dharliza Dris, an officer at the Attorney 
General’s Chambers Malaysia. My comparative studies of the UDHR with the UIDHR and 
CDHRI and of Malaysian Muslim women’s rights laws with the Women’s Convention 
were based on the theoretical and legal aspects in responding to the agenda for the 
protection of women. Three main stages were involved in the process of comparison; the 
descriptive phase, the identification phase and the explanatory phase. The first phase was 
used for describing the concepts of rights and equality and provisions of human rights in 
the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI and also the concepts of Muslim women’s rights in the 
Women’s Convention and Malaysian laws. I used the second phase to identify the 
similarities and differences in understanding rights and equality from the international and 
Islamic human rights declarations and how Muslim women’s rights are protected under the 
Women’s Convention and Malaysian laws. Lastly, I used the third phase to provide a 
40 
 
critical and comparative analysis between the Women’s Convention and Malaysian laws in 
matters relating to marriage and family relations of Muslims. These three stages were 



























THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL AND 
ISLAMIC HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS: TOWARDS PRINCIPLES OF 




In this Chapter, I discuss the jurisdictional background and engage in a conceptual analysis 
of rights in international and Islamic human rights jurisprudences in an attempt to explore a 
wider understanding of rights and the principle thereof. First, I consider whether ‘rights’ 
exists in Islam. If the concept of human rights does not exist in Islam, an analysis of 
whether Muslim women are guaranteed rights as humans would indeed, be fruitless. I 
apply the introductory concept of ‘rights’ as described by Mohammad (2003) to argue that 
the notion of ‘rights’ is not a concept foreign to the Islamic tradition; as Ali (2000: 15) has 
said, the term ‘haqq’ has always existed and translates into the English term ‘rights’. In the 
analysis of whether rights in Islam are harmonious with rights in Western terms, I draw 
upon Lacey’s (2004) and Mohammad’s (2003) ideas of rights to argue that international 
and Islamic human rights jurisprudences share similar meanings and principles of rights. I 
argue that the ‘rights’ concept may be reinterpreted to consider collective interest which 
stresses the correlative relationship of rights and duties and non-absolute rights.   
 
Second, I explore the feminist critique of the theory of rights in the international 
jurisdiction and analyse whether ‘rights’ as a legal subject, is gendered. I examine how the 
principle of rights may be reconstructed for the purpose of upholding gender equality 
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should ‘rights determine the identity of the rights-bearer’ (Krishnadas, 2007: 161). From 
the theory that ‘rights’ are an individual entitlement, I consider the critique that individual 
entitlements are not absolute (Lacey, 2004). Through my analysis of the image of rights’ 
subject, I discover that the framework of non-absolute individual entitlements constructs a 
value of interest and a wider coverage of rights, which limits the gendered nature of rights. 
Non absolute individual entitlements of rights might construct a value of interest rather 
than only a value of choice. This framework erects a wider coverage of rights by 
considering collective rights rather than only individual rights. Collective rights balance 
the rights of individuals as human beings, that no person will be prioritised over the other 
and that no persons will be given rights as human beings that are denied to others. Thus, it 
is able to limit the gendered nature of rights by avoiding the maleness of rights, because 
individualism is synonymous with patriarchal nature of rights. This theoretical review 
develops a framework to analyse whether rights could inform equality. This framework 
will be a tool for my analysis of whether Malaysian laws, policies, administrative decisions 
and programmes secure Muslim women’s equal (formal and substantive) rights in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six. I argue that rights could inform gender equality should they reflect an 
unbiased legal product which considers collective interests and covers the public and 
private spheres.  
 
Third, I critically examine how the conception of rights informs the international and 
Islamic human rights underpinned by the UDHR, the UIDHR and the CDHRI in an 
attempt to grasp an idea that reconciles international and Islamic human rights instruments 
on the notion of rights. I argue that both jurisprudences and all three Declarations present 
rights as an instrument for equality among human beings. This is important for my analysis 
of human rights laws in Malaysia in Chapter Four, as the sources of the Malaysian human 
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rights laws are common laws and the Islamic texts (Quran and the Prophetic tradition). I 
explore the existing data provided in the works of leading scholars, their conceptual 
implications and, often, their reinterpretation as a method of obtaining the answers to the 
above questions.   
 
The complementary nature of the international and Islamic human rights idea is 
understandable, given that almost all Islamic nations are signatories to the UDHR, the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
32
 and the International 
Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
33
, and have contributed 
actively to their formulation (Dacey and Koproske, 2008: 9). Brems (2001: 289) 
considered that the CDHRI conforms to the ‘genre of a human rights declaration’ and 
counted this aspect as one of universality. This is supported by Rehman’s (2010: 357) 
argument that the UIDHR and CDHRI are influenced by international human rights 
instruments. Here, I start my study by briefly explaining the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI 
to obtain a legal picture of these three Declarations and to consider how, in the eyes of 
legal scholars, the UDHR is complementary to the UIDHR and CDHRI, before continuing 
with a study of the jurisdictional background of rights. Next, I explore feminist critiques of 
rights and examine the concept and principles of rights under the UDHR, UIDHR and 
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CDHRI. Since I take the view that the UDHR is capable of harmonisation with the UIDHR 
and CDHRI, my further concern is to show how they might complement one another.     
 
2.2 THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (UDHR), THE 
UNIVERSAL ISLAMIC DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (UIDHR) 





December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), among 
others, was adopted by the UN General Assembly
34
 at Palais de Chaillot, Paris, as a 
response to tremendous pressure to include an international bill of rights in the Charter of 
the UN (Morsink, 1999: 1; Smith, 2003: 38; Rehman, 2003: 54). Thirty-three years later, 
the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) was adopted by the Islamic 
Council in Paris on 19 September 1981 (Mawdudi, 1976: 14; Rehman, 2010: 357 and 362). 
Nine years after the UIDHR was adopted, 56 Member States of the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC)
35
 created the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) in 
Cairo; this, according to Achilihu (2010: 86), is similar in basis to the UIDHR. Its aim was 
to serve Member States of the OIC as guiding principles in human rights issues (Rehman, 
2010: 367-368). If the UDHR was adopted to protect the ‘human rights part of the 
conditions for peace at the end of the World War II’ (Morsink, 1999: 1), the UIDHR and 
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CDHRI were presented as a response to the perceived exclusion of Muslims from the 
domain of human rights as propounded in the West and to argue that there is indeed a 
human rights tradition in Islam. Apart from the reasons for adoption, in this Section I 
proceed with the legal analysis of the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI and to consider how, in 
the eyes of legal scholars, the UDHR is complementary to the UIDHR and CDHRI. 
 
The UDHR aimed to advance the goal of increasing peace and security in the international 
regime (Renteln, 1990: 24-25). The task of writing the UDHR was given to the 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which worked on the drafting project from 27 
January 1947 to 10 December 1948 (Morsink, 1999: 4; Rehman, 2003: 54). Although it 
has a strong moral force, (Smith, 2003: 38-40), the UDHR is neither a treaty nor legally 
binding although it sets out a common standard of achievement for all nations (Rehman, 
2003: 57; Waltz, 2004). It establishes the objects of human rights and was the first 
international legal effort to limit the behaviour of states and impress upon them their duties 
to their citizens (Sohn, 1968; Unesco, 1973; Morsink, 1999). According to Humphrey 
(1967: 55), together with various human rights conventions, it was considered a 
‘respectable body of international human rights laws’. A number of Articles in the UDHR 
express vital human needs, leaving the exact margins of interpretation and enforcement to 
the individual states (Douzinas, 2000).          
 
Similar to the idea of rights and duties as generally stated in the UDHR and as part of the 
intentions of the UDHR’s drafters36, the UIDHR, which stressed the correlative 
relationship between rights and duties, focused on the idea of freedom and insisted that this 
was a fundamental right given by God which no one could take away from a human being 
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(Mawdudi, 1976: 14). The UIDHR was written by representatives of various Muslim states 
such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan under the auspices of the London-based Islamic 
Council, a private organisation affiliated with the Muslim World League (Bielefeld, 2000: 
105; Rehman, 2010: 362; Mayer, 2007). Arkoun (1994: 106) has submitted that all 23 
Articles of this Declaration are based on verses of the Quran or on selections from official 
Sunni compilations of Hadith.  
 
I submit that the CDHRI, which was adopted in 1990, provides an overview of the Islamic 
perspective on human rights and affirms the Quran and the Prophetic tradition as its sole 
source (Article 24). Its purpose is to act as general guidance for Member States of the OIC 
in the field of human rights (Rehman, 2010: 368). The CDHRI presents a state perspective 
whereas the UIDHR has a non-state perspective
37
 (Mas’ud, 2007: 96). The CDHRI 
believes that fundamental rights and universal freedom are integral parts of the Islamic 
religion; every person is individually responsible and the community is collectively 
responsible for their safeguarding (Preamble). Technically, as Mas’ud explained, it is quite 
difficult to compare the UIDHR and the CDHRI due to their different approaches. 
However, according to Mas’ud, both documents show a basic concern for human rights 
from a Muslim perspective. Hence, they are not totally contradictory of each other and, 
apparently, the CDHRI was not intended to denounce the UIDHR or to replace it.   
 
Interestingly, even though the UDHR was described by the UN representative of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Said Raja’i Khorasani, as un-Islamic (Dacey and Koproske, 
2008: 6), Western-based (Arkoun, 1994) and failing to take into account cultural and 
religious contexts of Muslim societies (Mas’ud, 2006: 3; Dacey and Koproske, 2008: 4), 
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Al-Awabdeh (2005), in his dissertation on the ‘History and Prospects of Islamic Criminal 
Law with Respect to the Human Rights’, contended that there is no general theory or even a 
single definition of human rights according to the views and attitudes of the Islamic world 
as opposed to the opinions of the West. The content found in the CDHRI is also not totally 
new, for it has incorporated almost all essential human rights as stipulated in the UDHR 
(Mas’ud, 2007). Earlier, Tabandeh (1970) agreed that most of the UDHR’s provisions are 
also inherent in Islam.  
 
Furthermore, Baderin (2001; 2003), while formulating a synthesis between Islamic and 
international human rights laws underpinning the ICCPR and ICESCR, has argued that the 
scope and application of Islamic and international human rights do not create ‘a general 
state of dissonance’ between them, especially if the concept of human rights is not 
established as a concept foreign to Shariah. Mary Robinson, the then High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, agreed that Islam is entirely consonant with the principles of 
fundamental human rights. In her address in the OIC Conference Symposium on 15 March 
2002, she said: 
‘No one can deny that at its core Islam is entirely consonant with the principles of 
fundamental human rights, including human dignity, tolerance, solidarity and equality. 
Numerous passages from the Quran and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad will testify to 
this. No one can deny, from a historic perspective, the revolutionary force that is Islam, 
which bestowed rights upon women and children long before similar recognition was 
afforded in other civilisations. Custom and tradition have tended to limit these rights, but 
as more Islamic states ratify the Convention for the elimination of discrimination against 
women, ways forward for women are being found and women are leading the debate. And 




Political scholars also accept that there is some commonality between the UN human rights 
instruments and Islamic human rights instruments. The Pakistani Ambassador to the UN 
Human Rights Council, for instance, has claimed that the CDHRI is complementary to the 
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UDHR, not an alternative (Dacey and Koproske, 2008: 16). I trace that employing similar 
principles would be relevant to reconcile Islamic and international human rights, a method 
which I employ in this Chapter, in an analysis of the complementary principle of rights 
under the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI, and in Chapter Three, in an analysis of the concept 
of gender equality from the Islamic viewpoint, in feminists’ debates and in the three 
Declarations. Baderin alleged that ‘the methods and relevant principles of Shariah can be 
positively employed to ensure the effective practical realization of human rights in Muslim 
states’ (Baderin, 2006: 1).     
 
Even though Mas’ud’s (2006: 7) comparative studies of the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI 
found that there is a difference between Western-based and Islamic-based declarations, he 
revealed that the area of common ground between these three Declarations is larger than 
the area of differences. According to Mas’ud, the UIDHR and the CDHRI share 20 and 14 
themes of rights respectively with those mentioned in the UDHR. The conflicting themes, 
Mas’ud observed, were on freedom of thought and expression, protection of life, penal 
laws, marriage, and the holding of public office. Conversely, I note that these conflicting 
themes do not mean that the rights mentioned in the UDHR are not covered in the UIDHR 
or CDHRI or otherwise, but that the rights mentioned above are not specifically restricted 
in the UDHR. I argue that, even though rights in the UDHR are not specifically restricted 
as they are in  the UIDHR and CDHRI, the rights of human beings as stated in the UDHR 
are not absolute or, in other words, restricted. Hence, in principle, the UDHR, UIDHR and 
CDHRI are capable of harmonisation in terms of non-absolutism of rights. Having 
understood the background of the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI, my further concern in the 
next Section is to examine whether the meanings and principles of rights in the Islamic and 




2.3 INTERNATIONAL AND ISLAMIC JURISDICTIONAL BACKGROUND 
OF ‘RIGHTS’38 
  
In this Section, I consider whether ‘rights’ exists in Islamic traditions and analyse how the 
international and Islamic legal principles share similar meanings and principles of rights. I 
argue that exploring the Islamic jurisdictional background of the term ‘rights’ will help us 
to understand whether ‘rights’ exists in Islamic traditions. I apply the introductory concept 
of ‘rights’ described by Mohammad (2003) to argue that the notion of ‘rights’ is not a 
foreign concept to the Islamic tradition. In the analysis of whether rights in Islam are 
harmonious with rights in Western thought, I draw upon Lacey’s (2004) and Mohammad’s 
(2003) ideas of rights to argue that international and Islamic human rights jurisprudences 
share similar meanings and principles of rights. This is specifically important in analysing 
the application of human rights in the post-colonial Malaysian legal context, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
In investigating the theories of legal rights, Lacey (2004) has analysed four influential 
attempts to construct the framework of rights. Starting from the most analytic level, Lacey 
demonstrated Hohfeld’s appeal to rights, which are claim, liberty, immunity and power. 
Most human rights scholars have defined rights from these four separate perspectives 
which might be revealed from Hohfeld’s idea. Analytically, research on rights that draws 
significantly on Hohfeld has been conducted by, among others, Berlin (1969), Lyons 
(1969; 1970), Feinberg (1970; 1973; 1980), Flathman (1976) and Raz (1986). According to 
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Hohfeld (1946), rights as a claim are a demand to something, and can be made of someone 
else who has active duties
39
 to perform or to provide something. Liberty is also part of the 
meaning of rights, meaning a freedom to do something ‘which is supported by other rights, 
which is claims that other persons do not interfere with the exercise of that freedom’ 
(Hoffman, David and John Rowe, 2003: 7). I challenge Orend’s (2002: 21) view that rights 
referring to liberty ‘may survive and flourish only in an environment where there is no 
duty’. This idea derives from the emphasis on correlating the term ‘rights’ only with active 
duties. It is critical at this point to recognise that not only active but also passive duties 
could provide the rights claimed by someone. Here, the duty bearer’s responsibility is to 
prevent interference with the exercising of freedom by others. I will consider in Chapter 
Four that Malaysian laws on human rights provided in Article 5 to Article 13 of the Federal 
Constitution grant rights as a claim and liberty. 
 
In terms of immunity, rights denote an exemption from challenge when doing something or 
from having a legal status altered (Jones, 1994: 24-25). Duty bearers have responsibilities 
to ensure that the rights holders achieve their aim of rights by not challenging their act of 
doing something (passive duties). An interesting example of colonial or Western 
jurisprudence’s influence in Malaysia is the public constitutional right of immunity. In the 
United Kingdom, elected members of public legislatures are exempt from being sued for 
anything they might say during debates in the legislature (Article IX of the Bill of Rights 
1689). The same is expressed in Article 63 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. This 
exemption was intended to encourage the maximum freedom of expression during 
legislative debates, in the hope that such will ultimately enhance the public good (Bari and 
Shuaib, 2006: 127). Finally, rights, as drawn from Hohfeld, also mean power to do 
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something or to create a legal relationship which affects other people. Likewise, the duty 
bearer has a passive responsibility not to restrain other people’s power to do something.  
 
Secondly, Lacey demonstrated rights defended by H. L. A. Hart as ‘will’ or ‘choice’. 
According to Hart, Lacey (2004: 32) wrote: ‘the essence of rights is choice or agency: a 
right is a specially protected choice to interfere with another’s freedom’. The third appeal 
to rights was developed by Neil MacCormick, which Lacey confirmed as having been built 
on Jeremy Bentham’s concept of rights as ‘interest conception’. I believe that this interest 
conception guarantees the automatic existence of rights when someone benefits from the 
performance of duties. The final view of rights defended by Ronald Dworkin, which Lacey 
claimed was built on the interest theory, is ‘rights as trumps’. This meaning of rights, 
which seems to make the rights holders winners or deciders, confers the power to force 
duties to be fulfilled when claims of rights are made. That is why Lacey (2004: 33) 
considered this idea of rights as ‘trumping background considerations’.  
 
I believe that Mohammad (2003), who analysed the terms ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ in common 
laws and Islam, has proved that the concept of rights is clearly identified by the Quranic 
verses and the Prophetic tradition. Mohammad has explained that Muslim jurists have 
devoted independent titles to the concept of rights, such as civil obligation (Al-Sanhuri, 
1954), property of a deceased individual (Al-Kabashi, 1984), and nature and restrictions of 
rights (Al-Durayni, 1984). According to Mohammad, Al-Durayni examined rights in 
contexts where they are restricted by the public good whereas Husayn and Al-Sariti (1992) 
explained in detail the concept of rights and how it differs from liberty. Uthman and Al-
Sharanbasi (1986) explained the meaning of haqq, bearers of rights and its classification 
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and Al-Sabuni (1979-1980), Badran (1965) and Qasim (1982) also set out the meaning of 
haqq, its subject matter and its sources (Mohammad, 2003: 4-10).     
 
In providing a wide explanation of the meaning of the term ‘haqq’, Mohammad explained 
that the word is legally relevant if used in the sense of rights vis-à-vis a duty, property, 
ownership, share, an allocation and desert, an exclusive or preferred interest, and justice. 
According to Mohammad, the texts of the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad show that 
the word ‘haqq’ is used in different contexts including rights and other related concepts. 
This demonstrates that the term ‘haqq’ in its literal as well as religious forms is vague; 
however, such ambiguity may be clarified by the context in which ‘haqq’ is used.  
 
The word ‘haqq’ occurs around 287 times and has about 18 different meanings in the 
Quran (Mohammad, 2003: 64-65), of which the most common are ‘certainty’, ‘conformity 
to reality’, ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ (Said, 1979: 63). It also means ‘appropriate’ and ‘suitable’ 
and is sometimes used in reference to easements such as drinking and watering rights and 
rights of way. Arabs used ‘haqq’ for ‘rights’ as a ‘litigation’ and ‘lawsuit’ (Mohammad, 
2003: 64). According to Mohammad’s explanation, which I found similar to the term 
‘rights’ in English as revealed by Hohfeld, Hart, MacCormick and Dworkin, the word 
‘haqq’ is commonly used in different sets of meanings such as ‘liberties’ and ‘options to 
do or not to do something’, ‘privileges to specific interests’, ‘incumbent and mandatory’, 
‘authentic’ and ‘benefits’. It also connotes ‘power’ as in cases of rights of owners and 
guardians to use and dispose of their property
40
, and it could mean ‘immunity’ from certain 
liabilities. 
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Therefore, I argue that ‘rights’ exists in Islam as ‘itself’ and as correlative with duties. As 
Ali (2000: 15-16) has stressed, ‘rights’ is also the established meaning of the term in 
Arabic in the sense of a ‘claim right’. This is supported by the literal, legal and juridical 
meaning of the term ‘rights’ which always stressed responsibilities rather than entitlements 
(Zafrullah Khan, 1967: 13-14). Zafrullah Khan suggested, as an example, a marriage 
contract; Islam regards marriage as a civil contract, imposing mutual duty and obligation 
on both parties, rather than stressing claims to rights or power (Zafrullah Khan, 1967: 39). 
This is specifically important for my analysis of the rights and responsibilities of a Muslim 
wife and husband during marriage and at its dissolution in Chapter Six. I will argue that the 
husband’s ‘superiority’ in marriage and family relations is not because he has or can claim 
more rights than his wife, but because he has more duties and responsibilities to perform. 
 
Here, it is noteworthy to show that, for a long time in Western jurisprudence, there was 
also a correlative relationship between ‘rights’ and ‘duties’. Similarly to the Quran, 
Clapham (2007: 5) argued, the Bible can also be read as proclaiming not only rights but 
also duties. Renteln (1990: 138) always correlated rights with duties and Austin (1995: 
231) considered that duties ground the rights. Orend (2002: 21) stated that the rights holder 
and duties bearer come together even though ‘rights’ position the rights holder, as a more 
dominant party than the duties bearer, as they may ordinarily exercise their rights as they 
see fit. Donnelly (2007: 22) stressed the relationship between rights and duties more 
critically when he conceded that rights involve a special set of social institutions, rules or 
practices due to their enforceability which stands at the very foundation of political 
morality in this era. Without those systems that support the application of human rights 




Even though Hohfeld’s analysis has been used to refute the logical correlativity doctrine of 
rights and duties (Lyons, 1970), I argue that the correlation can always be found if the 
division between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ duties is understood. As Hohfeld (1946) stressed in 
his book ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning’, a right is a 
fair claim that remains justified even when the rights holder is not actually making a verbal 
claim. This abstractly demonstrates Hohfeld’s emphasis that duties, whether active or 
passive, were correlated with rights. Because rights represent autonomy whereas duties are 
responsibility, the concept of duties might serve to balance the notion of rights.    
 
Hence, in describing various classes of claims and responsibilities, I argue that the 
combination of Hohfeld, Hart, MacCormick and Dworkin’s analyses as demonstrated by 
Lacey (2004) provides a framework similar to that of Islamic scholars in which to place 
various human rights, ranging from economic, social and cultural rights to civil and 
political rights as well as the more controversial third generation or group rights. It is 
obvious that, in both Western and Islamic jurisprudences, the term ‘rights’ has been 
analysed in depth, resulting in a certain degree of refinement. In Malaysia, where legal 
sources have originated from the West as well as from the Quran and the Prophetic 
tradition
41
, Muslim jurists too have felt the need for a conceptual articulation of ‘haqq’ and 
have therefore tried to devise a comprehensive definition of ‘haqq’ in Islam.    
         
I note that rights may not be a biased concept for international acceptance of the human 
rights idea. The international and Islamic-based human rights jurisprudences, as such, have 
embodied similar meanings of rights and duties to protect and promote values and ideals 
that reaffirm the basic rights of human beings. Next, I explore feminists’ critiques of rights 
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in the international jurisdiction. I examine how the principle of rights may be reconstructed 
for the purpose of upholding gender equality.  
 
2.4 FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF THE THEORY OF RIGHTS IN THE 
JURISDICTION 
 
2.4.1 Rights as Product: Gendered or Neutral? 
In this section, I consider whether ‘rights’, as a legal subject, is gendered. I argue that the 
term ‘rights’, which denotes a claim, power, liberty, immunity, choice and interest as 
explained earlier, does not discriminate against anyone, or specifically, for the purpose of 
this thesis, women. However, any discrimination of whether it is impartial or biased, or 
kind or cruel, will depend on the application of the term as a product of laws. For Smart 
(1989), rights languages, if properly defined and employed, would empower women, as 
rights could be claimed by everyone irrespective of gender; they could also be extended to 
claim gender equality and they could construct laws as the centre of political campaigns. A 
proper definition of ‘rights’ is particularly important for my later analysis of how rights 
might inform equality. One of the most important aspects of ‘rights’ talk’ to explore is 
feminists’ perceptions of rights, such as those of Charlesworth (1994) on male-biased 
rights, of Kingdom (1991) on correlative rights and duties, and of Kiss (1997) who 
proposed to construct an affluent understanding of rights to ensure that people understand 
rights and that they work for gender justice. Generally, rights have been criticised by 
cultural feminists as too abstract and impersonal, reflecting and endorsing a selfish and 
atomistic vision of human nature and an excessively conflictual view of social life (Fox-




Contemporary feminists have felt that rights may not be the best ‘instrument’ to protect 
women from discrimination. According to Kiss (1997: 1-2), international women’s 
movements have even reached a consensus that human rights are subordinating women. 
Even though the social and legal benefits women derive from rights cannot be totally 
denied, a few feminists have argued that rights do not have a positive image at all (Fox-
Genovese, 1991; Rifkin, 1993) and may even be detrimental (Smart, 1989: 139). I trace 
that feminists from legal backgrounds have argued that rights obscure male dominance, 
while other theorists have alleged that the rights approach reinforces a patriarchal status 
quo and abandons women’s rights. Charlesworth, (1994: 65) for instance, has alleged that 
many feminists have claimed that laws are part of male domination and patriarchal 
institutions. Here, I explore the criticism that rights are a sexist or gendered product within 
the compass of laws and language.    
 
Two phases of reflection of feminist theory to identify the development of the idea of how 
laws on rights are gendered can be understood from Smart’s statements ‘law is sexist’, and 
‘law is male’ (Smart, 1992). To support her position, Smart (1995: 187) argued that laws 
are sexist because they disadvantage women or treat men better than women. Smart has 
explained that women being disadvantaged in marriage and divorce by allocating to them 
fewer material sources and as ‘sexually promiscuous’ by judging them by inappropriate 
standards. As legal subjects, women being disadvantaged by denying their equal 
opportunities, or by failing to recognise the harm done to them because the harm 
advantaged men (Smart, 1995: 187-188). According to Smart (1995: 189), law is male 
because majority lawmakers and lawyers are male, thus, Smart referred to MacKinnon’s 
idea that ‘ideals of objectivity and neutrality which are celebrated in law are actually 




Therefore, when applying to laws on rights, such as human rights laws, ‘rights’ do indeed 
disadvantage women. This is particularly important for my analysis in Chapter Five, which 
explains how the former Malaysian laws disadvantaged women. Finlay (1989) has 
examined how laws are characterised by maleness from their claim to be authoritative, 
objective and rational
42
. She stressed that, even though law presents itself as gender-
neutral, analysis reveals that law is far from that. Interestingly, what is regarded as 
objective in society reflects a set of assumptions that are valued above competing 
considerations and are considered by many feminists to be ‘masculine’ (MacKinnon, 
1987) and reproducing bias in favour of men (Lacey, 1995). Thus, it is perhaps easy to say 
that this analysis suggests that objective criteria applied in laws are masculine and 
feminists consider the rejection of these criteria essential for a legal system to work.    
 
Dawson (1993) highlighted that the objective masculine criteria of laws derive from the 
fact that they interact differently with women than with men. However, Smart (1989) was 
involved in a rather different engagement slanted at the level of theorising the 
‘malevolence’ of both legal method and the institutions of laws. Although feminists reject 
the notion that ‘objective’ rules are important in the legal system (Scales, 1993: 53-54), I 
would concede that legality has certain qualities of fairness in the system but they do not 
necessarily depend on objectivity. Rather, Scales’s (1993) suggestion to discard the habit 
of equating most noble aspirations with objectivity and neutrality is a rather important way 
of departing from ‘male-mirror neutral law’; however, as I mentioned above, the quality 
of the legal system is not compromised. Smart (1992: 31) rightly discovered that laws ‘can 
be put right such that all legal subjects are treated equally’. 
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I trace that the subordination of women in the eyes of the law has proved that laws may be 
gendered and can be used to deny women their rights. Daly (1991), for instance, has 
examined the laws of female foot-binding, suttee and circumcision to provide evidence 
revealing the extent to which women’s rights to choose have been denied and they have 
traditionally been controlled by men using laws. Meanwhile Barnett (1997), in her analysis 
of the relationship between feminist theories on rights and laws, asserted that the maleness 
of every field of laws and legal practices are established when the laws are themselves 
gendered and that they reflect the sexual characteristics of men, who have created them, 
regardless of whether they are developed through the courts under common laws or 
enacted in legislative provisions.   
 
Feminists who have sought to prove that laws are sexist and gendered also rest their 
analysis on the question of ‘legal personhood’ or ‘sui juris’. Dawson (1993: 47), while 
discussing legal personhood based on the case of The Queen v. Crosthwaite
43
, has stressed 
that ‘women’ were not included within the meaning of ‘persons’ entitled to hold public 
office under the Towns Improvement (Ireland) Act 1854. In addition, Donovan and 
Wildman (1980), who analysed the idea of the ‘reasonable man’ in the criminal laws 
context of self-defence of provocation, discovered that the standard of the ‘reasonable 
man’ applies only to white middle-class male techniques for self-defence and reactions to 
provocation. According to Donovan and Wildman, the standard fails to account, for 
example, for any behaviour that may be described as culturally female.  
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Similarly, Bender (1992), while reviewing the standard of care required in tort laws for the 
‘reasonable person’, found that this is another example of male naming and acceptance of 
the implicit male norm. Since the laws have been crafted ‘patriarchally’, the way they 
frame issues and define problems and the speech they credit, according to Busby (1993) 
and Chen (1997), clearly excludes women. Thus, women were not considered ‘legal 
persons’ in legislation and were not recognised as having rights as subjects in law. Who 
the laws recognise as being capable of having rights and duties is defined by the concept of 
the legal person or legal subject (Cotterrell, 1992: 123-124). Therefore, from this point of 
view, women were not recognised as having rights and obligations as subjects in laws. In 
my exploration of the application of gender equality laws in Malaysia in Chapter Four, I 
examine whether women in Malaysia are ‘sui juris’ and I will analyse in Chapters Five and 
Six, the ways in which Malaysian women’s rights laws were gendered (prior to 
amendments of the laws) and are currently gendered.  
 
In the sphere of international laws, Stamatopoulou (1995: 36) has stressed that, for 
feminists, the UN has failed to declare all women’s human rights concerns to be part of 
international human rights laws and has failed to integrate women’s human rights into the 
mainstream human rights agenda. Women’s rights issues have been considered 
insignificant in international laws’ responsibility for human rights due to the failure of 
covenant makers to recognise the normative male model of traditional human rights 
formulation (Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wrights, 1991: 613). Because of this failure to 
include women’s lives, feminist analysis has proceeded to explore the tacit commitments 
of obviously so-called ‘neutral’ principles of international laws and how male perspectives 
are established in them (Charlesworth, 1993: 1). Charlesworth demonstrated the way states 
institutionalise the patriarchal family both as the qualification for citizenship and public 
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life and also as the basic socio-economic unit. Based on her analysis, men have dominated 
in the public sphere of citizenship and political and economic life because the formation of 
the state depended on a sexual division of labour and the relegation of women to the 
domestic sphere. As a result, the functions of the state were identified with men.  
 
If the state is patriarchal, the international and national laws codified for human rights 
protection may also be patriarchal. The major sources of international laws, as set out in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, conventions and customs are 
the product of state action (Charlesworth, 1993). I will not deny Cook’s (1993: 93) 
contention that women’s exposure to disadvantages originated in acts of private persons 
and institutions but this social construction of discrimination could be removed by human 
rights laws as instruments of societal change. However, if the law itself is also 
disadvantaging women, expressly or implicitly, this is the most crucial aspect that 
women’s movements need to address. In Chapter Five, I will analyse the ways in which a 
number of legal provisions in Malaysian statutes and policies, administrative decisions and 
programmes disadvantage women by the patriarchal nature of laws. I will analyse in 
Chapter Six whether the reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) has been due to 
the different interactions of Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights with women and 
men which bring about women’s disadvantage.  
 
From the compass of language, Poovey (1992) has argued that feminist post-structuralists 
have accused rights language of being bound up with ‘socio linguistic hierarchies of 
gender’ and with the ‘outdated patriarchal fiction of a unitary self’. According to Kiss 
(1997: 2), feminists have contended that the rights language cannot adequately express 
women’s experience, be it from moral or political parts of life. This might be due to the 
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exclusion of women’s experience and recognition in the rights debate. Consider, for 
instance, the application of rights for gender equality; even though not generally 
approached as a problem of language, there is a connection between language (Jong, 1993: 
74-75), male domination, gender and the suppression of women (Busby, 1993: 76-77). 
According to Busby, in the early development of the English language, the pronoun ‘he’ 
referred to both female and male because there was no separate pronoun for female and 
‘he’ did not signify either the female or the male gender. When the word ‘she’ was 
introduced, it referred only to female, but the pronoun ‘he’ continued to refer to both 
female and male. Later, the ambiguity of ‘he’ was resolved by formulating two principles 
of grammar: firstly, a pronoun must be in the same gender as the noun to which it refers; 
and, secondly, when a referent is either of indeterminate sex or of both sexes, it shall be 
considered masculine (Busby, 1993: 77). Busby has shown that it is more natural to place 
the male before the female, as man may be first in the natural order or more important. 
This ‘unintended language priority’ given to males in the language of rights and statutes, 
denotes that the term ‘rights’ used in the legal sphere is gendered. 
 
Therefore, a commitment to gender corrective language
44
 in all UN works would be a way 
of reducing the overtly masculine culture of international law-making (Charlesworth, 
1995: 110) if women’s rights laws are to be transformed into a single, universal, legal 
instrument shared with men. This means that ‘man’ must not be taken to represent ‘human’ 
(Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000: 17). As pointed out by Hevener (1987), this will avoid 
the victimization of men, allow a women-centred solution without referring to male actions 
and standards, and prescribe an active public policy to achieve fairness. This is particularly 
important for my analysis in Chapter Three of whether the language of rights and equality 
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under the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI is patriarchal and whether different interactions of 
the legal provisions with women and men under the three Declarations bring about 
women’s disadvantage. Throughout my analysis, I will consider whether Malaysian laws 
on Muslim women’s rights disadvantage women by the legal languages, which are 
patriarchal.  
 
2.4.2 Subject, Object and Coverage: Towards Gender Equality 
In this Section, I examine whether the feminist and Islamic human rights discourses share 
similar principles justifying human rights. Even though feminists have criticised liberal 
rights, their idea is to invite women’s rights debaters to rethink rights, not to reject them, so 
that rights will not marginalise women’s choices and interests. This is due to a few feminist 
writings on rights debates, as I analysed earlier, which seem to criticise the role that rights 
play rather than the term ‘rights’ itself. I note that limiting the nature, character and 
potential of rights in ensuring justice for each and every different human being could be 
the basis of criticisms of rights. In fact, I trace that there are pieces of evidence which 
denote that struggles for the right ‘rights’ have helped women to achieve significant gains 
over the past centuries. For instance, from Mary Wollstonecraft to the drafters of the 
Women’s Convention, feminists have made demands for rights to ensure gender equality 
and justice (Kiss, 1997: 1).    
 
Therefore, for the purpose of my thesis, I argue that it is important to understand rights as a 
positive instrument, provided that the term ‘rights’ is refined to a non-gendered product of 
laws which consider collective interest. Even though rights have been criticised by 
feminists in terms of the meaning, nature and use of rights, here I focus my analysis on the 
feminists’ critique of rights from three perspectives; subject of rights, object of rights and 
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rights’ coverage. In this analysis, I consider the subject of rights as individual and 
collective and the object of rights as choice and interest which interrelated with the 
absolute and non-absolute power of rights. I argue that the feminist and Islamic human 
rights discourses on subject and object of rights and rights’ coverage share similar 
principles justifying human rights. During this discussion, some points may overlap due to 
the correlative nature of the subject and object of human rights that I have analysed. 
 
2.4.2.1 Image of Rights’ Subject: Choosing Agent or the Value of Interest?  
The subject of human rights, according to Lacey (2004: 34), depended on whether rights 
operated in terms of an image of freely choosing an agent capable of asserting claims or an 
image of accommodated groups in which their interests or the benefits to them are valued. 
In simple terms, the subject of human rights is either an individual or a community (Jones, 
1994). It was during the 19th century, after collective political rights were enlarged, that a 
genuine concern for the rights of the individual developed internationally (Luard, 1967: 9-
10).    
 
In the feminist debate on the critique of rights, Lacey (2004: 38) explained that 
‘individualism’ is the key criticism. According to Lacey, the danger of individualism 
occurs when the subject of human rights is only the individual and not the community; thus 
the object of rights could be conceived of as individual property and collective interest or 
goods would therefore be disregarded. As feminists have argued, ‘individual’ might be 
limited to man or to a certain class of people. For instance, within the familial relationship, 
individualism might conceal men’s superiority over women. To reconstruct rights from this 
perspective and to ensure that rights do not favour just one person or class, I therefore 
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agree with Lacey (2004: 48-50) that both the individual and the collective interest should 
be considered the objects of rights.    
  
Arkoun (1994) was of the view that Islamic thought always included a discourse on the 
rights of God (public or collective rights) and the rights of man (individual rights), with the 
former having priority over the latter. According to Arkoun, postclassical jurists defined 
the rights of God as those that are for the collective interest and the rights of man as those 
of the individual interest. According to the Islamic faith, the respect for human rights is an 
aspect of, and a basic condition for, respecting the rights of God, as Islam does not separate 
any aspect of life from religion (Arkoun, 1995; Weeramantry, 2007). As the division 
between rights of God and rights of man clearly indicates, the jurists have used ‘haqq’ or 
rights for tangible and intangible property as well as benefits and interests owned by a 
particular person whereas it is only used to imply conceptual interests if the Lawgiver has 
validated them (Moosa, 2004: 5).   
 
By looking at the relationship between the individual and the state, even though Islam 
considers collective rights, Schacht (1959: 139-140) argued that human rights in Islam are 
also individualistic in their entire structure, which I note is similar to the Western practice 
of human rights. To be individualistic is not simply to resist relationships of domination 
but also shows a ‘capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and 
enable’ (Mahmood, 2005: 18). Ali (2000: 33) has explained that Schacht challenged the 
view of many scholars of Shariah, who contended that there is strong element of anti-
individualism in Islam, by claiming that the scholars had failed to look at the individual 




, contract and private property, which 
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are well in line with the trend of contemporary Western legal thought. Moreover, the 
Former Minister of Religious Affairs of Islamabad, Dr. Ghazi, has also pointed out that 
Shariah is a complete system based on fundamental instructions which covered all aspects 
and details of individual and collective interests of the people
47
.    
 
Hence, the contents of international and Islamic human rights have focused on individual 
and collective rights, the relationship between the individual and the state, and the highest 
level of organisation in a society with the ability to control the lives of the members of that 
society. In the atmosphere of human rights, I argue in this thesis that collective rights 
balance the rights of all individuals as human beings, that no person (or man) will be 
prioritised over the another person (or woman) and that no persons will be given rights as 
human beings that are denied to others. Tabandeh’s argument that non-believers ‘are 
reckoned as outside the pale of humanity’ (Tabandeh, 1970: 17) might be due to his 
different understanding about the fact that a common standard of rights can be established 
for all people. In Islam, human rights are rights which all human beings should have 
(Hassan, 1982: 54), which make them human. Thus, a common standard of rights, which is 
entrenched in the humanness, belonged to every human being irrespective of religion. 
 
I will analyse in Chapters Four, Five and Six whether Malaysian human rights laws 
underpinning the Federal Constitution and other statutes consider the collective interest. As 
Krishnadas (2007: 155) contended, ‘a collective identity which is based on basic needs and 
rights reflects a collective agenda for men and women against oppression and 
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exploitation’. Therefore, I argue that, to build the concept of equality among human 
beings, collective rights must be considered the subject of legal rights.   
 
2.4.2.2 Can ‘Choice’ be an Instrument to Discriminate against Others? 
Here, I find that there are strong relationships between individualism and collective rights 
(subject of human rights) and choice and interest (object of human rights). Choice or 
autonomy or ‘self-rule’ is a similar concept to ‘agency’, a capacity to realize one’s own 
interest without being weakened by other obstacles (Mahmood, 2005: 5-17). However, 
choice is not unconditional. The term that I shall be using to define unconditional choice 
and independence is ‘absolute choice’. This is a definite independence that prevents one 
from being influenced by others and allows one to refuse to be under obligation. I note that 
unrestricted rights cannot be possessed because social conditions need to be considered. As 
stressed from the feminist point of view by Kingdom (1991: 56-57), there is ‘nowhere in 
the real world that absolute rights can be enjoyed’.  
  
On one side, I argue that, as rights holders, human beings are indeed autonomous and their 
individuality must be protected from infringement by others, by the family or by the state. 
Without autonomous capacity, the rights of human beings cannot even be addressed. As 
stressed by Mookherjee (2011: 62), even though feminists are suspicious of the idea of 
autonomy because of its male and individualistic value, ‘it is plausible to retain a focus on 
autonomy in a feminist and multicultural theory of rights’. Thus, non-absolute autonomy 
which considers individual as well as collective interest, as discussed earlier, might inform 
how the value of autonomy could be reconstructed for gender equality. Mookherjee argued 
that, for the ‘well-being of all human beings’, there are forms of self-determination that 
seem essential. Both individuals and family units must be given independence rights to 
67 
 
provide for the needs of their members. Yet, justice is not only for an individual or a 
family, but also for the interests of the community and social institutions as a whole.  
 
Because the aim of equality, as stated by Fredman (2003: 43), is ‘to give all people, 
regardless of their sex, race or age an equal set of alternatives from which to choose and 
thereby to pursue their own version of a good life’, everyone must have equal autonomous 
rights according to their own interpretation of happiness and a good life. Therefore, in my 
analysis of human rights underpinning the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI in this Chapter and 
Malaysian laws on human rights in Chapters Four, Five and Six, I maintain that, even 
though individual autonomy is recognised and can be legally entertained, it must not be 
unconditional, as it has to consider the arrangement of the state and its regulation of 
relationships with other societal institutions for the public good. In fact, individual choice 
is only possible when one is able to share the benefits and burdens with society at large.  
 
Certainly, absolute individual choice could jeopardise equality. In other words, one cannot 
be independent if it means disadvantaging others. The very existence of an organised 
society is itself a benefit to the individuals living within that society (Sheriff, 2007: 9). 
Once the value of individual choice is recognised, a reason not to deny other people’s 
interests will also be recognised (Griffin, 2008: 134). As Safi (1998: 5), in his research on 
‘Human Rights and Islamic Legal Reform’ pointed out, the individual is recognised in 
Western society as a member of a ‘homogeneous’ community which denotes that 
individual rights depend on the non-violation of others’ rights.  
 
Fineman (2004), in talking about gender in general, has stressed that non-autonomy (non-
absolute choice) or dependency is congruent with equality as it is one of the societal 
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circumstances under which gender justice can be achieved. Fineman did not mention 
absolute autonomy in her analysis of the myth of autonomy; she referred to autonomy as 
unconditional independence, which is why she asserted that only ‘dependency’ is 
compatible with equality without taking into consideration a conditional autonomy. 
However, Fineman’s proposal that ‘the goal of autonomy must be supported through an 
understanding of collective responsibilities for basic needs’ (Fineman, 2004: 30) means 
that Fineman has to agree that autonomy (but not absolute autonomy) is also comparable 
with equality.     
 
Having said that individuals are entitled to what might be called moral autonomy, I agree 
with Hoffman and Rowe (2003: 10-12) that individuals can rarely achieve such goals by 
themselves; they need to have some form of government because cooperation between 
individuals is often required. For instance, Malaysia’s laws, as those of a state, have the 
ultimate say on what citizens are or are not allowed to do based on individual autonomy, 
yet they consider the public good. This is because autonomy, if suitably conceived, can be 
a tool for equality, as correctly stated by Mookherjee (2011: 73): a commitment to 
autonomy ‘plays a special role in protecting the interests of potentially vulnerable 
individuals’. Bearing in mind that, in Islamic human rights jurisprudence and feminist 
discourse, rights can be extracted from individual choice as well as public interests, it is 
also important to address the feminist critique of rights’ coverage.   
 
2.4.2.3 Rights’ Coverage: Only Public Sphere? 
Apart from viewing it as a biased legal product, feminists criticise the application of the 
term ‘rights’ from the perspective of its coverage. Even though I categorise the coverage 
into three types; public and private sphere, individual choice and community interest, and 
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formal and substantive equality, my analysis in this Section only covers the first category 
since I have already discussed the individual choice and community interest earlier
48
 and 




I trace that, while examining the effect of laws on the lived experience of women, feminist 
legal scholars have found that laws have restricted women’s rights and freedom by limiting 
their participation in the public sphere. Rights talk in terms of the legal aspect, for instance, 
wrote Rifkin, (1993: 416-417) relegated women to the ‘private world of the home and 
family’. It has been said that women’s freedom and equality are persistently compromised 
by customs and laws, something which does not happen to men (Peters and Wolper, 1995: 
2). This is due to women’s huge involvement in the domestic sphere, which is highly 
regulated by customs and laws; men are not subject to the same degree of regulation.  
 
The meanings of the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ depend on the purpose for which they are 
employed in this thesis, the private sphere is associated with managing household 
activities, acting as a wife, reproduction and the raising of children. In all societies, these 
activities have been treated as inferior and to be managed by women (General 
Recommendations No. 21, 13th Session, 1994: Comment para 11). In contrast, a broad 
range of activities outside the domestic sphere or public life is dominated by men, who 
historically have exercised the power to confine and subordinate women within the private 
sphere (General Recommendations No. 23, 16th Session, 1997: Comment para 8). Hence, 
men’s failure to share private tasks with women is among the most significant factors 
inhibiting women’s ability to participate in public life. In my analysis in Chapter Four, 
Five and Six, I analyse whether Malaysian laws and policies limit the ‘world’ of Muslim 
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women in Malaysia to the private sphere. I argue that, even though the majority of women 
are still responsible for the domestic tasks, they are not entirely excluded from the public 
sphere due to special measures and affirmative actions secured by laws and policies to 
empower women in the public sphere.   
 
Historically, Western-educated propertied men who first advanced the cause of human 
rights most feared the violation of their civil and political rights in the public sphere, which 
is the reason why this area of violation has been privileged in human rights work, much 
more so than in the private sphere (Bunch, 1995: 13). Human rights work has traditionally 
been concerned with ‘state-sanctioned or condoned oppression’ which has taken place in 
the ‘public sphere’, or civil and political rights, away from the privacy to which most 
women are relegated, which is in economic and social rights (Peters and Wolper, 1995: 2). 
Although international human rights laws have challenged the discipline’s traditional 
public and private dichotomy between states and individuals and are regarded as a radical 
development in international laws, Charlesworth and Chinkin (1993) have argued that they 
have in fact retained the profound gendered, public and private distinction. International 
laws seem to use the public-private divide as a convenient screen to avoid addressing 
women’s issues (Engle, 1993: 143).    
 
Other than that, feminists have argued persuasively that the ‘public/private distinction is a 
false one and that the real question is not whether laws should apply to the private as well 
as the public, but rather, what types of private acts are and are not protected’ (Gunning, 
1991-92: 238). Even though Gunning’s idea may be correct, to determine the area in 
private life that has yet to be protected without proposing that all private spheres be 
regulated is complicated in terms of upholding justice for women. It seems to recognise 
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that laws do not have to intrude on certain areas in private life. This, too, may be correct. 
Again, however, we might ask which private life does not need to be protected? And who 
will decide that?  
 
I argue that women’s disadvantages will be endlessly neglected in those unregulated areas 
by reason of ‘private life’. For instance, women might be disadvantaged due to the denial 
of collective interest in the familial relationship. In this research, I will argue that collective 
interest could balance every person’s choice, women and men to uphold gender equality. 
Polygamous marriages among Muslims, which will be examined in Chapter Six, are 
permitted under certain conditions, among which is the stipulation, that the existing wife 
and husband are guaranteed equal happiness and justice and that the possible disadvantages 
of the existing wife (or wives) will not be neglected. Also, as the lives of Muslims are 
governed by laws, be they public or private, these laws cover not only the application for 
polygamous marriage, but also the rights and duties of wives and husbands. Therefore, to 
determine whether the husband is following the rules or not, there must be, in the first 
instance, rules that regulate the husband’s rights and duties, which could be considered the 
rules that regulate private life. Indeed, abolishing the distinction between public and 
private will not help if the public world of rules and rights comes to dominate everything 
(Campbell, 2006: 76). Women’s rights strategy at this point should be to demand that laws 
intervene in the private realm and to propose greater public regulation of the private sphere 
of home and family. 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the experience of those who will be affected by rights must be 
taken into account. Krishnadas (2007), in her analysis of the roles of rights in governing 
and shaping women’s relationship with the reconstruction process, has argued that 
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women’s rights to determine their lives’ patterns are dependent upon the process of 
recognition. In fact, Krishnadas (2007: 139) has argued that ‘the act of recognising local 
women’s identities was dependent upon the different cultural, material and spatial 
frameworks in which women were recognised’, which broadens the understanding of the 
rights and recognition relationship. For instance, the prohibited working hours applied to 
women in industrial and agricultural undertakings between the hours of ten in the evening 
and five in the morning might ignore women’s disadvantages, even though this 
‘patriarchal rule’ is intended to protect women’s rights to safety. It is due to the need to 
work and earn salaries, as given to male workers. One can see that working in an industrial 
and or agricultural undertaking at night might not be suitable for women but, at the same 
time, their right to work cannot be denied. Here, an alternative must be offered to women 
who are supposed to work in industrial and agricultural undertakings during those hours; 
they could be moved to another area which is more suitable for them. In regard to the 
aforementioned points, if the experiences of female workers and women’s autonomy are 
not taken into account, I would argue that a ‘male’s presumption’ that women’s rights to 
safety are more important than their rights to work could be called amiss and wrong. For 
women, both rights are equally important and must be guaranteed by laws. Indeed, 
recognition is accorded not only by the local community which governs social structure but 
also by the laws, policies, administrative decisions and programmes. I will consider in my 
thesis how the laws, policies, administrative decisions and programmes have recognised 
Muslim women in Malaysia as rights bearers. 
 
Knowing that the rights of human beings in these diverse traditions are correlated with 
duties and that the equal priority of collective and individual (or class) interests and 
autonomy could avoid dominant choice of rule or laws, the issue that needs to be 
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considered next is how rights inform the international and Islamic declaration of human 
rights, underpinned by the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI. The questions of whether rights in 
these Declarations convey the most critical element of rights, which are equal dignity and 
justice, and whether rights are correlated with duties and not absolute autonomy will also 
be answered. I argue that the values of equal dignity and justice remain the most important 
agenda in achieving gender-neutrality. Here, I trace that the added values which harmonise 
the UDHR with the UIDHR and CDHRI are the application of rights in these Declarations 
on issues of equal dignity and justice, the correlative relationship between rights and 
duties, and the non-absolutism of rights. This is important for my analysis of human rights 
in the Malaysian local legal context in Chapter Four, as the sources of the Malaysian 
human rights laws are common laws and the Islamic texts (Quran and the Prophetic 
tradition). 
 
2.5 COMPLEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF RIGHTS UNDER THE UDHR, 
UIDHR AND CDHRI
50
     
 
2.5.1 Elementary Value of Rights: Equal Dignity and Justice 
In this Section, I consider whether rights in the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI convey the 
most critical elements of rights, which are equal dignity and justice. I argue that the entire 
concept and content of the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI is to ensure justice and fairness for 
all human beings, which could be the keys that locate their justification of commonality. I 
agree with Sachedina (2009: 119), who offered the view that justice could be the major 
analytical tool leading to the recognition of universal morality from scriptural resources in 
                                                 
50
 Part of this Section is published in the American International Journal of Contemporary Research. See Nik 
Saleh, Nik Salida Suhaila. 2012. ‘A Conceptual Analysis of Rights in the International and Islamic Human 




Islam and its commanding influence over the deconstruction of discriminatory religious 
discourse. A perusal of the Quran on justice leaves no doubt that justice is integral to the 
basic outlook and philosophy of Islam, within or beyond the Shariah, and that there is no 
justice without gender equality (Musawah, 2011: 21). 
 
I trace that the most elementary ideals and values of human rights expressed in the 
Preamble and the First Article of the UDHR are equal dignity and justice. The Preamble 
affirms that ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world’. Its principle of equal dignity for justice for all human beings is further explicated in 
Article 1 which expresses that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another 
in a spirit of brotherhood’. According to Smith (2003: 32 and 42), equality was the goal of 
the UN and a prohibition of discrimination is at the foundation of the UN’s human rights 
policy. 
 
The same is also stressed in the Islamic theory of human rights. As explained by Noor 
(2007: 130), Muslims generally understand that justice is a fundamental part of Islamic 
teachings. The UIDHR protects every person’s equal dignity as stated in Preamble G (xiv) 
(b)
51
, and the CDHRI states the same rights in Article 1 (a)
52
 and Article 6 (a)
53
. I believe 
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that the most transparent idea of equal dignity may be the one offered by Howard (1991: 
81), that it is something granted at birth and is the ‘particular cultural understandings of 
the inner moral worth of the human person and his or her proper political relations with 
society’. Finding equal dignity as the inherent quality of the sacredness of human beings, 
Shestack (2000: 53) claimed that some religious philosophers believed that an entire rights 
system can flow from this concept. Many in the human rights field cite a concept of human 
dignity as the ultimate justification for human rights (Finnis, 1980; Vlastos, 1984: 41-76). 
For Muslims, the idea that all human beings are ‘unconditionally equal’ in dignity through 
God’s act of creation is stated in the Quran and is sufficient to confirm that all human 
beings are entitled to certain rights as part of their inviolable personhood (Sachedina, 2009: 
115). 
 
Kofi A. Annan, the Former UN Secretary General pointed out that human rights ‘asserts 
the dignity of each and every individual human being, and the inviolability of the 
individual’s rights’ (Kamali, 2006: 7). This characterisation of human dignity is in total 
harmony with the clear text of the Quran, and could also be said to manifest the basic 
Islamic outlook on the subject (Kamali, 2003). For Muslims, Quranic commentators have 
drawn the conclusion that physical and spiritual dimensions of dignity are natural rights of 
every human being regardless of race, colour and religion as they are endowed with dignity 
at the moment of birth (Kamali, 2002: 1). In numerous verses, the Quran speaks of dignity 
for humankind without distinction as to gender (Yaacob, 1986: 7; An-Naim, 1990b). 
Hence, because of their commitment to human dignity, it is only natural to say that the 
UIDHR and CDHRI are committed to the realisation of human rights, similar to the 
UDHR.  
                                                                                                                                                    
53
 Article 6 (a) of the CDHRI stated that ‘Woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has rights to enjoy as 
well as duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the right to retain her 




2.5.2 Rights vs. Rights and Duties 
As I argued earlier, Islamic and Western jurisprudences not only assigns extensive 
meanings and usages of the term ‘rights’, which is, the word ‘haqq’ in Arabic, but also 
imply that the term ‘duties’ is correlated with ‘rights’. In this Section, I consider whether 
rights in the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI are correlated with duties. I trace that the 
UIDHR lays emphasis on the same priority of rights and duties and states that every person 
shall perform obligations proportionate to his capacity (Preamble). In its Explanatory 
Notes 2, it is stated that ‘each one of the human rights enunciated in this Declaration 
carries a corresponding duty’. Further, in Article IV (c), this Declaration points up the 
rights and duties of every person to defend others’ rights including community rights. 
Also, Muslims are guaranteed rights and duties to refuse to obey any command which is 
contrary to the laws (Article IV (e)) and to protest against oppression (Article XII (c)). The 
obligation to fulfil duties is mentioned again in Article XIX (c), which requires a husband 
to maintain his wife and children. Moreover, if parents are unable to perform their duties to 
their children, the community is responsible for fulfilling them at public expense (Article 
XIX (e)). Here, duties are a responsibility not only of the individual but also of a 
community. Motherhood, as such, is entitled to special respect and care by the family and 
public organs of the community (Article XIX (g)). The most interesting correlation of 
rights and duties can be seen from within the familial relationship, in which women and 
men have shared obligations according to their sex (Article XIX (h)).   
 
Similarly to the UIDHR, I trace that the CDHRI also expressly guarantees rights 
corresponding with duties. In the CDHRI, Article 8 secures rights to enjoy legal capacity, 
but it must be in terms of both ‘obligation and commitment’. I find that the relationship 
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between rights and duties can be seen in Article 2 (a), (c) and (d), that every human being 
is given rights to life and duties to preserve human life. A state’s duties also include 
exchanging prisoners of war and arranging visits for families separated by circumstances 
of war (Article 3 (a)). Other than entitlement to the protection of good name and honour, 
every human being’s burial place is also to be protected, as this is a duty conferred upon 
the state and society (Article 4). It is also the duty of the state and society to remove all 
obstacles to marriage and ensure family protection and welfare (Article 5 (b)). While men 
are responsible for supporting their families (Article 6 (b)), women also have duties to 
perform (Article 6 (a)). Article 6 (a) stated that ‘woman is equal to man in human dignity 
and has rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and 
financial independence and the right to retain her name and lineage’. The language of 
duties is further stressed in Article 7 (a), which imposed on parents, society and the state 
the responsibility for maintaining the child’s rights. Society and the state also have duties 
to provide education (Article 9 (a)), support the struggles of colonized peoples (Article 11 
(b)), provide a clean environment that will foster everyone’s self-development (Article 17 
(a)), and provide medical and social care. The state must ensure a decent living for every 
individual (Article 17 (c)) and protect everyone from arbitrary interference (Article 18 (b)). 
Even countries sheltering refugees must ensure every person’s protection until they reach 
safety (Article 12).   
 
I note that the UDHR speaks about rights in which freedom, justice and world peace are 
the basis of inalienable rights secured for every human being. In its Preamble, a common 
understanding of rights and freedom is stated as being of the greatest importance for 





 of rights with duties; there is only the entitlement to rights and freedom set 
out in Article 1 and Article 2. Only Article 29 (1) in its general form states that every 
person has duties to the community. However, I argue that the substance of the UDHR 
intended to deal both with human rights and duties. Morsink (1999: 239-241) has 
demonstrated how the delegates at the Third Committee proceedings in drafting the UDHR 
were in conflict regarding the issue of whether to include a list of duties in the bill or 
whether the reference to Article 29 was adequate. Among the delegates who proposed that 
duties be included were those from Cuba, Latin America, China and Egypt. Others, such as 
the delegates from France and Belgium, were not against the proposal, but did not agree 
that the ‘list of duties’ should be set out specifically as, for them, Article 29 was adequate. 
In the end, Morsink (1999: 240) explained, ‘the majority of the drafters were satisfied that 
Article 29 was a sufficiently comprehensive statement on the duties a person has to the 
various communities of which he or she is a part. There simply was not enough time at the 
end to expand upon Article 29. All that could be done in the Third Committee was to edit 
it’.  
 
I trace that the correlative relationship between rights and duties is evident in the UIDHR 
and CDHRI, yet the same is not obvious in the UDHR. However, this does not make these 
Declarations irreconcilable because, even though the relationship of rights and duties is not 
specifically mentioned in the UDHR, the generality of Article 29 is seen as a reference of 
rights and duties to the whole provisions. As I will argue in Chapter Six that equal outcome 
is the substance of rights to gender equality, wives and husbands in Islam could have 
different entitlements to rights and duties. In other words, similar entitlements to rights and 
responsibilities for wives and husbands in certain situations during marriage may result in 
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 Correlativity refers to a relationship where a right is vested in one party (right holder) and a duty is 
imposed on another (duty bearer). See Mohammad, Mohammad Tahir. 2003. Rights and Duties in Shariah 
and Common Law. Kuala Lumpur:  Ilmiah Publishers 
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inequality; therefore differences could secure equal dignity and justice. While wives 
perform their biological duties which cannot be performed by husbands, as persons in 
disadvantaged situations wives need a guarantee of a protected life such as rights to basic 
needs (clothing, food, shelter) to be provided by husbands.  
 
As I mentioned earlier, claiming rights only may unbalance community (or family) justice, 
and may cause injustice to the duty bearers; therefore, the rights holders must also perform 
their duties to ensure that other people’s rights are protected as well as theirs. That is why I 
argue in this research that, to ensure collective justice, rights must not be an individual 
absolute choice, because absolute rights are patriarchal in nature. Next, I explore whether 
rights in the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI are non-absolute, which would bring about 
justice for all human beings. The new understanding that autonomy is a positive instrument 
is important, provided that the term ‘autonomy’ is refined to a moral or non-absolute 
autonomy which upholds gender equality.  
 
2.5.3 Absolute vs. Non-Absolute Rights 
I trace that a number of provisions in the UIDHR and CDHRI impose restrictions on 
certain human rights; this is done purposely to protect the public interest. The Centre for 
Inquiry (CFI), in an article to the UN of September 2008, wrote that the CDHRI’s 
imposition of restrictions on nearly every human right was based on Shariah (CFI Defends 
Freedom of Expression at the UN Human Rights Council, 2008). This might not be 
questioned as the CDHRI provides human rights based on Islamic textual sources and 
limited to the Islamic principles. Apart from that, I contend, it is not intended to limit 
human rights, but, to ensure that rights and interests of the community are considered as 
well as individual choice. I argue that it may be incorrect to claim that there are elements 
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of anti-individualism in Islam due to the restrictive nature of Islamic human rights, as the 
provisions of the UIDHR and CDHRI explained earlier have shown that, as well as 
preserving the public good, Shariah also protects individual rights, similarly to the Western 
practice. Brems (2001: 249), for instance, admitted that the UIDHR is of an individual 
nature even though it still includes collective rights.     
 
This can be seen in the UIDHR and CDHRI’s provisions on rights to life (Article I (a) of 
the UIDHR and Article 2 (a) of the CDHRI), rights to own property (Article XVI of the 
UIDHR and Article 15 (b) of the CDHRI), freedom of thoughts and beliefs (Article XII (a) 
of the UIDHR and Article 22 (d) of the CDHRI)
 
and equal access to public services 
(Article XI (a) of the UIDHR and Article 23 (b) of the CDHRI). The UIDHR further 
extended non-absolute rights to protection against exile (Article XXIII (b)) whereas 
CDHRI extended them to freedom of movement (Article 12) and rights to freely 
participate in cultural life (Article 16). Indeed, to ensure justice for all, the collective 
interests need to be considered as well as individual interests. Thus, I employ the non-
absolute rights theory in my research to prove that this model is effective in upholding 
gender justice. 
 
The UDHR, even though it does not necessitate restrictions on any particular rights 
mentioned in its provision, only affirms limitation of everyone’s rights in general as 
determined by laws for the purpose of securing due recognition, respecting others’ rights 
and meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and general welfare of society. 
I trace that it shares a similar principle with the UIDHR and CDHRI that rights are not 
absolute. Article 29 (2) stated that ‘In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone 
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of 
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securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting 
the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society.’  
 
I trace that, like the application of the relationship between rights and duties as discussed 
earlier; the difference between the UDHR and the UIDHR and CDHRI pertains to the 
generality of the restrictive nature of rights in the UDHR, which is only expressly 
mentioned in Article 29. However, this does not mean that the UDHR does not grant 
limited rights to the individual. In the Third Drafting Session of the UDHR, I note that the 
issue that arose was not whether rights were absolute or not, but whether to put the 
restricted provision of human rights at the beginning or at the end of the Declaration. 
Morsink (1999: 245-246) has analysed that some delegates proposed to keep the restricted 
clause with the other two ‘basic announcements’, which were Article 1 about ‘all human 
beings being born free and equal’ and Article 2 which prohibits ‘discrimination of any 
kind’, and not in Article 29. Geoffrey Wilson, the British delegate, objected to the proposal 
to locate the provision dealing with the limitations on the exercise of rights at the end of 
the Declaration. According to Morsink, Mr. Wilson felt that the Declaration ‘should avoid 
giving the reader the impression that the individual was granted unlimited rights’, a view 
that was later supported by the USSR, Lebanese, Belgian and Egyptian delegates. 
However, from the above explanation, Article 29, which had invited various ideas and 
strategies for the application of human rights and duties and their non-absolutism, is one of 
the fundamental provisions in the UDHR. As rightly observed by the Beaufort of the 
Netherlands (Morsink, 1999: 249), an important idea that needs to be preserved is that ‘the 
debate on Article 29 had shown that the rights of the individual were not absolute. It was 
necessary to define the restrictions demanded by respect for the rights of other individuals 
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and of different social groups’. Thus, it is evident that restrictive rights are clearly 
employed in the Islamic-based and Western-based human rights instruments underpinned 
by the UIDHR, CDHRI and UDHR.     
 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
I have argued that ‘rights’ is not a foreign concept in the Islamic tradition. The Islamic-
based human rights jurisprudence has embodied a meaning of rights similar to that of 
international human rights to protect and promote values and ideals that reaffirm equal 
dignity and justice for human beings. The subject (individual and collective) and object 
(choice and interest) of rights in the international and Islamic human rights doctrines also 
share similar principles justifying human rights. The international and Islamic human 
rights doctrines focus on the correlative relationship between rights and duties and the non-
absolute autonomy of individual choice to enable the interests of the community to be 
considered; this balances the rights of every individual as human beings. I argued that the 
concept of rights might be reinterpreted to consider collective interest which stresses the 
correlative relationship between rights and duties and non-absolute rights.   
 
I argued that the convergence principles of the Western-based and Islamic-based human 
rights Declarations take these perspectives; both provide entitlements to human rights 
which correlate rights with duties, and the contents of international and Islamic-based 
human rights instruments are non-absolute autonomy-based, be they general or specific, 
focusing on the relationships between the individual and the state and between individuals. 




Through my analysis of the image of rights’ subject, I argued that the framework of non-
absolute individual entitlements constructs a value of interest and a wider coverage of 
rights, which limits the gendered nature of rights. This theoretical review developed a 
framework to analyse whether rights could inform equality. I traced that both international 
and Islamic jurisprudences and all three Declarations present rights as an instrument for 
equality among human beings. The tenets of justice and dignity, rights and duties and non-
absolutism of rights are the principles that accommodate similar values of the human rights 
concept underpinned by the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI. I argued that the concept of 
rights in Islam underpinning the UIDHR and CDHRI is capable of harmonisation with the 




















DIVERGING OR CONVERGING? THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF GENDER 







In this Chapter, I discuss the jurisdictional background and provide a conceptual analysis 
of equality in Islamic jurisprudence and feminist debates in an attempt to explore a wider 
understanding of equality and its principles. I critically examine how the conception of 
equality informs the international and Islamic human rights instruments underpinned by 
the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI. I present an analysis of the principle of equality in the 
Women’s Convention to consider whether the application of substantive equality (different 
entitlements to rights for women and men) in marriage and family relations in order to 
address gender disadvantages in the UIDHR and CDHRI is harmonious with the Women’s 
Convention. This is particularly important for my analysis in Chapter Six of whether 
Malaysia’s reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the Women’s Convention 
concerning marriage and family relations due to its inconsistencies with Shariah, leaves 
Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights in disharmony with the Women’s Convention. 
I will consider whether, different entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men 
according to Malaysian laws in marriage and family relations render Muslim women in 
Malaysia unequal from men, based on the interpretation of equality under the Women’s 




First, I draw upon Fletcher’s (2002) and Bakar’s (2003) ideas of equality to argue that 
Islamic human rights jurisprudence and feminist standpoints share similar meanings and 
principles of equality. I argue that an equality of rights that considers substantive equality 
rather than just formal equality could reconcile both traditions. The basic premise of the 
argument is founded on the discourses of formal and substantive equality, in that similarity 
of legal treatment does not necessarily denote equality because, if a woman is in a different 
position from a man to begin with, treating them with total similarity will simply 
perpetuate the differences between them. Minow’s explanation about women’s relationship 
to the workplace might describe how treating women with total similarity with men will 
simply perpetuate the differences between them. According to Minow (1991: 41), 
‘women’s biological differences from men may be deployed to justify special 
accommodations at the workplace, such as safety protections against chemical damage to 
their reproductive systems, or maternity leave following childbirth’. Hence, it is important 
to apply equality appropriately to ensure that all human beings are guaranteed equal access 
to justice. I argue that an extended equality model which focuses on the subordinated 
group is rather significant in this analysis of gender equality. The central focus of this 
model is on the ‘disadvantage’, i.e. whether the laws contribute to the subordination of 
women (disadvantaged group).  
 
Second, I consider whether both formal and substantive notions of equality inform the 
UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI. I reflect on whether the UDHR shares similar application of 
the principles of equality with the UIDHR and CDHRI. I argue that the UDHR is 
harmonious with the UIDHR and CDHRI in terms of the ‘language of rights to equality’, 
but conflicting in terms of different entitlements to rights for women and men in marriage 
and family relations. Finally, I present an analysis of the principle of equality in the 
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Women’s Convention, drawing upon Facio and Morgan (2009), to consider whether the 
application of substantive equality (different entitlements to rights for women and men) in 
marriage and family relations in order to address gender disadvantages in the UIDHR and 
CDHRI, although irreconcilable with the UDHR, is harmonious with the Women’s 
Convention. I will argue that dissimilar entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men 
in the UIDHR and CDHRI pertaining to marriage and family relations are consistent with 
the extended equality model which focuses on the disadvantaged group to ensure equal 
outcomes. The same battle has been fought in the feminist debates against ‘unequal’ liberal 
equality, which addressed the Women’s Convention. Hence, throughout my analysis, I 
argue that, on the application of substantive equality, the UIDHR and CDHRI are not 
entirely harmonious with the UDHR, but are reconcilable with the Women’s Convention.  
  
3.2 BRIEF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF GENDER EQUALITY FROM 
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE AND IN FEMINIST DEBATES 
 
In this Section, I examine the jurisdictional background and provide a conceptual analysis 
of equality from Islamic jurisprudence and in feminist debates to search for a wider 
understanding of equality and its principle. I trace whether notions of equality from Islamic 
jurisprudence and in feminist debates are complementary to each other. I note that, 
according to Islamic human rights jurisprudence and feminist standpoints, equality is one 
of the most fundamental principles of human rights together with justice and dignity. 
Baderin (2003: 58), in his research on international and Islamic laws on human rights, 
quotes Justice Tanaka in the South West Africa Cases
55
 that equality has been described as 
the ‘starting point of all liberties’. Griffin (2008: 39) has stressed that ‘equality is a ground 
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for human rights’. I note that equality and non-discrimination are the basis of international 
and Islamic human rights; as Rehman (2003: 269), McCrudden (2004) and Grant (2007) 
said, a corollary between equality and non-discrimination is well recognised. I will argue 
that, according to the Islamic jurisprudence and feminist debates, the meaning and 
principle of equality are capable of harmonisation. 
 
The widespread understanding of equality today is based on liberal equality, that ‘things 
that are alike should be treated alike’. Non-discrimination is understood as formal equality 
(Kapur and Cossman, 1996: 178). As stressed by Smith (2003: 185), the usual rule that 
applies for equality is that ‘a situation is unequal if like situations are treated differently or 
different situations are treated similarly’. Wesson (2007: 751) and Ahmad (2005: 4) stated 
that this kind of equality relied upon the proposition that fairness requires similar treatment 
only. Liberal equality, which is drawn from the aforementioned maxim ‘likes should be 
treated alike’, asserted by Fredman (2001: 154), is associated with ‘neutrality’, 
individualism and autonomy. This might conflict with collective interest and equal 
distribution of social goods, as discussed in Chapter Two. Fredman (2003: 43) has stressed 
that the aim of equality is to give people an equal set of alternatives from which to choose 
to pursue their own version of a good life, thus, treating different people similarly will 
deny them their choice for a good life. Fredman has explained that this limited sense of 
equality which is correlated with neutrality is achieved by forbidding the state’s 
preferences for any group (disadvantage group) but applying similar treatment by laws. 
Even though this sounds impartial to every individual, the insistence on a particular set of 
values based on the dominant power which set the choice might result in discrimination 
against disadvantaged groups. Fiss (1976: 107) has even claimed that the neutral value of 




Using the terms ‘adl’ and ‘ihsan’, the context of justice in Quran is also related to the idea 
of ‘equality’ or ‘balance’, defined by Fyzee (1978: 17) as ‘to be equal, neither more nor 
less’. Bakar (2003: 4), while stressing that the definition of ‘adl’ related to equality in 
Islam, claimed that justice in Islam has been widely defined as ‘to put a matter in its 
proper and valid context’. Equality in Islam is not about the distribution of one thing into 
two portions of similar amounts without taking into consideration whether or not both 
parties need such portions or whether or not both parties’ needs are similar (Yaacob, 1986: 
82). This is consistent with the notion of equality stressed by Fredman (2003) earlier that 
equality is to give people an equal set of alternatives from which to choose to pursue their 
own version of a good life. Hence, equality could entail the distribution of things into 
dissimilar amounts; more importantly, equal distribution might lead to inequality.  
 
I note that, for Muslims, Islam accords equal dignity to women and men, which could be 
based on similar or different entitlements to rights and duties. Proponents of Islamic 
standards defined equality as the complementary nature of the roles played by women and 
men
56
 (Venkatraman, 1995: 2005), in that different roles and responsibilities between 
women and men are assigned purposely to ensure equal outcomes for dignity and justice. 
Baderin (2003: 60-61) has stressed that Islam recognises the equality of women and men, 
but it is not absolute. By referring the idea of non-absolute equality to the notion that 
women and men could have different roles and responsibilities, Baderin demonstrated the 
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ratify the Convention) and declaring that the Women's Convention  does not recognize rights and 
responsibilities of women that differ from those of men) 
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concept of ‘equal but not equivalent’ in Islam. Baderin (2003: 60) noted that ‘equality of 
women is recognised in Islam on the principle of equal but not equivalent’, especially in 
terms of their roles within the family. From this statement, to avoid inequalities, Islamic 
textual sources sometimes do not advocate equal treatment of women and men which is 
equated with sameness in family relations, because this will not result in equal dignity and 
justice. 
 
Thus, in Islam, even though equality could be achieved if the laws treat likes alike, there is 
still a possibility that equality might not be achieved by treating likes alike. I note that, 
apart from similar treatment of laws, Islam also focuses on ‘substantive equality’ to ensure 
gender justice and fairness and to promote the collective interest. I find that this type of 
equality is not intended to give similar treatment, but to give more advantages to the 
disadvantaged individual or group to safeguard equal outcomes. Again, this type of 
equality for women, for instance, is not meant to protect women because women are 
different from men but because women have been historically and systematically 
disadvantaged (Ahmad, 2005: 5; 2007: 61). The aim of substantive equality is to remedy 
past and present disadvantages (Rebouche, 2009: 712-713). As stressed by Husband (2004: 
11), equality of treatment does not take into account the fact that ‘the equal application of 
rules to unequal groups or individuals can have unequal results’. According to Husband, 
equal treatment for unequal potential groups tends to reinforce inequalities and can lead to 
inequalities for groups that have been disadvantaged by a system that fails to take different 
needs into account. I argue that substantive equality goes further than the notion of equal 
treatment because it considers different needs between groups and individuals to achieve 
equal outcomes. Indeed, focusing only on results would not be the best practice because 
overemphasis on results might cause unfairness inherent in the process of achieving these 
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results. Therefore, the application of formal equality without setting aside substantive 
equality in Islam would help achieve the maximum justice for people, including 
disadvantaged groups. In my analysis of the application of principle of equality under the 
UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI in the next Section and the Malaysian laws on Muslim 
women’s rights in Chapters Four, Five and Six, I will show that formal equality is equally 
as important as substantive equality. 
 
There is a varied body of literature on equality based on gender
57
 from the feminist 
perspective. Issues of equality and possible ways to achieve it have always been at the 
heart of the feminist project (Frug, 1992: 4). I trace that, like the Islamic perspective on 
equal treatment, most writers have claimed that similar treatment is insufficient because it 
fails to address societal structures that perpetually disadvantage women. Charlesworth and 
Chinkin (2000: 10) professed that, even though women’s rights to equality are guaranteed 
with similar treatment, inequality might still exist in the process and the principles of legal 
systems. As noted by Unterhalter (2005: 30), ‘equality is no longer a matter of equal 
amounts, but a more substantive idea associated with solidarities and confronting 
injustice’.     
 
Even though equality has been described as a simple concept (Holtmaat, 2004: 2), its 
meanings and principles have not been properly understood. I note that similar treatment 
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might not have a value of neutrality because, once the right to equality is related to and 
enforced by laws, its objectivity and impartiality can be challenged. As discussed earlier, 
because of the ‘aura’ of truth and justice, laws have always caused people to believe that 
truth and justice are incorporated into laws; in fact, however, as Fredman (1997: 2) alleged, 
laws are made by people in power, and their interests have always been predominantly 
male, which is why Fiss (1976) challenged the neutral value of similar treatment. I suggest 
that this might be due to the fact that the concept of similar treatment conceals the real 
nature of substantive needs and correlative principles of human rights and equality.  
 
In thinking their way through such problems, feminists have developed certain critiques of 
the concept of equality which informs them. The critique asks that ‘equality not be reduced 
to sameness’ (Fletcher, 2002: 149), similar to the Islamic perspective of equality offered by 
Bakar (2003), Yaacob (1986), Baderin (2003) and Unterhalter (2005) as explained earlier. 
In other words, if obstacles still exist to impede genuine exercise of choice, equal treatment 
is not sufficient (Fredman, 2003: 43). On the basis of my analysis of substantive equality 
applied in the Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights in Chapters Four, Five and Six, I 
am in agreement with Smart (1989: 85 and 1995: 188) when she criticized the notion that 
women should be equal (treatment) to men, as if men are the standard by which women 
must be judged. As claimed by Fredman (1997: 15), ‘the problem with relying in this way 
on the male norm is that the existing values in a male-dominated world are accepted 
without challenge and women are required to compete on their terms’. McKinnon (1987: 
34) also condemned the notion of the sameness standard which always measures females 
against male standards. Women, as such, I argue, must be given equal rights with men in 
order to gain access to all opportunities that might lead to equal outcomes of justice for 
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them, not similar treatment with men which results in injustice. And indeed, justice for 
women, to which I refer here, must be defined by women, not men. 
 
Clearly, the idea that equality can be achieved by considering the differences between 
people is a departure from the notion that it can be achieved only by considering the 
sameness between them, as the latter requires that laws or policies be applied to treat 
people in the same way (Fredman, 2003). Therefore, I note that, like the Islamic method of 
achieving gender equality, modern feminism corresponds not only to equal treatment 
(similar treatment), which is commonly known as ‘formal equality’ in the feminist 
discourses, but also to ‘substantive equality58’ which can be achieved through laws (Smart, 
1989: 140). For feminists, equality of gender may not be achieved if substantive equality is 
not to be considered, because the objective of substantive equality is to eliminate the 
substantive inequality of disadvantaged groups (Kapur and Cossman, 1996: 176). That is 
why feminists, both in the United States and United Kingdom, have been concerned with 
the inability of the concept of equal rights (which refers to formal equality only) to address 
the reality of gender inequality (Kingdom, 1991: 114). Wolgast (1980: 48), for instance, 
did not reject the concept of equality as commonly referring to equal status, but preferred 
the notion that rights are equally protected if they depend on gender differences. I argue 
that women, as such, should be treated in a manner which implies they need special 
protection solely on account of being a disadvantaged group. Fredman (2003: 43) thus 
stressed that the aims of equality require more than equal treatment: they require equal 
outcomes.  
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3.3 CONTRASTING PRINCIPLES OF GENDER EQUALITY IN THE UDHR, 
UIDHR AND CDHRI 
 
In this Section, I examine gender equality based on the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI. I 
analyse whether the UDHR is harmonious with the UIDHR and CDHRI in terms of the 
application of gender equality. I argue that the UDHR is parallel with the UIDHR and 
CDHRI in terms of their usage of ‘male-biased language’ in the provisions relating to 
rights conferred on women and men. I explain that the difference between the UDHR and 
the UIDHR and CDHRI is pertaining to different entitlements to certain rights in marriage 
and family relations for women and men. In my analysis of the contrasting principle and 
application of equality underpinning the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI in this Chapter, I 
consider whether different entitlements to rights for Muslim women (wives) and men 
(husbands) in marriage and family relations could protect women as a disadvantaged 
group. Some critics have alleged that the UIDHR and CDHRI disadvantaged Muslim 
women due to the ‘inequality of gender’ expressed in the language and entitlements 
applied in both the Declarations’ provisions. From this perspective, I examine both aspects 
of ‘gender inequality’ applied in the UIDHR and CDHRI.     
 
This is particularly important for my analysis in Chapter Six of whether different 
entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men in marriage and family relations 
according to Malaysian laws could protect women as a disadvantaged group. I will argue 
that women or wives, as persons who have been historically disadvantaged, must be 
accorded special measures which are not accorded to men or husbands, purposely to 
achieve equal outcomes between the sexes. Within the context of marriage, Ali (2000: 39) 
has agreed that the Quranic laws stipulate that a wife is her husband’s responsibility. Ali 
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based her assertion on Verse 4: 34, which stated that ‘men are the managers of the affairs 
of women for that God have preferred in bounty one of them over another, and for that 
they have expended of their property’. 
  
I trace that the UDHR confirms the right of every human being to freedom and equality 
(Article 1 and Article 2)
59
. Similarly to the UDHR, the UIDHR assures freedom (Preamble 
G (ii) and Article II (a))
60
 and equality (Preamble G (i))
61
. The CDHRI also offers the same 
right to freedom and equality as stated in its Preamble,
62
 Article 1 (a)
63
 and Article 11 (a)
64
. 
However, there have been criticisms of the different entitlements to rights for women and 
men as set out in both the UIDHR and the CDHRI. The UIDHR and CDHRI were 
                                                 
59
 Article I of the UDHR stated that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’. 
Article 2 stated that ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the 
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether 
it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty 
60
 Preamble G (ii) of the UIDHR stated that ‘….Therefore, we, as Muslims who believe in our obligation to 
establish an Islamic order, wherein all human beings are born free, do hereby, as servants of Allah and as 
members of the universal brotherhood of Islam at the beginning of the fifteenth century of the Islamic era, 
affirm our commitment to uphold the following inviolable and inalienable human rights that we consider are 
enjoined by Islam’. Article II (a) stated that ‘Man is born free. No inroads shall be made on his right to 
liberty except under the authority and in due process of the law’ 
61
 Preamble G (i) of the UIDHR stated that ‘….Therefore, we, as Muslims who believe in our obligation to 
establish an Islamic order, wherein all human beings shall be equal and none shall enjoy a privilege or 
suffer a disadvantage or discrimination by reason of race, colour, sex, origin or language do hereby, as 
servants of Allah and as members of the universal brotherhood of Islam at the beginning of the fifteenth 
century of the Islamic era, affirm our commitment to uphold the following inviolable and inalienable human 
rights that we consider are enjoined by Islam’ 
62
 Preamble of the CDHRI stated that ‘The Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
wishing to contribute to the efforts of mankind to assert human rights, to protect man from exploitation and 
persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the Islamic Shariah’ 
and ‘Believing that fundamental rights and universal freedoms in Islam are an integral part of the Islamic 
religion and that no one as a matter of principle has the right to suspend them in whole or in part or violate 
or ignore them in as much as they are binding divine commandments, which are contained in the Revealed 
Books of God and were sent through the last of His Prophets to complete the preceding divine messages 
thereby making their observance an act of worship and their neglect or violation all abominable sin, and 
accordingly every person is individually responsible - and tile Ummah collectively responsible - for their 
safeguard’ 
63
 Article 1 (a) of the CDHRI stated that ‘All human beings form one family whose members are united by 
submission to God and descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic 
obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, 
religious belief, political affiliation, social status or oilier considerations. True faith is the guarantee for 
enhancing such dignity along the path to human perfection’ 
64
 Article 11 (a) of the CDHRI stated that ‘Human beings are born free, and no one has the right to enslave, 
humiliate, oppress or exploit them, and there can be no subjugation but to God the Most-High’ 
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criticized by Mayer (1995: 102) on the grounds that the treatment of the status of Muslim 
women is deliberately obscure in both Declarations. Among the examples that Mayer cited 
were Article III, Article XIX and Article XX of the UIDHR, and she further claimed that 
Muslim women’s rights in the UIDHR are denied by the application of Islamic principles, 
which are patriarchal in nature. Mayer also criticised Article 19 of the CDHRI because it 
does not endorse equality. 
 
Article III of the UIDHR reads as follows: 
‘Right to Equality and Prohibition against Impermissible Discrimination 
a) All persons are equal before the Law and are entitled to equal opportunities and 
protection of the Law.  
b) All persons shall be entitled to equal wage for equal work.  
c ) No person shall be denied the opportunity to work or be discriminated against in any 
manner or exposed to greater physical risk by reason of religious belief, colour, race, 
origin, sex or language’ 
 
Here, the phrase in Article III entitled ‘right to equality and prohibition against 
impermissible discrimination’ gives the impression that there is a ‘permissible 
discrimination’ in Islam. However, because the Quran is emphatic on the objectivity of 
justice and rejects any compromise in its basic conception (Sheriff, 2007: 6), it seems 
problematic to claim that Islam discriminates against women. Hence, permissible 
discrimination in Article III might refer to different entitlements to rights due to the 
differences or different treatment to protect disadvantaged groups, which might be called 
‘positive distinction’ and will not amount to ‘less favourable’ treatment to women. Indeed, 
Mayer’s argument was not wrong, as other people might also think that the term 
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‘permissible discrimination’ used in Article 3 of the UIDHR is the symbol of Shariah’s 
promotion of gender inequalities. 
 
Mayer’s argument that Islamic principles are patriarchal in nature is also based on Article 
XIX (c) and Article XX. Article XIX (c)
65
 of the UIDHR, similar in formulation to Article 
6 (b)
66
 of the CDHRI, establishes that the husband is the head of the household and 
obligated to provide for the family. Article XX
67
 makes a detailed provision for the right of 
married women to be given rights to residential and other maintenances by their husbands 
during marriage and for the period of iddah
68
 following dissolution of marriage, and also 
the right to seek dissolution of marriage and to secure inheritance.  
 
Mayer (2007: 102) has observed that the CDHRI does not endorse equality and has argued 
that Article 19
69
, which refers to equality before the laws, should be read as meaning that 
the laws apply equally to rulers and ruled only. My argument is that, as the provision 
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 Article XIX (c) of the UIDHR stated that ‘Every husband is obligated to maintain his wife and children 
according to his means’ 
66
 Article 6 (b) of the CDHRI stated that ‘The husband is responsible for the maintenance and welfare of the 
family’ 
67
 Article XX of the UIDHR stated that ‘Every married woman is entitled to: 
a) live in the house in which her husband lives 
b) receive the means necessary for maintaining a standard of living which is not inferior to that of her 
spouse, and, in the event of divorce, receive during the statutory period of waiting (iddah) means of 
maintenance commensurate with her husband's resources, for herself as well as for the children she 
nurses or keeps, irrespective of her own financial status, earnings, or property that she may hold in her 
own rights 
c) seek and obtain dissolution of marriage (khul'a) in accordance with the terms of the law. This right is in 
addition to her right to seek divorce through the courts 
d) inherit from her husband, her parents, her children and other relatives according to the law 
e) strict confidentiality from her spouse, or ex-spouse if divorced, with regard to any information that he 
may have obtained about her, the disclosure of which could prove detrimental to her interests 
 A similar responsibility rests upon her in respect of her spouse or ex-spouse’ 
68
 Iddah is a period of time following the dissolution of marriage by divorce or death in which the divorced 
wife or the widow is not permitted to enter into another marriage. The iddah of a divorced woman who has 
not reached menopause is three menstrual cycles, and for a divorced woman who has reached menopause or 
whose menstrual cycles are irregular it is three lunar months. Ter iddah period of a pregnant woman is until 
she delivers the child, and the iddah of a widow is four months and ten days. However, no iddah is 
prescribed to those woman whose marriages have not been consummated 
69
 Article 19 (a) of the CDHRI stated that ‘All individuals are equal before the law, without distinction 
between the ruler and the ruled’ 
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clearly mentions that ‘All individuals are equal before the law’, it should be interpreted as 
applying just to a certain hierarchy of people, but to all persons in general. I argue that the 
line ‘without distinction between the ruler and the ruled’ is only an example given in this 
provision, that the hierarchy distinguishing the ruler and the ruled is palpable; therefore, if 
the ruler and the ruled are equal, there will obviously be no distinction among ordinary 
people. Indeed, an important task of human rights documents is to guarantee that every 
individual is equal, not only in terms of protection by laws but also in terms of 
‘opportunities’ to be protected by laws, as expressly mentioned only in the UIDHR 
(Article III (a)). Article III (a) provides that ‘All persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled to equal opportunities and protection of the law’. 
 
Like Mayer, Smith (2003: 195) has also criticised the CDHRI for falling short of universal 
human rights standards by distinguishing between the equality of Muslim women and men. 
Smith claimed that the Declaration asserts the superiority of men, as mentioned above by 
Mayer. Littman (1999) has condemned the CDHRI for introducing intolerable 
discrimination against Muslim women. However, I argue that all three Declarations 
guarantee that every person is equal before the law. The UDHR guarantees all persons 
equality before the law as stated in Article 7. Even though there is no mention in the 
UIDHR and CDHRI that everyone is recognised as a person before the law, the versions of 
provisions which guarantee equality before the laws (Article III (a)
70
 of the UIDHR and 
Article 19 (a)
71
 of the CDHRI), to enjoy legal capacity (Article 8 of the CDHRI)
72
 and to 
                                                 
70
 Article III (a) of the UIDHR stated that ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal 
opportunities and protection of the law’ 
71
 Article 19 (a) of the CDHRI stated that ‘All individuals are equal before the law, without distinction 
between the ruler and the ruled’ 
72
 Article 8 of the CDHRI stated that ‘Every human being has the right to enjoy a legitimate eligibility with 
all its prerogatives and obligations; in case such eligibility is lost or impaired, the person shall have the right 
to be represented by his/her guardian’ 
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be treated in accordance with laws (Article IV (b) of the UIDHR)
73
 automatically 
acknowledge all persons as having legal personalities equally. Both also list basic human 
rights for every human being irrespective of gender. Without recognition of their legal 
personality, ‘sui juris’ or ‘ahliyah’ under the Shariah, no individual will ever be able to 
bring any claims before the laws. Hence, as argued earlier, having legal personality is not 
sufficient if disadvantaged persons are not legally guaranteed affirmative actions to 
authenticate their detriment.   
 
3.3.1 ‘Man’ is Mankind 
3.3.1.1 Freedom and Equality in Dignity and Rights 
In this Section, I analyse whether the language of rights to equality under the UDHR, 
UIDHR and CDHRI is neutral and not gendered. As stressed by Smart (1992) earlier, if all 
legal subjects are treated equally, law can be an instrument to gender equality. The word 
‘men’ is often understood to be unmarked74 and gender-neutral, similar to ‘people’, which 
refers to both women and men (Jong, 1993: 75); however, changing the word ‘men’ to 
‘people’ indeed changes the perspective of a masculine-based idea into a fair and just 
statement: as ‘verified by sociological and physiological studies, the use of the male 
pronoun does not bring women into readers’ minds’ (Busby, 1990: 77). Indeed, the male-
biased language definitely has negative impacts on women. For instance, gender-biased 
terms in human rights laws could form the basis for sexist argumentations when dealing 
with rights to life, even though the laws might not have intended this. Moreover, the word 
                                                 
73
 Article IV (b) of the UIDHR stated that ‘Every person has not only the right but also the obligation to 
protest against injustice; to recourse to remedies provided by the law in respect of any unwarranted personal 
injury or loss; to self-defence against any charges that are preferred against him and to obtain fair 
adjudication before an independent judicial tribunal in any dispute with public authorities or any other 
person’ 
74
 The word is considered as ‘unmarked’ if it refers to a noun that includes women and men. See Busby, 
Karen. 1990. ‘The Maleness of legal Language’ in Dawson, T. Brettel (ed.), Women, Law and Social 
Change. Canadian Legal Studies Series. Captus Press. p. 76 
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‘men’ is not commonly understood by lay persons to include women. Charlesworth and 
Chinkin (2000: 232) wrote; ‘Such word use is significant in reinforcing hierarchies based 
on sex and gender even if it is intended to be generic’. This is particularly important for my 
analysis in Chapter Four of whether Malaysian laws on human rights are gendered and 
how Malaysian laws, prior to the amendments made to uphold gender equality language, 
were gender-biased. 
 
In the UIDHR, I note that the ‘male-biased language’ can be seen in Article II (a) 
pertaining to freedom and equality in dignity and rights. Article II (a), which warns that no 
inroads shall be made on man’s rights to liberty, uses the word ‘man’, not ‘mankind’ or 
‘everyone’, as has been used in the Preamble G (xiv) (a) and (b) about the same rights. 
Article II (a) states that ‘Man is born free. No inroads shall be made on his right to liberty 
except under the authority and in due process of the law’. The same rights mentioned in 
the Preamble G (xiv) (a) and (b), Article II (b) and Preamble G (i) and (ii) are flexible and 
gender-neutral; however, because Article II (a) uses the word ‘man’, this still indicates the 
privileging of the male subject. That is why Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000: 17) stressed 
the importance of replacing the word ‘man’ with ‘human’. This ‘male-language’ also 
supports feminist arguments that rights language is gendered (Poovey, 1992). Preamble G 
(xiv) (a) and (b) provides as follows:  
 
‘(a)….Therefore, we, as Muslims who believe in our obligation to establish an Islamic 
order, wherein every effort shall be made to secure unto mankind deliverance from every 
type of exploitation, injustice and oppression, do hereby, as servants of Allah and as 
members of the universal brotherhood of Islam at the beginning of the fifteenth century of 
the Islamic era, affirm our commitment to uphold the following inviolable and inalienable 
human rights that we consider are enjoined by Islam’;  
 
(b)‘….Therefore, we, as Muslims who believe in our obligation to establish an Islamic 
order, wherein every effort shall be made to ensure to everyone security, dignity and 
liberty in terms set out and by methods approved and within the limits set by the law do 
hereby, as servants of Allah and as members of the universal brotherhood of Islam at the 
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beginning of the fifteenth century of the Islamic era, affirm our commitment to uphold the 
following inviolable and inalienable human rights that we consider are enjoined by Islam’. 
 
I trace that, even though Article II (b) applies the terms ‘every individual’ and ‘every 
people’, this is inconsistent as the first limb (Article II (a)) explained above, uses the term 
‘man’. Article II (b) states that ‘Every individual and every people has the inalienable 
right to freedom in all its forms - physical, cultural, economic and political - and shall be 
entitled to struggle by all available means against any infringement or abrogation of this 
right; and every oppressed individual or people has a legitimate claim to the support of 
other individuals and/or peoples in such a struggle’. This inconsistency might shows that 
the legal provisions are not fully gender-neutral. Smart (1989) argued that rights language 
would empower women as rights could be claimed by everyone irrespective of gender; 
however, Smart stressed that, should rights language not be properly employed, it will not 
bring any justice to women. Moreover, the Preamble G (i) and (ii) states that all human 
beings are born free irrespective of sex; however, it does not necessarily confirm equal 
protection of women and men because of the ‘male-biased language’ employed in Article 
II (a). Preamble G (i) and (ii) confirms this: ‘(i)…wherein all human beings shall be equal 
and none shall enjoy a privilege or suffer a disadvantage or discrimination by reason of 
race, colour, sex, origin or language’; (b) ‘….wherein all human beings are born free’. 
  
The CDHRI also offers similar protection to that provided in the UIDHR, for the freedom 
of all ‘man’ (Preamble) and every human being (Article 11 (a)). In contrast to the 
UIDHR’s Preamble, which uses the words ‘mankind’ and ‘everyone’, the Preamble’s 
language in CDHRI prefers to use the word ‘man’ in affirming rights to a dignified life. 
The Preamble states: ‘In contribution to the efforts of mankind to assert human rights, to 
protect man from exploitation and persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a 
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dignified life in accordance with the Islamic Shariah’. Even though the same rights 
mentioned in Article 2 (a) and Article 18 (a) are conferred on ‘every human being’ and 
‘everyone’, again, these are inconsistencies, indicating laws as ‘male subject’. Article 2 (a) 
states that ‘Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human 
being. It is the duty of individuals, societies and states to safeguard this right against any 
violation, and it is prohibited to take away life except for a Shariah prescribed reason’, 
and Article 18 (a) provides that ‘Everyone shall have the right to live in security for 
himself, his religion, his dependents, his honour and his property’.  
 
Although I trace that the UDHR uses gender-neutral language in its provisions, in the 
drafting process this aspect was contentious. Morsink (1999: 118) has demonstrated that 
‘most of the early versions of Article 1 of the UDHR started out with the phrase ‘all men’ 
and from the start various delegates expressed dissatisfaction with that phrase’. Delegates 
from the USSR and Australia, Morsink explained, in the First Session of the Drafting 
Committee, argued against the idea of starting any Article with ‘all men’ and objected to 
other delegates’ understanding that ‘all persons are included in this phrase’. According to 
Koretsky, the delegate from the USSR, the phrase ‘all men’, ‘implied an historical 
reflection on the mastery of men over women’ (Morsink, 1999: 118). This ‘conflict’ 
continued until the Second Session of the Commission and some delegates proposed 
substituting the term ‘men’ with ‘human beings’, to mean women and men without 
differentiation, even though Roosevelt repeatedly pointed out that the word ‘men’ used in 
the draft was generally accepted as including all human beings. Interestingly, the delegate 
from the UK forwarded a suggestion, which might have reconciled the conflict, to include 
a note in the draft of the Declaration stating that the word ‘men’ referred to ‘all human 
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beings’. However, according to Morsink, until the Third Session of the Commission, the 
‘debate’ was not enough to change the term ‘all men’. 
 
In the Third Session of the Commission, the delegates received a draft of Article 1 from 
the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)
75
 which proposed that ‘all people’ be 
substituted for all ‘men’ and ‘in the spirit of brotherhood’ for ‘like brothers’ (Morsink, 
1999: 119). As I argued earlier, even though the term ‘men’ is unmarked and gender-
neutral, it is unable to avoid ‘misrepresentation’ of any rights. Amilia C. de Castillo 
Ledon, the Vice-Chairman of the CSW, has said that ‘her Commission understood that the 
term ‘all men’ had a general sense but was still ambiguous’ (Morsink, 1999: 119). In the 
end, all subsequent drafts of the Declaration changed the term ‘men’ to ‘all people, men 
and women’ and ‘like brothers’ to ‘in the spirit of brotherhood’, as proposed by the Vice-
Chairman of the CSW. However, as explained by Morsink, the draft of the Secretariat 
report for that Third Session begins Article 1 with the phrase ‘all human beings’, instead of 
‘all people, men and women’ as a result of an error in the transmission of the text from the 
Third Session to the Third Committee. Article 1 of the UDHR states that ‘All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in the spirit of brotherhood’. 
 
Thus, I argue that, while the UDHR is more gender-neutral in its language, it originally 
intended to use male-biased language. This might indicate how covenant-makers fail to 
recognise the normative male model of traditional human rights formulation 
(Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright (1991: 613). Without the interference of the CSW in 
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 The Commission on the Status of Women is one of the functional commissions of the ECOSOC. Its 
function is to prepare reports and recommendations for the ECOSOC to promote women’s rights. See 




the Third Session of the Commission, the Article might have not changed. Hence, we 
cannot deny the ‘gender-biased’ nature of the UDHR, similar with the UIDHR and 
CDHRI. The UIDHR and CDHRI sometimes prefer to use the word ‘men’, even though it 
refers to all persons, instead of ‘all human beings’ or ‘everyone’. The UIDHR and CDHRI 
may have been influenced by the Quranic language which, according to Buang (2001: 18), 
always uses male pronouns to refer to both women and men. However, in the end, this 
does not exempt or release women from being the ‘victims’ of male subject, which might 
counteract the endeavour of the ‘rights’ and ‘equality’ languages to empower women and 
protect them as a disadvantaged group.   
  
3.3.2 ‘Wife’ is Not an Ordinary Woman  
 
3.3.2.1 Right to Marry and Found a Family 
In this Section, I consider whether the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI take into consideration 
the disadvantages of women in marriage and family relations and confer different 
entitlements between sexes in order to ensure equal outcomes. I examine whether the 
UDHR is harmonious with the UIDHR and CDHRI in terms of the entitlements to rights 
for women and men in marriage and family relations. In the Islamic context, marriage is 
the legitimate means of founding a family, in which rights, privileges and obligations of 
every spouse must be stipulated by its laws (Al-Qardhawi, 1998). In this perspective, 
because of the marriage relationship, women and men are specifically assessed as wives 
and husbands, not merely women and men. This is because, when a woman is ‘appointed’ 
as a wife, she is no longer an ordinary woman; the same is true for a man. For Muslims, an 
appointment as wife or husband comes with specific entitlements to rights and obligations 
to duties in the familial sphere and relationship, in which the entitlements and 




Therefore, it is easy to understand that Islam confers upon wife and husband different 
entitlements and responsibilities due to their differences (Mustafa, 2004). In Chapter Six, I 
will analyse whether different entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men in 
marriage and family relations according to Malaysian laws disadvantage women. Here, I 
argue that different strengths are not a question of superiority or inferiority, but a question 
of natural capacity and proper functioning to achieve equal outcomes, which, according to 
Fredman (2003: 43), could come from choices to pursue a good life. These will not amount 
to inequality; rather, these different entitlements and responsibilities are purposely 
designed to suit their disparities and disadvantages to achieve an equal outcome, unless 
women are treated ‘less favourably’ than men.    
 
Safi (1998: 13) has rightly proposed that, to advance equitable rights for wife and husband, 
it is important to focus on ensuring that ‘marriage constitutes a consensual relationship 
that contributes equally to advancing the interests of the various parties involved’. I find 
that, by correctly understanding what equality is and how it works in the Muslim familial 
sphere, the debate on gender equality will be more helpful to Muslim women. Safi 
conditioned his proposal subject to providing Muslim women (wives to be) and men 
(husbands to be) with equal rights to enter into the relationship based on their own terms 
and to empower women (wives) to ensure that they can negotiate the marriage’s strengths 
and weaknesses. This is indeed helpful in order to justify that equality depends on how it is 
defined.  
  
In the UDHR, Article 16 (i) states that ‘Men and women of full age, without any limitation 
due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are 
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entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.’ The 
UIDHR also stresses the sharing of obligations and responsibilities between wife and 
husband in the family and in terms of the paying of maintenance, an obligation imposed on 
the husband only (Article XIX (c)). Article XIX (c) expresses that ‘Every husband is 
obligated to maintain his wife and children according to his means’. I note that, in 
marriage and family relations of Muslim, the equality of wife and husband is equal in 
terms of their participation as wife and husband and parents to their children, no matter 
what their roles and functions are. Because of its difference from the UDHR, this 
dissimilar entitlement to right regarding maintenance payment is claimed as ‘recognition’ 
of the gender inequality. Provided that one understands that equality is sometimes not 
about sameness, one might not regard this as a kind of gender inequality. This is because, 
like husbands, there is no law prohibiting Muslim wives from having jobs and receiving 
payment; moreover, wives are entitled to maintenance (whether they work or not). The 
general rule is that every husband must provide maintenance for his wife because not all 
wives can provide for themselves. Indeed, to ensure equal gender outcomes, in performing 
their biological tasks, for instance to become pregnant and give birth, wives are considered 
disadvantaged persons who must be afforded special measures (in the form of maintenance 
from husbands). The rule would not be different even if a woman decides not to have 
children in a marriage, because, as mentioned earlier, the general rule is that every husband 
must provide maintenance for his wife. Thus, even if wives could provide for themselves, 
they are still entitled for rights to be maintained.  
 
The UIDHR not only assures wives of their right to receive maintenance but also 
guarantees motherhood a ‘special respect, care and assistance’ in public and private 
spheres (Article XIX (g)). I trace that, whilst the detailed rights of married women to be 
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respected, cared for and assisted as disadvantaged persons are not cited in UDHR, they are 
precisely set out in the UIDHR. According to the UIDHR, every married woman is entitled 
to live in the marital home with her husband, receive maintenance during marriage and the 
iddah period irrespective of her own financial status (whether she can provide for herself 
or not), obtain rights to dissolve marriage, obtain inheritance rights from husband, parents, 
children and other relatives, and enjoy privacy and confidentiality in respect of anything 
harmful to her interests (Article XX). I note that, according to the CDHRI, women can also 
retain their name and lineage (Article 6 (a)) even after marriage, which shows that they are 
equal with men in terms of dignity rights. To ensure that every wife enjoys equal rights 
with her husband in family matters; both Islamic Declarations impose duties on every 
husband to be responsible for the support and welfare of the family (Article XIX (c) of the 
UIDHR and Article 6 (b) of the CDHRI). Therefore, it is dubious to allege that the Islamic 
Declarations affirm gender inequality. 
 
Thus, I argue that the UIDHR and CDHRI conflict with the UDHR pertaining to the 
different entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men. The UDHR confers on women 
and men equal and similar entitlements to rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. The UIDHR and CDHRI stress equal and different entitlements to rights to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution based on the sharing of obligations and 
responsibilities between wife and husband in the family. The UIDHR and CDHRI take into 
consideration the disadvantages of women in marriage and family relations and confer 
different entitlements between sexes in order to ensure equal outcomes, which is parallel 
with equality informed by feminism, as explained earlier. Hence, in marriage and family 
relations of Muslims according to the UIDHR and CDHRI, the status of wife and husband 
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is equal in terms of their participation as wife and husband and as parents to their children, 
no matter what their roles and functions are.    
 
3.4 PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY UNDER THE WOMEN’S CONVENTION 
 
 
In this Section, I examine the principle of equality under the Women’s Convention and 
analyse whether it is congruent with the application of equality underpinning the UIDHR 
and CDHRI based on the idea of different entitlements to rights for women and men in 
marriage and family relations in order to address gender disadvantage. I will argue that the 
Women’s Convention’s principle of equality is harmonious with the application of equality 
underpinning the UIDHR and CDHRI should equality be defined as enabling different 
entitlements to rights to protect women as a disadvantaged group. Under the Women’s 
Convention, rights for women are based on three fundamental principles: non-
discrimination, equality and state obligation
76
 (Byrnes, 2002; Facio and Morgan, 2009). I 
trace that the Women’s Convention spells out the meaning of equality and how it can be 
achieved through its principal provisions which guarantee women’s rights and needs. Even 
though there are various debates on whether the term ‘equality of gender’ should be 
changed to ‘equity’, the Women’s Convention is comfortable in its use of the word 
‘equality’, which sets broad standards for Member States77 (Facio and Morgan, 2009: 5-9). 
The Women’s Convention recognizes in its Preamble that ‘a change in the traditional role 
of men and women as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to 
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 Following the obligation of the state under the terms of the Convention, State Parties must submit a 
national report within one year of acceding to the Convention and within every four-year period thereafter 
(Article 18 (1) of the Women’s Convention). This process ensures that State Parties implement the 
Convention. These principles provide the framework for formulating strategies and give meaning to the 
Articles of the Convention (International Women’s Rights Action Watch)  
77
 The term ‘equity’ appears only once in the Women’s Convention. Preamble: ‘Convinced that the 
establishment of the new international economic order based on equity and justice will contribute 
significantly towards the promotion of equality between men and women’ 
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achieve full equality between men and women’. The substance and framework of the 
Convention expressly convey feminist voices and messages on rights (Lacey, 2004: 53). 
According to Lacey, it locates the realization of rights and recognises important differences 
among women.  
 
The Convention defines discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national 
action to end such discrimination (Saksena, 2007: 483). In its Title, the Convention 
underscores states’ obligation to prohibit discrimination against women. Under the 
Convention, equality is non-discrimination (Coomaraswamy, 1994: 47) and discrimination 
against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity. 
In the Preamble, the Convention explicitly acknowledges that ‘extensive discrimination 
against women continues to exist’ and emphasizes that such gender discrimination 
‘violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity’. Article 1 
provides that, 
‘For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ 
shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or 
any other field’. 
 
Here, according to the definition of discrimination stated in Article 1, there is a close 




In this analysis, I explore of the principles of the Women’s Convention which are best 
demonstrated by Facio and Morgan (2009). Facio and Morgan established six important 
substances of Article 1. The first concerns the forms of discrimination which can arise 
from the distinction, exclusion or restriction of the person (Facio and Morgan, 2009: 10). 
As discussed earlier, it is important to bear in mind that discrimination may still occur even 
if different people are treated differently, unless the disadvantaged people are guaranteed 
special measures to achieve equal results similar to those of advantaged people. Bindman 
(1992: 52) and Fredman (2001: 160) explained that this direct discrimination could be 
proved by evidence that the victim of discrimination has been or would be treated less 
favourably than another person. Less favourably, stressed Bindman, means that ‘different 
treatment must be proved between the complainant and others; it must be shown to be less 
favourable.’ 
 
Secondly, the Convention defines discrimination as any act or omission that has the ‘effect’ 
or ‘purpose’ of denying women’s exercise and enjoyment of all rights (Facio and Morgan, 
2009: 10). From this perspective, acts or omissions constitute ‘discrimination’ not only if 
they either expressly single out women for disparate treatment but also if they appear to be 
gender-neutral but, nevertheless, have a discriminatory impact on women. In other words, 
formal equality may discriminate against women if the outcome of affording equal 
treatment results in discrimination. This is what Bindman (1992) called indirect 
discrimination. Indirect discrimination seeks to address practices that have discriminatory 
effects (Lacey, 1992: 102; Fredman, 2001: 161).  
 
Thirdly, Facio and Morgan stressed the degrees of discrimination, in that the Women’s 
Convention prohibits not only total but also partial discrimination. For instance, if women 
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are allowed to be citizens of a country but the citizenship is not extended to their children. 
The fourth issue concerns the stage of occurrence of discrimination. Article 1 refers to the 
existence of rights as the ‘moment of creation of laws that establish the right’ as 
recognition, ‘necessities for satisfying right’ as enjoyment and ‘active aspect of right’ as 
exercise (Facio and Morgan, 2009: 10). Thus, states’ impairment of recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise of women’s rights goes against the principle of equality under the Women’s 
Convention. Fifthly, Article 1 specifies that the Women’s Convention intended to 
eliminate all kinds of discrimination against women in all aspects of life, to be precise, in 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural life. Finally, the Women’s Convention 
recognises women as legal subjects who have legal capacity and dignity equal to men.  
 
Based on the substances of Article 1, discrimination can be defined as an act that violates 
the principle of equality. In Article 1, equality is presented more as substantive equality (de 
facto equality), which requires the delivery of equal outcome rather than equal treatment. I 
quote Paragraph 8 of the General Recommendation No. 25 of Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the 
Women’s Convention: 
‘In the Committee’s view, a purely formal legal or programmatic approach is not sufficient 
to achieve women’s de facto equality with men, which the Committee interprets as 
substantive equality. In addition, the Convention requires that women be given an equal 
start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of 
results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. 
Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between 
women and men must be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical 
treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such differences. Pursuit 
of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming 
under representation of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men 
and women.’ 
 
Indeed, the substance of the Women’s Convention encapsulates the meaning of substantive 
equality by aiming to eliminate de jure and de facto discrimination (Byrnes, 2002: 124; 
General Assembly, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
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Women. U. N. Doc. A/59/38/Annex (2004)). In order to promote substantive equality, the 
Convention recognises that women do not share equal treatment with men, and women 
have to be treated differently from men (Facio and Morgan, 2009: 14-15).       
 
Article 4 states that de facto equality between women and men shall not be considered 
discrimination. Women must not necessarily be treated in the same way as men, with an 
understanding that women’s lack of empowerment arises precisely because they do things 
that cannot be compared to the things that men do. Hence, equality informed by Article 1 
and Article 4 of the Women’s Convention suggests that different entitlements to rights for 
women and men as outlined by the UIDHR and CDHRI in marriage and family relations 
do not necessarily discriminate against women because different entitlements to rights are 
purposely provided to uphold equality of outcomes by giving special measures to women 
as a disadvantaged group. This is why Steiner and Alston (2000: 179) stressed that one of 
the vital characteristics of Article 1 is its reference to ‘effect’ as well as ‘purpose’, thus 
directing attention to the intentions and consequences of governmental measures to 
eliminate discrimination. Therefore, I suggest that, as stated in Article 4, temporary special 
measures are important.  
  
On the basis of equality, the Women’s Convention requires State Parties to take all 
appropriate corrective measures in the political, social, economic and cultural fields to 
ensure full development of women (Lacey, 2004: 48). Here, I note that discrimination is 
not limited to ‘state action’ but can also be performed by ‘non-state actors’. The 
modification of social and cultural patterns of women and men’s conducts which are based 
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles 
for women and men (Article 5 (a)) is part of the basis of gender equality. However, women 
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are still to be guaranteed equality with men before the law (Article 15). Article 15 states 
that, 
‘1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law 
2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that 
of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give 
women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them 
equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals 
3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with 
a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed 
null and void 
4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law 
relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and 
domicile’. 
 
Here, I submit that State Parties must not only take actions to achieve equality for both 
genders, but should also ensure that actions are taken to correct the inequalities.   
 




In summary, I have argued that Islamic and feminist jurisprudence are harmonious 
pertaining to the idea of equality which is based on the different entitlements to rights 
between the sexes in order to address gender disadvantages. I traced that an equality of 
rights that considers substantive equality rather than just formal equality could reconcile 
both traditions. Indeed, as asserted by feminists, focusing on equal rights can be awkward 
if equality is defined in ways that protect only one group of people and omit others or if it 
confers similar entitlements on women and men without taking into consideration the 
disadvantaged group (Fletcher, 2002; Facio and Morgan, 2009; Byrnes, 2002; Kingdom, 
1991; Wolgast, 1980). This might occur even if equality were formulated in gender-neutral 
language. In laws as such, equality in general, which is legislated in statutes, can still 
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systematically disadvantage women. It is biased and unfair to groups that are non-
autonomous and have less power and fewer opportunities. However, I argued that this 
problem might possibly be overcome were equality to be clearly understood and employed 
to include a comparison of like with like, unalike with unalike and to give affirmative 
measures to individuals or groups who are disadvantaged, such as women, or at least to 
encourage women (the disadvantaged) to see themselves as persons born with equal rights, 
even though equality is given and practised differently. This might also accommodate the 
tensions between diverse theoretical and applied understandings of equality from all 
traditions and practices.  
 
I argued that the principle and application of equality in the Islamic human rights 
instruments underpinning the UIDHR and CDHRI are not entirely harmonious with the 
international human rights instrument underpinning the UDHR in terms of the different 
entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men in order to address gender 
disadvantages, although they are harmonious with the Women’s Convention. I argued that 
the UDHR confers on women and men equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at 
its dissolution, yet does not address special measures to be accorded to women as a 
disadvantage group whereas the UIDHR and CDHRI stress equal and different 
entitlements based on the sharing of obligations and responsibilities between wife and 
husband in the family. The UIDHR and CDHRI also differentiated entitlements to rights 
for women and men to compensate for women’s disadvantages. I noted that, in marriage 
and family relations of Muslims based on the UIDHR and CDHRI, the status of wife and 
husband is equal in terms of their participation as wife and husband and as parents to their 




I traced that dissimilar entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men in the UIDHR 
and CDHRI pertaining to marriage and family relations are consistent with the extended 
equality model which focuses on the subordinated group to ensure equal outcomes. The 
same battle has been fought in the feminist debates against ‘unequal’ liberal equality, 
which was addressed by the Women’s Convention. According to the Women’s 
Convention, inequality can arise from the distinction, exclusion or restriction of women, 
any act or omission that has the ‘effect’ or ‘purpose’ of denying women’s exercise and 
enjoyment of all rights or impairment of recognition, enjoyment or exercise of women’s 
rights in all aspects of life, to be precise, in civil, political, economic, social and cultural 




















MUSLIM WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND EQUALITY UNDER THE MALAYSIAN 




In order to analyse the extent to which Malaysian laws and policies are in line with the 
Women’s Convention, I will consider in this Chapter whether the principles of equality 
interpreted by the Malaysian Federal Constitution and their application in various statutes 
and policies are harmonious with the principles of equality under the Women’s 
Convention. This is particularly important for my analysis in Chapter Five, of how the 
notion of equality is interpreted according to the Women’s Convention and Malaysian 
local context which produces a response to the CEDAW’s concluding comments made 
against Malaysia in the Thirty-Fifth Session and how laws have been legislated and 
amended to uphold gender equality. I will analyse in Chapter Six how the notion of 
equality is interpreted according to the Women’s Convention and the Malaysian legal 
context which brings about a reservation to Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the 
Women’s Convention regarding marriage and family relations, because of the Article’s 
inconsistencies with Shariah practised in Malaysia. Harmonisation of the principle of 
equality according to the Malaysian legal context with the Women’s Convention is 
significant considering that the notion of equality under the Women’s Convention is 




First, I consider how Islamic textual sources became one of the sources of Malaysian laws, 
apart from the English common laws. This is important for this research as Malaysia 
reserved Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the Women’s Convention regarding marriage 
and family relations because of the Article’s inconsistencies with Shariah practised in 
Malaysia. I examine Part II of the Federal Constitution to acquire a legal picture of 
Malaysian laws on fundamental liberties and consider whether woman is a legal subject. I 
analyse how Malaysian laws on human rights inform ‘rights’ and whether Malaysian 
human rights laws are parallel with the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI. Second, I consider 
Malaysia’s progress towards empowerment of women, women’s rights and gender equality 
laws. Here, my reference to ‘women’ is not confined to Muslim women but also includes 
non-Muslim women, because the overall intention of the Government of Malaysia in its 
effort to develop women’s rights is to empower all women in this country. I examine 
whether Malaysia enhances the status of women through Government policies and study its 
commitment to the global standard. Third, I explore how the term ‘equality’ is interpreted 
under the Malaysian Federal Constitution and its application in various statutes. I analyse 
whether ‘de facto’ equality is considered. I will argue that the principle of equality applied 
in the Malaysian Federal Constitution and statutes runs parallel with that of the Women’s 
Convention, which was discussed in Chapter Three.  
 
4.2 MALAYSIAN SHARIAH AND FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES: IS WOMAN 
A LEGAL SUBJECT? 
 
In this Section, I trace how Islamic textual sources have formed part of the sources of 
Malaysian laws on human rights and Muslim women’s rights, apart from English common 
laws. I note that the current Malaysian legal system is shaped by both legal backgrounds 
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which have been determined by a historical chronology of a period of some six hundred 
years. Before the arrival of the British, the laws of the Malay land were Islamic-based 
(Mohamad Ibrahim, 1987; Aun, 1999). In the case of Shaikh Abdul Latif and Others v. 
Shaikh Elias Bux
78
, Edmonds J.C. in his judgement said:  
‘Before the first treaties the population of these states consisted almost solely of 
Mohammadan
79
 Malays with a large industrial and mining Chinese community in their 
midst. The only law at that time applicable to Malays was Mohammadan modified by local 
customs.’ 
 
The influence of Islamic-based laws can be traced in most of the digests (Ngah, 1980; 
Awang, 1984) so as to recognize the Malay customary law, which was not contrary to 
Islam. It started with the founding of Malacca Sultanate
80
 at the beginning of the 15th 
century, in which Islamic-based formal legal texts were compiled (Awang, 1984: 32); the 
most significant were Hukum Kanun Melaka or Risalat Hukum Kanun, Undang-Undang 
Laut Melaka, Pahang Legal Digest, Kedah Law, Majallat Al-Ahkam and Al-Ahkam As-
Syariyyah (Selvaratnam and Mohd. Labib, 2003: 63). The rapid progress of Islamisation in 
South East Asia started in the 15th and 16th centuries, when the Shafie school of thought
81
 
began to establish itself (Mohamad Ibrahim, Ahmad, Awang Othman, Mahmud Saedon 
and Hassan, Kamal, 1990: 9). The study of the laws of Malacca (the texts of Hukum Kanun 
Melaka and Kitab Undang-Undang Melaka) of the 15th century by Mohamad Ibrahim, 
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 The adoption of Islam by the 15th century saw a rise in the number of Sultanates, the most prominent of 
which was the Malacca. Malacca was a major point of Islamic piety and learning prior to 1511, when the 
Portuguese captured Malacca. See Mohamad Ibrahim, Ahmad, Awang Othman, Mahmud Saedon and 
Hassan, Kamal. 1990. ‘Islamisation of the Malay Archipelago and the Impact of Al-Shafi’i’s Madhhab on 
Islamic Teachings and Legislation in Malaysia’. Paper presented at the International Symposium on Imam Al-
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 Before the establishment of the Sultanate of Malacca (Malacca is one of the Malaysian States), the centre 
of Islamic mission in this region was in Pasai. His Majesty Malik al-Zahir was a follower of Shafie school of 
thought. Later, Shafie school of thought was proclaimed by the Pasai Government to be the official school of 
thought; other states in this region then followed suit, including Malacca. See Mohamad Ibrahim, Ahmad, 
Awang Othman, Mahmud Saedon and Hassan, Kamal. 1990. ‘Islamisation of the Malay Archipelago and the 
Impact of Al-Shafi’i’s Madhhab on Islamic Teachings and Legislation in Malaysia’. Paper presented at the 
International Symposium on Imam Al-Shafi’i’s at Petaling Jaya Hilton, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 13-15 
August 1990. pp. 8-9 
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Ahmad, Awang Othman, Mahmud Saedon and Hassan Kamal in 1990 discovered that, on 
the whole, the laws of Malacca were drafted based on Islamic laws according to the Shafie 
school of thought and Malay customary laws. These formal legal texts were widely 
accepted and practised until the British occupied the land and replaced them with English 
common laws throughout the Malaya
82
 territories (Awang and Mohamad Yunus, 2003: 2). 
 
The influence of Malay customary laws on the Islamic-based laws of Malacca may be the 
reason why, in Malaysia, as Mohamad (2008: 1) said, the word ‘Islam’ was synonymous 
with Malay people and the Malay race. ‘Islam’ has also been a symbol of religious-cultural 
identity for Malays (Noor, 2007: 124). Chandra Muzaffar, a Malaysian social activist, has 
observed that, as in a number of other post-colonial societies, Muslims in Malaysia have 
become very conscious of their Islamic identity (Frontline-Interview Chandra Muzaffar, n. 
d). Even when the Federal Constitution was being drafted, the Malays would not have 
accepted it had the definition of ‘Malay’ not included ‘Muslim’ and had Islam not been 
declared the religion of the Federation (Mohamad, 2008: 1).  
 
Hence, the Malaysian Federal Constitution defines a ‘Malay’, among other things, as a 
person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language and 
conforms to Malay customs (Article 160 (2)). Malay people, who were dominated by 
Hindus and Buddhists from India (Ahmed, 1964: 1-3) and by Islamic culture, influenced 
each other (Chin and Hack, 1951: 380-381). Even though Islam in South East Asia was 
spread by Muslim Arabs (Fatimi, 1963; Al-Attas, 1969), Noor (2007: 57) has stressed that 
Malay Sultanates were also influenced by the religious interpretation of Hinduism and 
Buddhism. However, Al-Attas (1969) argued that Islam played a significant role 
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afterwards, replacing Hinduism. The Shafie school of thought spread throughout the 
history of the Malay world until the 1990s due to the influences of religious education in 
which the jurisprudence of the Shafie school of law was taught (El-Muhammady, 1992: 
53); this continues to this day. 
 
Muslims believe that Shariah is God's law and that it is used in conjunction with the 
substantive laws of Islam, based on either the textual sources or ijtihad of jurists of all 
schools of laws (Bari, 2003), but they disagree among themselves as to exactly what it 
entails (Sheriff, 2007). In fact, according to the Former Chief Justice of Malaysia, Dato’ 
Abdul Hamid Mohamad, in his lecture on the ‘Harmonisation of Common Law and 
Shariah in Malaysia: A Practical Approach’ at the Harvard Law School in 2008, Shariah 
is any ‘law that is not un-Islamic’. This means that any laws which are not in direct 
conflict with the textual foundations of Islam (Quran and the Prophetic tradition) might be 
called Islamic even though they may be of English or Malay origins. It is important to 
highlight here that Shariah does not form a homogenous entity as it depends on 
interpretations of the sources, cultural and ethnic influence, historical and colonial context, 
school of jurisprudence, and political and economic policies of state (Ali, 2000: 42). 
Therefore, I find that Shariah as practised in Malaysia constitutes the Islamic laws that 
have been interpreted based on the Islamic sources (Quran and the Prophetic tradition), 
which are influenced by Malaysian cultural, ethnic, historical, colonial, political, economic 
aspects and Shafie school of thought. 
 
Even though Shariah in Malaysia is primarily interpreted based on Shafie school of 
thought, I argue that there were some modifications of Islamic Family Law Enactments in 
the 1980s which were based on the method of takhayyur, a selection of opinions from 
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schools of thought other than Shafie school of thought. Using this method, the rulings of 
Shariah were based not on Shafie school of thought but on Hanafi and Maliki schools of 
thought (Noor, 2007: 141). For example, according to Shafie school of thought, forced 
marriage is permissible but this is not accepted by Hanafi school of thought. Malaysia 
binds itself to the opinion of Hanafi in this situation to prohibit forced or unwanted 
marriage, which I will explain further in Chapter Five. Malaysia also follows Hanafi 
school of thought on the presumption of puberty pertaining to the minimum age for 
marriage; furthermore, on the law of divorce, Malaysia follows Maliki school of thought to 
make divorce more accessible to women
83
. I shall address these in detail in my analysis of 
Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) in Chapter Six. Hence, Muslim women’s rights laws on 
marriage and divorce in Malaysia have been progressively reviewed by Malaysian 
legislators to ensure women’s disadvantages are taken into consideration to ensure equality 
of dignity and justice. 
 
I trace that the most significant impact on modern Malaysia, and the reason for this 
research, was British colonial rule which brought with it constitutional government and the 
common law system to the Malay States in the late 19th century. This colonial power 




 and the whole 
Malay Peninsula (Tan, Min and Seng, 1991: 35). Malaysia inherited the English legal 
system as a colonial legacy and, therefore, Malaysian and Western-based human rights 
laws share common laws, stemming from the fact that much local legislation is based on 
English models (Aun, 1999: xvii). The Royal Charter of Justice of 1807, which established 
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 Penang was the first territory in Malaysia to fall into British hands. Francis Light, who declared British rule 
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the Court of Judicature of the Prince of Wales’ Island (as Penang was then known) to 
exercise jurisdiction in all civil, criminal and ecclesiastical matters, marked the beginning 
of the formal statutory introduction of English common laws to Malaysia (Selvaratnam and 
Mohd. Labib, 2003: 65). Mohamad (2008: 2) claimed that the main preoccupation of the 
British administrators after the founding of Penang was the maintenance of some form of 
public order; however, local customs and laws were allowed to continue by leaving 
‘matters related to Islamic religion and Malay custom to the Malay Rulers’. According to 
Abdullah (2007: 515), the Western colonization had failed to intervene in the family affairs 
of the Malay Muslim community. Thus, Muslim laws on marriage and family relations in 
Malaysia are not necessarily influenced by English common laws.  
 
In the Malaysian Federal Constitution, although Islam would be referred to as ‘the religion 
of the Federation’ (Article 3), nowhere was it stipulated that the country would be referred 
to as a ‘Muslim State’. The application of Shariah is also very limited, since it is not 
included expressly in the definition of law in the Federal Constitution
86
. Today, under the 
federal-state division of powers, matters related to the administration of Islam have been 
put under the states’ jurisdiction for Shariah Courts to deal with (Article 121 (1A)) and the 
rulers (Sultans) of every state
87
 stand as the highest authorities on Islamic matters (Article 
3 (2) and Schedule 9, Section 1 of the Federal Constitution). These pertain to family 
matters, charitable and religious trusts, Malay customs, zakat
88
, mosques, and the 
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constitution, organisation and procedure of Shariah Courts. Other than these matters, all 
citizens of Malaysia are governed by uniform civil laws based on the common laws of 
England. This is because British administrators did not intervene in the custom and family 
affairs of the Muslim community because, as explained earlier, matters related to religion 
and customs of Muslims were under the authority of Malay Rulers. Even though Malaysia 
is not constitutionally a Muslim state, in this chapter I will refer to Malaysia as having the 
attributes of a Muslim state due to its majority Muslim population and its membership of 
the OIC
89
. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Shariah was the ‘law of the land’ applied in 
Malaya before colonialism.   
  
For human rights laws in Malaysia, even though rights enshrined in the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution reflect a heavy Western influence as a result of the colonisation by Britain 
(Tan and Thio, 1997: 514), the idea of rights had already taken root in the pre-colonial 
Malay states and the inspiration is not of Western origin (Kheng, 2001: 73). The idea of 
rights can be seen in the Hukum Kanun Melaka, the Islamic-based formal legal texts 
compiled during the Malacca Sultanate period; these texts used the term ‘merdeka’ 
(freedom) and its concept was embodied in the pre-colonial Malay Peninsula in relation to 
slaves (Reid, 1998: 141-160). Human rights laws were provided in the Hukum Kanun 
Melaka pertaining to rights of life and the punishment for wilful murder, stated in Clauses 
5: 1, 5: 3, 8: 2, 8: 3, 18: 4 and 39. Rights to property and even animal rights were also 
protected (Fang, 1976).   
 
Human rights laws in Malaysia today are rooted in the nine constitutional provisions 
contained in Part II of the Federal Constitution, from Article 5 to Article 13, and listed as 
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‘fundamental liberties’; this Constitution was drafted during the independence negotiations 
between Britain and Malaya in 1956 by the Reid Commission
90
 (Andaya and Andaya, 
1984: 261). It was substantially adapted to form the original Federal Constitution, which 
was heavily influenced by the system of parliamentary democracy but still took into 
consideration the aspirations of all ethnic and religious groups, and became a document of 
shared destiny that all parties could identify with (Thomas, 2005). It was based on the 
notion of personal liberty, equality and human dignity (Omar, 1996: 16-23).     
 
In my view, the choice of the term ‘fundamental liberties’ was deliberate and has a crucial 
effect because, even though it is not absolute, it demonstrates that the founders felt these 
were not mere rights that cannot be alienated and that the restriction of such fundamental 
rights by Acts of Parliament should not have the practical effect of destroying or abolishing 
them. Rather, such restrictions should be minimal, limited and proportionate. Restrictive 
clauses refer to such consideration to maintain public order, public health, security of the 
Federation and morality (Omar, 1996: 19). This is in accordance with the principle of 
rights informed by feminists, and application of rights under the UDHR, UIDHR and 
CDHRI discussed earlier, that rights are not an absolute individual entitlement but take into 
consideration the collective interest to balance the rights of all individuals (Lacey, 2004).     
 
Even though the Reid Commission did not explain the meaning of fundamental liberties 
(Bari and Shuaib, 2006: 17), Bari (2001: 183) has stressed that the underlying concepts and 
philosophy behind the provisions of fundamental liberties under the Federal Constitution 
were also influenced by the principles enunciated by the UDHR. I trace that the ambits of 
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these fundamental liberties are wide enough to cover basic human rights, with a heavy 
dose of legislative and administrative limitations built into them, and cover rights such as 
claim, power, immunity, liberty, choice and interest as explained earlier in Chapter Two. 
Section 2 of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 (Act 597) says that 
‘human rights refer to fundamental liberties in Part II of the Federal Constitution’. 
Meanwhile, Section 4 (4) of the Act added that ‘For the purpose of this Act, regard shall 
be had to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 to the extent that it is not 




 of the Federal Constitution, which stated that ‘No person shall be deprived of 
his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law,’ provides for life and personal 
liberties, including the right not to be deprived of life ‘save in accordance with law’; most 
importantly, Article 5 provides the right of an arrested person, among other things, to apply 
for habeas corpus. This guarantee applies to both women and men without gender 
distinction and, thus, does not discriminate against women. The word ‘person’, employed 
pertaining to this right is not a piece of male-language. Thus, the law is not patriarchal in 
the way it frames issues, but recognises women as legal subjects. In this perspective, law 
can be put right because all legal subjects, women and men, are treated equally (Smart, 
1992: 31). Similarly, the UDHR guarantees everyone’s rights to ‘life, liberty and security’ 
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 Article 5 of the Federal Constitution states that: 
‘1) No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law 
2) Where complaint is made to a High court or any judge thereof that a person is being unlawfully detained 
the court shall inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to 
be produced before the court and release him 
3) Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall 
be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice 
4) Where a person is arrested and not released he shall without unreasonable delay, and in any case within 
twenty-four hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey) be produced before a magistrate and shall 
not be further detained in custody without the magistrate's authority 
Provided that this Clause shall not apply to the arrest or detention of any person under the existing law 
relating to restricted residence, and all the provisions of this Clause shall be deemed to have been an 
integral part of this Article as from Merdeka Day 
5) Clauses (3) and (4) do not apply to an enemy alien’ 
125 
 
in Article 3. I note that the UIDHR assures the same rights, stating repeatedly in its 
Preamble G (xiv) (a), Preamble G (xic) (b), Article I (a) and (b) and Article II (a) that the 
sanctity of a person’s body (life or death) shall be inviolable. The CDHRI shapes the same 
rights protection in its Preamble, Article 2 (a), (c) and (d), Article 3 (a) and Article 18 (a) 




 of the Federal Constitution which affirmed that ‘No person shall be held in 
slavery’ provides protection for individual and community against slavery, including 
forced labour. The UDHR, in its Article 4 provides similar protection that ‘No one shall be 
held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their 
forms’. Article 6 (1) uses the term ‘person’ and not ‘man’ to represent mankind. This 
language of right too, does not have masculine criteria which could disadvantage women 
(Dawson, 1993) because it applies to both women and men, thus automatically recognising 
women as legal subjects. I find that the UIDHR guarantees the same protection in its 
Preamble G (iii), that slavery and forced labour are abhorred. Meanwhile, the CDHRI in 
Article 11 (a) states that ‘human beings are born free and no one has the right to enslave, 
humiliate, oppress or exploit them…’ 
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 Article 6 of the Federal Constitution states that: 
‘1) No person shall be held in slavery 
2) All forms of forced labour are prohibited, but Parliament may by law provide for compulsory service for 
national purposes 
3) Work incidental to the serving of a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of law shall not be taken 
to be forced labour within the meaning of this Article 
4) Where by any written law the whole or any part of the functions of any public authority is to be carried on 
by another public authority, for the purpose of enabling those functions to be performed the employees of the 
first mentioned public authority shall be bound to serve the second mentioned public authority shall not be 
taken to be forced labour within the meaning of this Article, and no such employee shall be entitled to 
demand any right from either the first mentioned or the second mentioned public authority by reason of the 





 of the Federal Constitution shelters both women and men from retrospective 
criminal law and repeated trials in order to protect people from being oppressed; which are 
also mentioned in Article 10 and Article 11 (1) and (2) of the UDHR. Article 7 (1) states 
that ‘No person shall be punished for an act or omission which was not punishable by law 
when it was done or made, and no person shall suffer greater punishment for an offence 
than was prescribed by law at the time it was committed’. Article 10 of the UDHR entitles 
people to a fair trial and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. I find that 
the UIDHR, apart from assuring similar rights in Preamble G (xi), Article IV (b) and (d) 
and Article V (a), (b) and (d), warrants that ‘punishment shall be awarded in accordance 
with the law, in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and with due consideration of 




 of the Federal Constitution, which provides for equality before the law, is 
consistent with Article 6 and Article 7 of the UDHR. It guarantees individual rights to 
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 Article 7 of the Federal Constitution states that: 
‘1) No person shall be punished for an act or omission which was not punishable by law when it was done or 
made, and no person shall suffer greater punishment for an offence than was prescribed by law at the time it 
was committed 
2) A person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence shall not be tried again for the same offence 
except where the conviction or acquittal has been quashed and a retrial ordered by a court superior to that 
by which he was acquitted or convicted’  
94
 Article 8 of the Federal Constitution states that: 
‘1) All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law 
2) Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on 
the ground only of religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender in any law relating to the acquisition, 
holding or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, 
vocation or employment 
3) There shall be no discrimination in favour of any person on the ground that he is a subject of the Ruler of 
the State 
4) No public authority shall discriminate against any person on the ground that he is resident or carrying on 
business in any part of the Federation outside the jurisdiction of the authority 
5) This Article does not invalidate or prohibit - 
(a) any provision regulating personal law 
(b) any provision or practice restricting office or employment connected with the affairs of any 
religion, or of an institution managed by a group professing any religion, to persons professing that 
religion 
(c) any provision for the protection, wellbeing or advancement of the aboriginal peoples of the 
Malay Peninsula (including the reservation of land) or the reservation to aborigines of a reasonable 
proportion of suitable positions in the public service 
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equality and equal protection under the law. Article 6 of the UDHR recognises every 
person as a person before the law. Article III (a) and Article IV (b) of the UIDHR 
guarantee all persons equality before the laws, as well as equal treatment, opportunity and 
protection. I have discovered that the CDHRI pledges the same in Article 19 (a). Article 8 
(1) of the Federal Constitution, which states that ‘all person are equal before the law and 
entitled to the equal protection of the law’, clearly indicates that woman in Malaysia is a 
legal subject, similar to man. Article 9
95
 of the Federal Constitution on banishment and 
freedom of movement appears to have been inspired by Article 13 (1) and (2) of the 
UDHR. Article 9 (1) states that ‘No citizen shall be banished or excluded from the 
Federation’. This right is secured for women and men equally as an individual right; 
however, to consider the collective interest, this right is subject to the security of the 
Federation, public order, public health, or the punishment of offenders (Article 9 (2)). The 




 of the Federal Constitution, on freedom of speech and association, has some 
bearing on Article 19 and Article 20 (1) and (2) of the UDHR. I find that the rights to 
                                                                                                                                                    
(d) any provision prescribing residence in a State or part of a State as a qualification for election or 
appointment to any authority having jurisdiction only in that State or part, or for voting in such an 
election 
(e) any provision of a Constitution of a State, being or corresponding to a provision in force 
immediately before Merdeka Day 
(f) any provision restricting enlistment in the Malay Regiment to Malays’  
95
 Article 9 of the Federal Constitution states that: 
‘(1) No citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Federation 
(2) Subject to Clause (3) and to any law relating to the security of the Federation or any part thereof, public 
order, public health, or the punishment of offenders, every citizen has the right to move freely throughout the 
Federation and to reside in any part thereof 
(3) So long as under this Constitution any other State is in a special position as compared with the States of 
Malaya, Parliament may by law impose restrictions, as between that State and other States, on the rights 
conferred by Clause (2) in respect of movement and residence’ 
96
 Article 10 of the Federal Constitution states that: 
‘1) Subject to Clauses (2), (3) and (4) - 
(a) every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression 
(b) all citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms 
(c) all citizens have the right to form associations 
2) Parliament may by law impose - 
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express thoughts and opinion are also protected by laws under Article XII of the UIDHR 
and Article 22 of the CDHRI. Article 10 (1) of the Federal Constitution mentions that ‘(a) 
every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression (b) all citizens have the 
right to assemble peaceably and without arms (c) all citizens have the right to form 
associations. These individual rights apply to women as well as men, all of whom are 
referred to as ‘all citizens’ which indeed recognises women as legal persons. Nevertheless, 
to consider the collective interest too, Article 10 (2) imposes restrictions to these rights in 
the interests of the security of the Federation, friendly relations with other countries, public 
order or morality, to protect the privileges of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or 
to provide against contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence. Again, 
collective interest is equally important as individual interest (Lacey, 2004) to balance the 
rights of all individuals.  
 
Article 18 of the UDHR is coherent with Article 11
97
 of the Federal Constitution on 
freedom of religion. Article 11 states that ‘Every person has the right to profess and 
                                                                                                                                                    
(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems necessary 
or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations 
with other countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of 
Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against contempt of court, defamation, or 
incitement to any offence 
(b) on the right conferred by paragraph (b) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems necessary or 
expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof, or public order 
(c) on the right conferred by paragraph (c) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems necessary or 
expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof, public order or 
morality 
3) Restrictions on the right to form associations conferred by paragraph (c) of Clause (1) may also be 
imposed by any law relating to labour or education 
4) In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof or public order 
under Clause (2) (a), Parliament may pass law prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status, 
position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III, article 
152, 153 or 181 otherwise than in relation to the implementation thereof as may be specified in such law’ 
97
 Article 11 of the Federal Constitution states that: 
‘1) Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it 
2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in 
part for the purposes of a religion other than his own 
3) Every religious group has the right - 
(a) to manage its own religious affairs 
(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and 
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practice his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it’. This right has no 
patriarchal identity due to the use of the words ‘every person’, which automatically 
recognises women as legal subjects. The same is also mentioned in Article X (a) and (b), 
Article XII and Article XIII of the UIDHR and Article 10 of the CDHRI. Women and men 
are also guaranteed rights to education, and it is considered the duty of the State to provide 
it, as stated in Article 12
98
 of the Federal Constitution. The same is mentioned in Article 26 
of the UDHR which assures rights to free education to every person, at least in the 
fundamental stages. I trace that this right is protected under Article XXI of the UIDHR and 
Article 9 of the CDHRI. Finally, Article 13
99
 of the Federal Constitution affords Malaysian 
citizens, women and men, the rights to property, as also seen in Article 17 of the UDHR. 
The UIDHR expresses its assurance on this right in Article XV and Article XVI, while the 
CDHRI does so in Article 14, Article 15 and Article 16. For both the right to education and 
the right to property, woman is a legal subject and entitle to equal entitlement as men.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law 
4) State law and, in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, federal law, may 
control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion 
of Islam 
5) This Article does not authorize any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health 
or morality’ 
98
 Article 12 of the Federal Constitution states that: 
‘1) Without prejudice to the generality of Article 8, there shall be no discrimination against any citizen on the 
grounds only of religion, race, descent or place of birth – 
(a) in the administration of any educational institution maintained by a public authority, and, in 
particular, the admission of pupils or students or the payment of fees; or 
(b) in providing out of the funds of a public authority financial aid for the maintenance or education 
of pupils or students in any educational institution (whether or not maintained by a public authority 
and whether within or outside the Federation) 
2) Every religious group has the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children in 
its own religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the ground only of religion in any law relating to 
such institutions or in the administration of any such law; but it shall be lawful for the Federation or a State 
to establish or maintain or assist in establishing or maintaining Islamic institutions or provide or assist in 
providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose 
3) No person shall be required to receive instruction in or take part in any ceremony or act of worship of a 
religion other than his own 
4) For the purposes of Clause (3) the religion of a person under the age of eighteen years shall be decided by 
his parent or guardian’ 
99
 Article 13 of the Federal Constitution states that: 
‘1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law 
2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation’ 
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To summarise, I have argued that Malaysia, as a member state of the UN since 17 
September 1957
100
 and of the OIC since 1969
101
, has drafted its human rights provisions 
with regard to both Western-based and Islamic-based human rights. It is important that 
these domestic human rights laws are congruent with both sources, because the laws apply 
to all people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, in Malaysia. I traced that human rights 
according to the Federal Constitution, cover rights such as immunity and liberty, reflecting 
rights and duties, individual and collective and not absolute, consistent with the meanings 
of rights according to Islamic and international jurisprudences’ definition of rights as 
explained in Chapter Two. I perceived that the language of human rights under the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution is non-gendered. I noted that woman according to the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution is a legal subject and has been given equal protection of 
the laws and equal rights to fundamental liberties as those conferred on man. Having 
established that Malaysian laws on human rights for women and men are based on English 
common laws which are not contradictory to Islamic textual sources, my further concern is 
to consider Malaysia’s progress towards empowerment of women, women’s rights and 
gender equality laws.    
        
 4.3 WOMEN’S RIGHTS: MALAYSIA’S ENHANCEMENT OR IMPAIRMENT? 
  
As stated in the Preamble to the UN Charter, equality of rights for women is a basic 
principle of the UN (Smith, 2003: 42). The International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) also proclaim the entitlement of everyone to equality before the laws and to the 
enjoyment of human rights. In this Section, I consider Malaysia’s progress towards 
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 See Online: http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml. Retrieved on 09/02/2011 
101
 See Online: http://www.oicun.org/3/28/. Retrieved on 06/10/2011 
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empowerment of women, women’s rights and gender equality laws. I argue that the 
emergence of a new consciousness in the patterns of discrimination against women and a 
rise in the number of organizations committed to combating the effect of such 
discrimination in the 1960s prompted the Government of Malaysia to show its support by 
allocating funds, setting up organizations and advancing actions and measures for women 
as disadvantaged groups to achieve gender equality. In this Chapter, my reference to 
‘women’ is not confined to Muslim women but also includes non-Muslim women, because 
the overall intention of the Government of Malaysia in its efforts to develop women’s 
rights is to empower all women in this country. 
 
4.3.1 From the National Advisory Council on Integrating Women in Development 
(NACIWID) to the Tenth Malaysian Plan (2010-2015) 
In response to the UN’s General Assembly Resolution, 30th Session102, to integrate all 
women into the development process, gender has been a development focus and was first 
mentioned in the Third Malaysian Plan (1976-1980) (Ministry of Women, Family and 
Community Development, 2007: 23). In the Plan, the Government allocated funds for the 
development of women, primarily in their roles and functions as housewives, mothers and 
supplementary income earners (Ahmad, 1998). To uphold equality of outcomes, the 
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 General Assembly Resolution 30th Session (U. N. Doc. A/RES/30/3519) on Women's Participation in the 
Strengthening of International Peace & Security of 15 December 1975:  
‘Calls upon all Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, particularly women's 
organizations and women's groups, to intensify their efforts to strengthen peace, to expand and deepen the 
process of international detente and make it irreversible, to eliminate completely and definitely all forms of 
colonialism and to put an end to the policy and practice of apartheid, all forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, aggression, occupation and foreign domination’ 
General Assembly Resolution 3521 calling on States to ratify international conventions and other instruments 
concerning the protection of women's rights, A/RES/3521 (XXX), 15 December 1975:  
‘Aware that women, enjoying fully the rights provided for in the relevant international instruments, should 
play an equal role with men in all spheres of life, including the ensuring of peace and the strengthening of 
international security, and should fully participate in political life.  
Confident that the relaxation of international tension contributes to the development and implementation of 
standards in all fields of concern to women 
Calls upon all States to promote vigorously wider participation of women in the strengthening of 
international peace and in extending the relaxation of international tensions contributing to the creation of 
the most favourable conditions for the complete elimination of discrimination against women’ 
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development and advancement of women is crucial, considering that women may not be 
able to stand at least as tall as men without positive measures being accorded to them. 
Thus, the Government’s earlier indication in the Third Malaysian Plan that it would take 
appropriate measures to ensure the full development and advancement of women, might 
have suggested that it would give special rights to women as a disadvantaged group to 
ensure their enjoyment of human rights on the basis of equality with men. This is 
consistent with the principle of equality under the Women’s Convention, that even though 
an act or omission appears to be gender-neutral, it still has a discriminatory impact on 
women if the giving of similar treatment results in discrimination (Facio and Morgan, 
2009). As stressed by Fredman (2001: 154) earlier, similar treatment mirrors individuality. 
Thus, if women are guaranteed equal rights by law, but are not accorded special measures 
for development and enhancement, they will still suffer discriminatory impacts, 
considering that women are a disadvantaged group.  
 
The Government of Malaysia formed the National Advisory Council on Integrating 
Women in Development (NACIWID)
103
 in June 1976, which served as an advisory and 
consultative body for the Government on matters relating to women in development, 
planning and implementation (Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development). 
I note that, amongst the functions of the Council, there are duties to provide guidance to 
women's organizations on their participation in national development and to give advice on 
the formulation of legislation and programmes affecting women, which could indeed help 
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 NACIWID was established as a multi-sectoral body comprising representatives from the government and 
non-government sectors and providing a platform for greater intensification of efforts towards the integration 
of women in development. Amongst the functions of the Council are to provide advisory services and 
guidance to women's organizations on their participation in national development and to advise on the 
formulation of legislation and programmes affecting women. It serves as a nucleus to which issues pertaining 
to women are referred and in addition, initiates research, studies and the dissemination of information. It 
liaises with appropriate authorities and related international organizations to promote friendly international 
relations and peace 
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to enhance and empower women in the public sphere. Moreover, it serves as a nucleus to 
which issues pertaining to women are referred, and also initiates research, studies and the 
dissemination of information. Furthermore, it liaises with appropriate authorities and 
related international organizations to promote friendly international relations and peace. 
However, to ensure maximum development of women, the role and composition of 
NACIWID should have been reviewed to establish a secretariat independent of the 
Government’s Women’s Ministry. According to the NGO Shadow Report on the Initial 
and Second Periodic Report of the Government of Malaysia in 2005, ensuring that 
NACIWID’s members are all experts on gender might also strengthen its role as a 
coordinating, consultative and advisory body and help it operate effectively (NGO Shadow 
Report Group, 2005: Articles 1-4: Definition of Discrimination, Law, Policy and Measures 
to Implement the Convention, para 4.7). 
 
In 1982-83, the Women’s Affairs Secretariat (HAWA)104 was set up in the Prime 
Minister’s Office of Malaysia to take over the tasks of the NACIWID Secretariat and to 
administer matters relating to women (Ahmad, 1998: 49). The HAWA is intended to 
ensure that women's interests and concerns are taken into consideration. This might have 
empowered women by recognising their voice and giving them the choice to realise their 
own interests (Fredman, 2003: 43; Mahmood, 2005: 5-17). Krishnadas (2007) has argued 
that women’s rights to determine their lives’ patterns are dependent upon the process of 
recognition. HAWA was later placed under the then newly established Ministry of 
Women, Family and Community Development in 2001 and restructured as the Department 
for Women's Development (DWD). By 1 March 2002, the DWD had set up branch offices 
in every state in Malaysia (Portal MyWanita, Department for Women’s Development). 
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Again, in this perspective, the aim of HAWA to ensure that women’s interests and 
concerns are taken into consideration in development, planning and implementation has 
indicated that women’s rights to autonomy have been implemented.   
 
The major initiative affecting gender equality in Malaysia was the National Policy on 
Women (NPW) prepared in 1989 (Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development and UNDP, 2007). The Status Report on Women’s Equality in Malaysia by 
the Women Aid’s Organisation (2001) testified that the NPW will ensure equitable sharing 
in the acquisition of resources and information, access to opportunities and benefits of 
development, and all sectors of national development in line with women’s abilities and 
needs. This would have ensured women’s recognition in the public spheres too.  I note that, 
as a ‘major initiative affecting gender equality and women’s empowerment in Malaysia’, 
the NPW was formulated as a basis of many subsequent policies and programmes, and its 
contents were incorporated in the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) with the Chapter 
entitled ‘Women in Development’ and the ‘Second Outline Perspective Plan (1990-2000)’ 
(Economic Planning Unit, 2005) to empower women in development mainly in health, 
education and training, law, employment, sports, media, religion and culture (Ministry of 
Women, Family and Community Development and UNDP, 2007). The Policy recognised 
that poverty, lack of education and, sometimes, culture and tradition are major hindrances 
to women’s progress. At the international level, the Policy recognises the international 
efforts to improve the status of women, in particular the Nairobi Forward Looking 
Strategies for the Advancement of Women 1985 and the Declaration of the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Meeting on Women 2000
105
 in the Bahamas, which have 
resulted in administrative policies becoming more gender-aware (U. N. Doc. 
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 Since 1999, the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association (CMJA) has run a number of 
Gender Section Conferences in conjunction with the Caribbean Regional Conferences in order to raise 
awareness of gender issues, including the one in the Bahamas 
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CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: Part 1, Article 3, para 77). The enhancement of women in the 
Sixth Malaysia Plan has indicated that special measures have been secured for women for 
their participation in the public sphere to compensate for their historical disadvantages.  
  
These affirmative actions to assist women in attaining self-confidence, achieving 
advancement under the opportunities afforded by the national development plans, and 
assuming increasingly larger roles outside the home and family are important considering 
that women are late starters in many fields and are confined in their lives to the private 
spheres. I note that an integral component of the planning process to provide special 
measures to achieve gender equality in the public spheres continued with the formulation 
of a National Action Plan (NAP) in 1992 to support the implementation of the NPW 
(Economic Planning Unit, 2005). Under the NAP, various strategies and programmes were 
drawn up to be implemented by Government agencies, the private sector and non-
governmental organizations. Therefore, the Sixth Malaysia Plan emphasized the 
formulation of the NAP, which was intended to integrate women in the institutional 
process for planning, implementation and monitoring followed by an Action Plan for 
Women in Development in 1997.  
 
In July 2003, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of 
Health, the Ministry of Human Resources and the Ministry of Rural and Regional 
Development participated in the ‘Gender Budgeting Pilot Project’ looking at incorporating 
gender-sensitive budgets into the national budgeting system (Economic Planning Unit, 
2005: 102-103). As a result, outputs and incomes have become the essence of the gender 
budget statements for the operating and development budget, which could empower 
women. Officers of the above said that ‘Pilot Ministries’ have acquired a good 
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understanding of the ‘Gender Responsive Budget’ (GRB) approach and skills in gender 
budget analysis, and are able to conduct training for other ministries (Ministry of Women, 
Family and Community Development, 2005: 12).  
 
In 2004, the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development initiated a project 
on gender mainstreaming and developed Malaysia’s Gender Gap Index (MGGI) to monitor 
trends in gender disparities in health, education, economic activity and political and 
economic empowerment, also aiming at integrating women into the development process 
in Malaysia (Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, 2007: xii). The 
project of monitoring gender disparities will help empower women. According to the 
trends in the MGGI, during the period of 1980 to 2004 gender inequality declined sharply. 
Between 1980 and 1990, the gender gap (in health, education, economic activity and 
political and economic empowerment) fell by 1.9 per cent per annum; between 2000 and 
2004 the gap fell by 1.7 per cent per annum, which was possibly a result of the previous 
Government’s policies to empower women. However, as stated by Aliran (10 October 
2010), in a report by the Women, Family and Community Development Ministry in 2009, 
the Malaysia Gender Gap Index showed that ‘while Malaysia scored well in the sub-
indexes of education and health, the gender gap in the political and economic 
empowerment sub-index remained high at 0.58 in 2007 (on a scale of 0 to 1, wherein 0 
indicates no gender inequality, and 1 indicates maximum gender inequality)’. This showed 
that, in the political and economic empowerment, women might have needed specific 
agenda for them to be integrated into the development process.   
 
Malaysia’s commitment was further demonstrated by the establishment of the Cabinet 
Committee on Gender Equality in December 2004 and the Gender Focal Point in all 
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Government Ministries and Departments to provide policy direction and to monitor the 
implementation of strategies and programmes for women and family development 
(Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, 2007: xi). The Government 
also announced that 30 per cent of decision-making positions in the public sector are to be 
filled by women (Suhakam’s Report on the Human Rights Approach to the Millennium 
Development Goals, 2006: 25). There has been a positive achievement in this regard as the 
percentage of women in top management positions in the public sector has increased from 
18.8 per cent in 2004 to 24.8 per cent in June 2010 (Rastam, 2010: 3).  
 
I have found that the Malaysian Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
106
, which 
emerged to guide efforts towards universal human wellbeing, addressed many of the most 
enduring failures of human development, placing human wellbeing and the eradication of 
extreme poverty at the centre of global development aims (Economic Planning Unit, 2005). 
The supreme objective among all the MDGs, which is, the eradication of poverty was 
already a primary national concern in 1970, when 49.3 per cent of all households in 
Malaysia were living in poverty (The Economic Planning Unit, Prime Ministers 
Department, 2008). And later, according to the Mid Term Review of the Ninth Malaysia 
Plan, just 5 per cent of households were poor.  
 
Because women are often the group most affected by poverty (Yeok, 2004, 28), the third 
MDGs was developed to promote gender equality and the empowering of women. It was 
targeted to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005 and in 
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 MDGs is a translation of the values and principles of the UN Millennium Declaration which resulted from 




all levels of education by 2015 (SUHAKAM
107’s Report on the Human Rights Approach 
to the Millennium Development Goals, 2006: i). Ariffin (2006: 7) has alleged that ‘none of 
these goals, targets or indicators is new’ because they are derivatives from the feminists 
goals already decided at numerous UN World Conferences of the 1990s as well as 
subsequent UN meetings in early 2000. In relation to this issue, Ariffin (2006: 12) has 
added, critics feel that economic empowerment by eliminating gender disparity in 
education without reproductive rights and the corresponding health care will leave women 
as less than full citizens. However, the review of the 2005 target in 2010 noted that 
Malaysia had achieved most of the goals ahead of the target date and had shown progress 
in achieving other goals, although they are yet to be fully achieved (Millenium 
Development Goals at 2010, 2011: vii-viii).  
 
Additionally, a chapter on ‘Women and Development’ in the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-
2000), the Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001-2005), the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) and 
‘references to women’ in the Third Outline Perspective Plan (2001-2010), which is the 
operational aspect of the second phase of the overall developmental plan called Vision 
2020
108
, have moved Malaysia closer to becoming a fully developed country. In the 
Seventh Malaysia Plan and Eighth Malaysia Plan, the Government of Malaysia identified 
women as an ‘important resource that can be mobilised national development agenda’ 
(Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2000). Thus, the Government has taken numerous measures to 
improve women’s participation in the labour market, such as by outlining the agenda for 
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 SUHAKAM is the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (hereinafter SUHAKAM), a national human 
rights institution. It was established by the Malaysian Parliament using the Human Rights Commission of 
Malaysia Act 1999 (Act 597) with a mandate to promote human rights education and advice on legislation 
and policy, and investigate complaints. See Online: http://www.suhakam.org.my/home. Retrieved on 
07/03/2009 
108
 Vision 2020 is a Malaysian ideal introduced by the 4th Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Bin 
Mohamad, during the tabling of the Sixth Malaysia Plan in 1991. The vision calls for a self-sufficient 
industrial, Malaysian-centric developed nation, complete with an economy that, in 2020, will be eight times 
stronger than the economy of the early 1990s 
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meaningful participation of women in the workplace in the National Policy on Women and 
Development (Omar and Davidson, 2004: 269). Furthermore, the Eighth Malaysia Plan 
explicitly demands that the strategies and programmes implemented for women’s 
advancement be consistent with Malaysian values, religious beliefs and cultural norms 
(Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2000).  
 
In the Ninth Malaysia Plan, the Government promises to continue to facilitate women’s 
greater participation in the nation’s labour force and to continue to review existing laws 
and regulations that disadvantage women (Ninth Malaysia Plan, 2005: 30). In this Plan, 
more skills and training upgrading programmes such as information and communications 
technology and entrepreneurship are being implemented to facilitate more self-
employment and greater participation by women in the economy (Ninth Malaysian Plan, 
2005: 19-20), which should enhanced women’s employment status in the public spheres in 
Malaysia. Moreover, single mothers’ employability is also being improved by the 
formulation of a strategic plan covering economics and education. Furthermore, the 
Government is expanding childcare services and promoting flexible working hours and 
places. Programmes are also being implemented to create awareness of the importance of 
women’s wellbeing (Ninth Malaysia Plan, 2005: 30). As a result, the Government has 
successfully conducted family development programmes for 60,000 participants and 
improved family wellbeing (Mid-Term Review of the Ninth Malaysian Plan 2006-2010, 
2008: 86). In the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015), the Government encourages women to 
increase their participation in the labour sector as decision-makers. Women will be given 






4.3.2 Commitment to the Women’s Convention: Sharing Global Standard? 
As discussed in the earlier Section, all human rights laws in Malaysia underpinning Article 
5 to Article 13 of the Federal Constitution apply to women as well as men, and 
automatically recognise women as legal subjects. I trace that the rights of all Malaysian 
women are further governed by other provisions in the Federal Constitution, legislations, 
religious and customary laws, and international conventions to which Malaysia is a State 
Party. In addition to the Women’s Convention, Malaysia is a party to other international 
instruments that protect the rights of women, such as the Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 100 (U. 
N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: Part 1, Article 2, para 75). 
 
I have found that, by the mid-1990s, the Women’s Convention had become a central part 
of campaigns for women’s human rights in Malaysia. This can be seen from the 
movements of individuals and groups of women, some of whom are from non-
governmental organisations, who have expressly demanded gender equality rights. The 
1990 Women’s Manifesto was launched by a combination of women’s organisation in 
1999 to secure commitments from all political parties to improve women’s rights before 
the law, women’s employment status and to protect women from violence (Stivens, 2003: 
131-133). According to Stivens, there were also attempts by women’s organisations to 
expand the issues of domestic workers rights, land, environment, sex workers and sexual 
harassment. As a result, Malaysia ratified the Women’s Convention on 5 July 1995. 
Among the international human rights treaties, the Women’s Convention takes an 
important place in bringing the female half of humanity into the focus of human rights 
concerns (Reichert, 2006: 221). As stated in the Introduction to the Women’s Convention’s 
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text, ‘the spirit of the Convention is rooted in the goals of the UN, to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human right, in the dignity and worth of the human person and the equal right 
of men and women’. Therefore, Malaysia’s ratification of the Women’s Convention 
marked an explicit acceptance that Malaysia shares common standards and values on 
women’s rights with the global community.  
 
The Government of Malaysia has also committed itself to a number of initiatives to 
promote gender equality by agreeing to the commitments set out in the World Platform of 
Action
109
 at the Beijing World Conference in 1995
110
. It promised to enhance the national 
machinery for women’s advancement and increase women’s participation in decision-
making (Malaysian Women’s Aid Organisation, 2001). At the Conference, the 
Government prepared its Report which outlined an enabling environment for the 
advancement of Malaysian women, a review of the situation of women in the early 1980s 
prior to the Nairobi Conference,
111
 changes that have taken place since the Nairobi 
Conference, and future strategic goals and objectives (Ahmad, 1998: 50). The Report noted 
that all the recommendations envisaged in the Action Plan for the implementation of the 
National Policy on Women are in line with the macro policies of the National 
Development Plans, Vision 2020, and the World Platform for Action endorsed in the 
Beijing World Conference. According to Aminah Ahmad in the ‘Country Briefing Paper 
on Women in Malaysia’, the Report prepared by the Government of Malaysia at the 
Beijing World Conference acknowledged that women had made significant advances in all 
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 Prepared by delegates that aimed at achieving greater equality and opportunity for women 
110
 Beijing Conference was the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 and was the 
largest international meeting ever convened under the UN. See Smith, Rhona K. M. 2003. Textbook on 
International Human Rights. Oxford University Press 
111
 Nairobi Conference was held from 15-26 July 1985 in Nairobi, Kenya to review and appraise the 
achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Quality, Development and Peace   
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aspects of life, be they public or private (Ahmad, 1998: 51). This was reflected in the 
overall status of women in the country.    
 
Malaysia, when acceding to the Women’s Convention in 1995, ratified the Convention 
with reservations to Article 2 (f), Article 5 (a), Article 7 (b), Article 9 and Article 16. 
Article 2 (f) pertains to the State Parties’ condemnation of discrimination against women in 
all forms, including legislation, policy, regulation, custom and practices, while Article 5 (a) 
is concerned with the State Parties’ action to modify social and cultural patterns of conduct 
of women and men to eliminate practices which are based on the superiority or inferiority 
of the sexes or on the stereotyped roles of both sexes. Article 7 (b) relates to State Parties’ 
action to eliminate discrimination against women in political and public life and to 
guarantee women’s rights to participate in government policy-making. Article 9 requires 
State Parties to grant equal nationality rights to women, while Article 16 obliges State 
Parties to eliminate discrimination against Muslim women in matters relating to marriage 
and family relations; this was objected to due to its non-conformity with Shariah practised 
in Malaysia and the Federal Constitution (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2, 2006: 18). The 
original reservations read as follows: 
 
‘The Government of Malaysia declares that Malaysia’s accession is subject to the 
understanding that the provisions of the Convention do not conflict with the provisions of 
the Islamic Shariah law and the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. With regards thereto, 
further, the Government of Malaysia does not consider itself bound by the provisions of 
Articles 2 (f), 5 (a), 7 (b), 9 and 16 of the aforesaid Convention. In relation to Article 11, 
Malaysia interprets the provisions of this Article as a reference to the prohibition of 




Even though the Government of Malaysia ratified the Women’s Convention, it has been 
criticized by local non-governmental organisations, opposition political parties and 
international organizations for discriminating against Muslim women due to its refusal to 
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accept certain provisions of the Women’s Convention affecting Muslim women as binding 
on it
112
. Because of these criticisms, the Government started to review such reservations 
progressively with a view to lifting them but is still taking into consideration the 
constitutional provisions and national interest. As a result, on 6 February 1998, the 
Government of Malaysia notified the Secretary-General of a partial withdrawal of 
reservations to Article 2 (f), Article 9 (1) and Article 16 (1) (b), (d), (e) and (h) 
(Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, Division for the Advancement of 
Women).  
 
Moreover, the Government of Malaysia has continued to make a commitment to review 
other reservations (Abdul Aziz, 2008: 86). I trace that this was proved by another 
withdrawal made to the reservations of Article 5 (a), Article 7 (b) and Article 16 (2) on 19 
July 2010. Originally, the Government of Malaysia reserved these Articles without specific 
reasons, apart from the fact that they conflicted with the Federal Constitution or Shariah 
practised in Malaysia. However, on 6 February 1998, the Government of Malaysia notified 
the Secretary-General that it had decided to modify its reservation made upon accession 
with respect to Article 5 (a), Article 7 (b) and Article 16 (2) of the Convention 
(Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, Division for the Advancement of 
Women, para 42). With regard to Article 5 (a), the Government of Malaysia declared that 
the provision was subject to the Shariah on the division of inherited property. The 
Government of Malaysia also proclaimed that the application of Article 7 (b) shall not 
affect the appointment of Muslim women to certain public offices such as the Mufti
113
, 
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 See detailed discussion in Chapter One, Section 1.1 
113
 Mufti refers to a person who presents the laws and fiqh of the scholars to people who ask for them.  Mufti 
in Malaysia means the person appointed to be the Mufti for the Federal Territories under Section 32 
(Appointment of Mufti and Deputy Mufti) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 
1993 (Act 505) and includes the Deputy Mufti. Section 33 of the Act stated that ‘The Mufti shall aid and 





 and the Imam
115
, which was in accordance with the provisions of 
Shariah. And lastly, with respect to Article 16 (2), the Government of Malaysia affirmed 
that, under the Islamic-based laws in Malaysia, the minimum age for marriage for Muslim 
women was 16 and for Muslim men 18.   
 
In withdrawing reservations to Article 5 (a), Article 7 (b) and Article 16 (2) of the 
Convention, the Government of Malaysia was not overruling Shariah. In fact, pluralistic 
views and Ijtihad among Shariah scholars in Malaysia pertaining to division of inheritance 
property, appointment of Muslim women as Mufti, Shariah Court Judges and Imam, and 
child marriage have been taken into consideration. This was to achieve the elimination of 
prejudices based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes 
according to the local Malaysian context. The judicial policy has been reformed by 
takhayyur or by selecting opinions from schools of thought other than Shafie and 
combinations of elements from various schools of thought, but it is still consistent with the 
spirit of divine injunctions to achieve equal dignity and justice (Noor, 2007: 136). As a 
result, the laws on the appointment of Muslim women as Mufti, Shariah Court Judges and 




For instance, by virtue of the Shariah practised in Malaysia, Muslim women were 
previously being denied similar rights to Muslim men to hold public offices, such as 
                                                                                                                                                    
the chief authority in the Federal Territories after the Yang di-Pertuan Agung, except where otherwise 
provided in this Act’. The Mufti also makes and publishes fatwa or rulings on any unsettled or controversial 
question of or relating to Islamic law (Section 34 (1)) 
114
 Shariah Court Judges in Malaysia means Judges of the Shariah High Court appointed under Section 43 
(1) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 but does not include a Judge of the 
Shariah Subordinate Courts appointed under Subsection 44 (1) of the same Act 
115
 Imam has multiple meanings, but normally refers to the person who leads congregational prayers and runs 
a mosque. Imam in Malaysia means Imam appointed under Subsection 76 (3) of the Administration of 
Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993. Subsection 76 (3) stated that Imam shall be appointed from 
amongst persons serving in the Religious Administrative Service  
116
 Please refer further discussion on child marriage in Subsection 5.2.2 
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Shariah Court Judges. However, previous scholars have had conflicting views; some of 
them approved of and some disagreed with the appointment of Muslim women as judges in 
Shariah Courts. The minority view, held by Imam Abu Hanifah
117
, expressed approval of 





Malaysian National Fatwa Council, at its 73rd Conference held on 6 April 2006, later 
decided that Muslim women could be appointed as Shariah Court Judges provided that 
they had qualifications, were credible and had wide experience in Shariah matters (Portal 
Rasmi Fatwa Malaysia). Recently, two female Muslim judges were appointed as the first 
female Shariah Court Judges in Malaysia (Mohamad, 2010). With that, I argue, reservation 
to Article 7 (b) deserved to be withdrawn.  
 
However, I note that, thus far, the Women’s Convention has yet to be made enforceable in 
domestic courts because Malaysia has yet to pass any legislation to fully adopt the 
provisions of the Convention and has instead opted to apply it in a piecemeal fashion. The 
CEDAW was concerned that the Women’s Convention is not yet part of Malaysian laws 
and that its provisions are not enforceable in domestic courts (U. N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 7). It is therefore necessary for a law be passed at the 
national level to give effect to the international commitments entered into. Because 
Malaysia follows a dualist approach in the application of international law, the rules of 
international law can operate in Malaysia only if they are deliberately transformed into it 
by means of a parliamentary enactment. Hamid (2006: n.p) has explained that ‘an analysis 
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 Imam Abu Hanifah’s full name is Nuʿman ibn Thabit ibn Zuṭa ibn Marzuban (699-765 CE/80-148 AH), 
the founder of the Sunni Hanafi school of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) 
118
 Hudud, also transliterated hadud, hudood; singular hadd. Its literal meaning is ‘limit’ or ‘restriction’, the 
words often used in Islamic literature for the bounds of acceptable behaviour and the punishments for serious 
crimes. In Islam, hudud usually refers to the class of punishments which are fixed for certain crimes that are 
considered to be ‘claims of God’. They include theft, robbery, rebellion, fornication, consumption of alcohol 
and apostasy 
119
 Qisas is an Islamic term which means retaliation, similar to the biblical principle of an eye for an eye. In 
the case of murder, it means the right of the heirs of a murder victim to demand execution of the murderer 
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of the Malaysian cases involving issues of international law in one way or another 
demonstrates convincingly that the Malaysian courts have applied international treaties to 
which Malaysia is a party provided that the treaty concerned has been transformed into 
the Malaysian law by means of a statute made by Parliament’. Although the Malaysian 
courts might not enforce treaty obligations, small windows have nonetheless been opened 
where Malaysian courts have referred to international human rights treaty obligations
120
. 
Malaysia submitted its initial and first periodical reports in 2006 prepared by the CEDAW 
Steering Committee
121
; these have thoroughly indicated Malaysia’s commitment and 
progress towards eliminating gender discrimination since its ratification of the Women’s 
Convention. 
 
4.4 EQUALITY UNDER THE MALAYSIAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND 
STATUTES: ‘DE FACTO’ CONSIDERED? 
 
 
In the concluding comment made against Malaysia in the CEDAW’s Thirty-Fifth Session, 
the CEDAW expressed concern that the term ‘discrimination’ is not defined in either the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution or in other statutes in Malaysia (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/ 
C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 7). I argue that Malaysia enacts human rights laws under the 
Federal Constitution in order to challenge bias and intolerance.  Secondly, these laws aim 
to create opportunities for vulnerable groups to participate in development processes. In 
this way, discrimination is tackled. Parliament has classified these as human rights which 
are based on the notions of ‘personal liberty, equality, free speech and human dignity’ (N. 
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 See Abdul Malek Hussin v Borhan Hj Daud [2007] 1 LNS 460 where the Judge held, ‘I am mindful of the 
fact that I am presently dealing with the fundamental liberty of the citizens. The preservation of the personal 
liberty of the individual is a sacred universal value of all civilized nations and is enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1948’. See also Jakob Renner v Scott King, 
Chairman of Board of Directors of Kuala Lumpur International School [2000] 3 CLJ 569 
121
 CEDAW Steering Committee was established to monitor the implementation of the Women’s Convention 
and to prepare the report 
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Mahmood, 2006: 3). It is a basic principle that all persons regardless of gender shall be 
afforded equal protection of the laws in Malaysia.   
 
As discussed earlier, gender equality does not mean that women and men are to be treated 
the same even though they are different or that they are to be treated differently when they 
are similar. Therefore, the first step to empowering women and protecting their equal 
rights as human beings in Malaysia is to understand the meaning of equality according to 
the national legal context. I explore how the term ‘equality’ is interpreted under the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution and its application in various statutes. I argue that gender 
equality laws could be regarded as being in the best interest of women rather than simply 
developing a ‘culture’ of equal rights. I trace that the Malaysian Federal Constitution 
reflects its guarantee of formal equality of gender by conferring similar rights on women 
and men, as stated in Article 5 to Article 13 discussed earlier, and substantive equality by 
offering special and affirmative measures for equal outcomes and assigning different rights 
and roles to women and men
122
 to avoid discrimination due to their differences.    
 
I trace that the other national legislations guarantee equal gender rights in a number of 
different areas, including public and political life, employment, education, healthcare and 
family matters, which will be examined in the next Chapter. Moreover, the Government 
policies are extended to uphold the principles of equality and integrate all women into all 
sectors of development in accordance with their needs and capabilities (Suhakam’s Report 
on the Human Rights Approach to the Millennium Development Goals 3: Promote Gender 
Equality and Empower Women, 2006: 1-2; Ahmad, 1998). As I explained in the earlier 
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 Men and women are given different roles and responsibilities in family matters. The Malaysian Federal 
Constitution gives jurisdiction to Shariah Court (State) to deal with personal rights of Muslims, as stated 
under Article 1, List II-State List of the Ninth Schedule, Federal Constitution. Article 74 (2) of the 
Constitution empowers the State legislatures to make laws on any matter in the State List  
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Section, the establishment of NACIWID, HAWA, National Policy on Women, National 
Action Plan and Action Plan for Women in Development was intended to empower 
women and to provide affirmative actions to assist women as a disadvantaged group in 
attaining self-confidence and achieving advancement under the opportunities afforded by 
the national development plans. Generally, Muslim women’s rights in Malaysia are similar 
to those of men according to the laws, but there are a few situations where women’s and 
men’s entitlements to rights are different due to the application of substantive equality.   
 
Malaysian women have been considered equal in their legal status with men, and this has 
been recognized and guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, which is stated under Article 
8 (1) mentioned earlier. However, the Constitution was silent on the meaning of equality 
apart from a few details on discrimination. Practically, discrimination is often interpreted 
as ‘treating women differently to men to the detriment of women’ (U. N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: Part 1, Article 1, para 25). Article 8 (2) further provides that 
citizens will not be discriminated against by laws on the ground of gender. Article 8 (2) 
reads: ‘except as expressly authorised by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination 
against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender in 
any law….’ 
 
Ahmad (2005: 3) has explained that the inclusion of the word ‘gender’ in Article 8 (2) read 
with Article 8 (1) provides the following: 
‘1. Non-discrimination against females on the basis of cultural definitions of her role in 
society 
 
2. Non-discrimination against females on the basis of her biological sex difference 
 
3. Non-discrimination against males on the basis of biological sex differences and 




Ahmad (2005), who analysed the compliance of Article 8 with the equality standard and 
the Women’s Convention, has come to the conclusion that formal equality was dominant in 
Malaysia but has been displaced by the substantive equality standard. Substantive equality 
was defined in Malaysia in 1987 by Tun Salleh Abbas, in Malaysian Bar & Anor v 
Government of Malaysia
123
 as follows ‘…the requirement for equal protection of the law 
does not mean that that all laws passed by a legislature must apply equally to all persons 
and that the laws so passed cannot create differences as to the persons to whom they apply 
and the territorial limits within which they are in force…’. Thus, in Malaysia, substantive 
equality is comprehensively defined and adopted not only in the policies and 
administrative programmes as discussed earlier, but also by the judiciary.  
 
Ahmad (2005) has argued that Article 8 (1) and (2) are in pari materia to Article 14 and 
Article 15 (1) respectively of the Indian Constitution, which gradually adopted substantive 
equality. This argument is based on Kapur and Cossman’s (1996: 175-176) studies on 
feminists’ engagement with laws in India, which stressed that Indian constitutional laws 
have been informed by formal equality, yet fragments of the substantive approach have 
been progressively identifiable. Moreover, Article 15, as explained by Singh, Musharraf 
and Mollah (2006: 156), ‘tries to ensure substantive equality by allowing special 
provisions in laws, including reservation for women and children to overcome the 
inequality in status’. It is important to note here that the Malaysian Federal Constitution is 
adapted from Indian constitutional concepts, apart from British and United States 
constitutional frameworks (Hamzah and Bulan, 2003). 
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The SUHAKAM, in its Report on the Human Rights Approach to MDGs 3: Promote 
Gender Equality and Empower Women, has stressed that, in promoting gender equality 
and women’s empowerment, Malaysia is in line with the approach of substantive equality 
adopted by the Women’s Convention. Malaysia, according to the Report, has three 
approaches to equality: formal equality approach, substantive equality approach and 
protectionist approach. Similarly to substantive equality approaches, the Report explained, 
the protectionist approach recognises the difference between women and men; however, 
the protectionist approach differs from the substantive equality approach insofar as it bars 
women from performing certain acts in order to protect them. According to Hevener (1983: 
4), the legal protectionist approach engenders a situation where women should not or 
cannot engage in specified activities. Thus, the protectionist approach is part of how 
substantive equality works, which purposely strives to ensure equal outcomes.      
   
Article 15 of the Women’s Convention asserts the full equality of women in civil and 
business matters, demanding that all instruments directed at restricting women's legal 
capacity ‘shall be deemed null and void’. In Malaysia, as I traced earlier, Muslim women 
are ‘sui juris’ and therefore have full equality in civil and business matters. Women may 
enter into any type of contractual relationship, whether in relation to commercial or non-
commercial activities as allowed by the Contracts Act 1950 (Act 319) (CA) (Kamaruddin, 
2006: 24). In this Act, for the contract to be valid, it should be entered into by a competent 
person who has given free consent, for a lawful consideration in relation to a lawful object 
(Section 10). Without disadvantaging anyone on the grounds of sex, ‘a competent person’ 
is further defined by Section 11 as ‘a person who has attained the age of majority and who 
is of sound mind and not disqualified by any law from contracting’. For the purposes of 
making a contract, a person of sound mind is one who is able to comprehend the contract 
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and form a rational judgement as to its effect upon her/his interest (Section 12). These 
provisions show that the capability and validity of a contract is based on the willingness of 
parties to perform or not to perform certain acts, rather than on the gender of the parties. 
That is why the term used to refer to the competent person is ‘a person’ which refers to 
both women and men. Hence, there is no room for sexual bias. In a specific commercial 
transaction, for instance, I trace that, in relation to the hire-purchase of goods, the 
terminology used in the law regulating such a transaction, in this case the Hire Purchase 
Act 1967 (Act 212) (HPA), is also neutral. The definitions of ‘owner124’ and ‘hirer125’ 
make no distinction on the basis of gender. The HPA also provides protection and redress 
to hirers on a general basis (Part III), regardless of the sex of the hirer or the owner. Based 
on this, a woman and man can enter into a hire-purchase agreement or any contract in so 
far as she fulfils the criteria laid down by the statutes.     
 
I trace that the judicial system in Malaysia regards women and men as equal and both have 
equal access to the judicial system. According to the Evidence Act 1950 (Act 56) (EA), 
any person, regardless of gender, can be a witness in court and can testify as long as he or 
she possesses a sound mind and rational understanding of the questions put to him or her. 
Section 118 of the EA stated that ‘All persons shall be competent to testify unless the court 
considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from 
giving rational answers to those questions by tender years, extreme old age, disease, 
whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind’. The testimony of women 
and men is treated equally and the acceptability is based on the credibility of the witness 
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 Owner is defined in Section 2 of the Hire Purchase Act 1967 (Act 212) as ‘a person who lets or has let 
goods to a hirer under a hire-purchase agreement and includes a person to whom the owner’s rights or 
liabilities under the agreement have passed by assignment or by operation of law’ 
125
 Hirer is defined in Section 2 of the Hire Purchase Act 1967 (Act 212) as ‘the person who takes or has 
taken goods from an owner under a hire-purchase agreement and includes a person to whom the hirer’s 
rights or liabilities under the agreement have passed by assignment or by operation of law’ 
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and relevance of the testimony, not on the gender of the witness. Thus, for the initiation of 
any legal proceeding, women and men can sue and be sued in their own names. A woman 
is also entitled to all remedies and redress available in laws in all respects.   
 
I find that women’s integrity and wellbeing are taken into consideration during criminal 
investigations and that they are treated differently from men in terms of sentencing. For 
example, the Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593) (CPC) provides that ‘whenever it is 
necessary to cause a woman to be searched, the search shall be made by another woman 
with strict regard to decency’ (Section 19). Further, in terms of sentencing, there is a 
circumstance in which women are treated differently from men in consideration of their 
disadvantages. For instance, a sentence of death shall be commuted to life imprisonment if 
the woman convicted of an offence punishable with death is pregnant (Section 275 of the 
Penal Code). Women also shall not be punished with whipping (Section 289 (a)). This 
shows that this Malaysian law on sentencing takes into consideration the substance and 
principle of gender equality as examined earlier, that women, as a disadvantaged group in 
this perspective, should be treated differently to ensure equal outcomes for dignity and 
justice.   
  
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this Chapter, I have provided an overview of the ways in which Islamic textual sources 
have formed part of the sources of Malaysian laws on human rights and Muslim women’s 
rights, because the laws of the Malay land were Islamic-based (Mohamad Ibrahim, 1987; 
Aun, 1999), which can be traced in most of the digests (Ngah, 1980; Awang, 1984). The 
idea of rights had already taken root in the pre-colonial Malay states prior to the the 
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introduction of English common laws in 1807 (Kheng, 2001: 73). However, I noted that 
Malaysia has drafted its human rights provisions in parallel with Western-based and 
Islamic-based Declarations. It is important that these domestic human rights laws are 
congruent with both sources, because the laws apply to all people, both Muslims and non-
Muslims, in Malaysia. In my exploration of the fundamental liberties of Malaysian 
citizens, I argued that woman is a legal subject under Malaysian laws.  
  
I argued that it is possible to admit that the notion of equality which informs the Women’s 
Convention is harmonious with the principle of right to equality as adopted by Article 8 of 
the Malaysian Federal Constitution, statutes and policies. I traced that Malaysia enacts 
laws on human rights (fundamental liberties) under the Federal Constitution purposely to 
prevent any forms of bias and intolerance among citizens with regard to the laws and 
policies of the government and to create positive opportunities for vulnerable groups to 
participate in development processes, which define how gender inequalities are to be 
eliminated. Apart from the laws, the Government applies equality through appropriate 
means, such as policies, administrative decisions and programmes. These indeed show that 
the Government has made a continuous and consistent effort to ensure that all women are 
given special measures to facilitate their full development and advancement, and their 
acclimatization into the mainstream of social and economic activities. These means also 
increase the understanding of the human rights concept, as they give formal recognition to 
the cultural and traditional influences that are restricting women's enjoyment of their 
fundamental rights. Even though men are not treated the same, this does not mean that the 
Government is biased against women; however, considering that women have been 
historically and systematically disadvantaged, they must be treated differently to 




It is important to ensure that Malaysian laws are in line with the Women’s Convention in 
interpreting equality because the Convention spells out the meaning of equality from 
women’s perspective and how it can be achieved. This harmonisation is significant 
considering that the notion of equality under the Women’s Convention is parallel with that 
of Islamic jurisprudence as explored in Chapter Three. With the idea that gender equality 
according to the Malaysian legal context runs parallel with that of the Women’s 
Convention, I will analyse in the next Chapter how Malaysia has responded to the 
CEDAW’s concluding comments made against Malaysia in the CEDAW’s Thirty-Fifth 




















CONFLICTING OR COMPLEMENTARY NORMS? MUSLIM WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS UNDER THE WOMEN’S CONVENTION AND MALAYSIAN LAWS, 




In this Chapter, I examine whether Malaysia, as a State Party to the Convention, is taking 
all appropriate measures, including laws, policies, administrative decisions and 
programmes, to eliminate Muslim women’s disadvantages based on the principal areas of 
concern and recommendations of the CEDAW in the concluding comments made against 
Malaysia following the Thirty-Fifth Session in New York from 15 May to 2 June, 2006, 
and based on the application of equality informed by the Women’s Convention. In the 
CEDAW’s concluding comments, I note that there are several principal areas of concern to 
the CEDAW which require progressive efforts by the Government of Malaysia to resolve. 
They are in regard to the definition and application of equality, elimination of gender 
stereotypes, public and political life, employment, adequate sanctions for acts of violence 
against women, trafficking, rural women and, most importantly, CEDAW’s concern about 
the reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the Women’s Convention. In this 
Chapter, I analyse Malaysia’s response to the CEDAW’s concerns regarding all the above-
mentioned issues, except the definition and application of equality, which has already been 
examined in Chapter Four, and reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the 




First, I consider whether the Government of Malaysia has amended or abolished existing 
laws, regulations and practices that constitute the disadvantaging of women and modified 
social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men which are based on the idea of 
superiority and inferiority of either of the sexes in economic and social mainstream 
activities and marriage and family relations. Second, I consider whether Malaysia has 
committed itself to undertaking a series of measures to end gender discrimination laws in 
all forms and to incorporate the principle of equality of women and men in its legal system. 
In this analysis, I argue that the Women’s Convention has provided a wide and general 
definition of the nature of rights, which might allow ratifying State Parties to interpret 
every single provision in the light of their national circumstances and cultural and religious 
beliefs, provided that the domestic laws guarantee gender equality and do not conflict with 
the object, purpose and principle of the Convention. Having said this, I argue that Malaysia 
has incorporated the substance of the Convention, which is the principle of equality, in its 
national legislation, policies, administrative decisions and programmes. I argue that the 
latest enactments and amendments of laws to prevent women from being treated unequally 
evidence the sensitivity of the Government to gender equality. The practical realization of 
gender equality in Malaysia can be seen from the response of the Malaysian Government 
to calls for a review of laws to adopt appropriate legislative measures, including sanctions 
prohibiting discrimination against women in various sectors. In Malaysia, Muslim and 
non-Muslim women share similar rights protection stated in the Women’s Convention, but 
not those pertaining to marriage and family relations.  
 
Earlier literature on women’s movements and the legal system in Malaysia as discussed in 
Chapter Four indicates that Muslims in Malaysia were dominated by Hindus and Buddhists 
from India (Ahmed, 1964: 1-3). Malay Sultanates, as the heads of religion of Islam in 
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every state, were also influenced by the religious interpretation of Hinduism and Buddhism 
(Noor, 2007: 57). According to liberal feminist literature, classical Malay Muslim scholars’ 
thought was gender-biased, misogynist, narrow-minded and backward, as demonstrated in 
the classical jurisprudence documents and writings
126
 (Ramli, 2010). Literal understanding 
of the religious teaching in the classical fiqh books, according to Noor (2007: 125), seemed 
to strengthen the superiority of men. The context of superiority of the male over the female 
in Malay Muslim society is generally understood based on the role of men as family 
providers and the role of women in managing household affairs and raising children (Raja 
Mamat, 1991: 14-15).  
 
However, Islam played a significant role afterwards, replacing Hinduism (Al-Attas, 1969). 
The Shafie school of thought spread throughout the history of the Malay world until the 
1990s due to the influences of religious education in which the jurisprudence of the Shafie 
school of law was taught (El-Muhammady, 1992: 53), which continues to this day. I trace 
that gender equality laws have been applied in Malaysia and the progressive development 
of women has been evidenced since the 1980s, following the establishment of the 
NACIWID, as explained in Chapter Four. I argue that the Government has worked towards 
reducing this disparity and has shown a commitment to promoting gender equality laws 
and implementing comprehensive measures to change stereotypical roles of women and 
men to eliminate stereotypes associated with traditional gender roles. I might say that, even 
though Malaysia has been slow in responding to international developments in the field of 
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 Almost all classical Muslim jurists were male. A study stated that nowhere in the history of Alam Melayu 
(Malay World) was there any mention of female Muslim jurists or their contribution. See Azra, Azyumardi. 
2002. Historiografi Islam Kontemporer: Wacana Aktualitas dan Aktor Sejarah. Jakarta: PT Gramedia 
Pustaka Utama. However, there was a Malay Muslim scholar named Fatimah who had written a book entitled 
‘Perukunan Jamaluddin’ which explained about Islamic pillars and the pillars of faith, yet the book was 
published under Fatimah’s uncle’s name, ‘Al-Alim Al-Allamah Mufti Jamal Al-Din Ibn Al-Marhum Al-Alim 
Al-Fadil Al-Syeikh Muhammad Arshad Al-Banjari’. See Ramli, Mohd. Anuar. 2010. ‘Pemikiran ‘Mesra 










Ramli (2010: 278) has proved that some views of classical jurists were ‘gender-friendly’129 
and the liberal feminist view that classical Malay Muslim scholars’ thought was gender-
biased is prejudicial to the Muslim scholars. Abdullah (2007: 517) has observed that the 
British administrators during the Malay colonial period wanted to investigate the Malay 
community practices and Malay customs pertaining to family relations further because, 
according to the British colonial administrators, Malay family relations were matrilineal. 
The matrilineal nature of family relationships among Malays was not uncommon (Kassim, 
1992) because the Malays had applied Islamic rules and customs to regulate their marriage 
and family relations, which had given more privileges to women as a disadvantaged group 
and imposed more duties on men. This might have been observed from the Muslim wife’s 
entitlement to dowry, maintenance during marriage and after dissolution of marriage, 
jointly acquired property, mut’ah or consolatory gift after divorce, and inheritance from 
father, husband, brother and son.   
 
The situation of Muslim women in Malaysia today has gradually improved due to their 
increasing access to the public sphere, such as in education and economic activities, as 
women’s higher educational attainment increases their income-generating capacity 
(Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development and UNDP, 2007). I will argue 
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 For example, in the 2010 worldwide press freedom ranking index by Reporters without Borders, Malaysia 
ranked 141 out of 178, in 2009 ranked 131 out of 175, in 2008 it was placed 132 out of 173, ranked 124 in 
2007 out of 169 and in 2006, Malaysia ranked 92 out of 168. Also, Malaysia’s score in the Corruptions 
Perceptions Index has dropped, with its ranking 47 out of 180 countries in 2008, 56 out of 180 in 2009, 56 
out of 178 in 2010 and 60 out of 182 in 2011. See Online: http:// www.transparency.org.my/. Retrieved on 
15/12/2011 
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 See detailed discussion in Chapter Four 
129
 Ramli may be using the term ‘gender-friendly’  to mean gender-neutral 
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that the improvement is also evidenced by several policies, administrative decisions, 
programmes and amendments to laws that have attempted to remove gender inequalities; 
these will be discussed in this Chapter. Major policy initiatives to empower women were 
included widely in the government and non-government sectors. Dato' Seri Najib
130
, who 
was reading a speech on behalf of the Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi
131
 (as he 





Supporting the Prime Minister’s statement, Dato' Seri Shahrizat Abdul Jalil, the former 
Minister of Women, Family and Community Development, said in her address at the same 
event that the Government of Malaysia, as a State Party to the Women’s Convention, 
would review laws and policies that were gender-biased. It is indeed the Government that 
plays an important role, as Rebecca Cook writes:  
‘If a state facilitates conditions, accommodates, tolerates, justifies or excuses private 
denials of women’s rights, the state will bear responsibility. The state will be responsible 
not directly for the private acts, but for its own lack of diligence to prevent, control, 
correct or discipline such private acts through its own executive, legislative or judicial 








In the concluding comments made against Malaysia by the CEDAW in the Thirty-Fifth 
Session in New York, the CEDAW calls upon Malaysia to implement comprehensive 
measures to change stereotypical roles of women and men and to eliminate stereotypes 
                                                 
130




 Prime Minister of Malaysia 
132
 The speech was delivered during the National Women’s Day celebration in 2006. See Online: 
http://www.undp.org.my/25-08-2006-dato-seri-najib-launches-gender-budget-publications-in-conjunct ion -
with-womens-day. Retrieved on 12/03/2010 
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associated with traditional gender roles in accordance with Article 2 (f) and Article 5 (a) of 
the Women’s Convention (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 16). Article 2 (f) 
states that State Parties undertake ‘to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, 
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women’. Article 5 (a) states an obligation of State Parties ‘to modify 
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the 
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the 
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for 
men and women’. In Malaysia, as explained by Raja Mamat (1991: 14-15), the superiority 
of the male over the female in Malay Muslim society is generally understood based on the 
role of men as family providers and the role of women in managing household affairs and 
raising children. Part of the obligation to eliminate women’s disadvantages is achieved by 
formally guaranteed equality by the Federal Constitution and also by statutes, as discussed 
in Chapter Four. In this Section, I consider whether existing laws, regulations and practices 
that constitute disadvantaging women in economic and social mainstream activities and in 
marriage and family relations has been amended by the Government of Malaysia.   
 
5.2.1 Economic and Social Mainstream Activities 
The CEDAW has encouraged Malaysia to take ‘sustained measures’ to accelerate the 
increase in the representation of women in public life (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 
2006: para 18). As I mentioned in Chapter Two, a broad range of activities outside the 
domestic sphere or public life is dominated by men, who historically have exercised the 
power to confine and subordinate women within the private sphere (General 
Recommendations No. 23, 16th Session, 1997: Comment para 8). In this Section, I will 
show that efforts such as providing temporary special measures have been made by the 
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Malaysian Government to facilitate the assimilation of women into the mainstream of 
social and economic activities to eliminate gender stereotype norms that constrain women 
in their private lives only. Private life, in this analysis, refers to the sphere associated with 
managing household activities, acting as a wife, reproduction, and the raising of children. 
This, I trace, could modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men 
which are based on the idea of the superiority or inferiority of either of the sexes. I note 
that the Government has progressively empowered women and eliminated gender 
stereotypes by ensuring women’s financial independence and providing special measures 
in economic activities, education and healthcare and in marriage and family relations. 
  
5.2.1.1 Financial Independence and Economic Activities 
As special measures are important for empowering women and for ensuring substantive 
equality (Kapur and Cossman, 1996), I have found that women are entitled to more 
financial rights to compensate for their previous economic disadvantages in Malaysia. This 
is parallel with Article 1 and Article 4 of the Women’s Convention regarding the principle 
of equality that, to ensure equality, those who are disadvantaged (women) should be 
protected by the provision of special measures to empower them (Facio and Morgan, 2009) 
and to remedy past and present disadvantages (Rebouche, 2009: 712-713). This aims to 
ensure that, in the end, women will be socially and economically equal with men.  
  
In 1975, the Government of Malaysia amended the Income Tax Act 1967 (Revised 1971) 
(Act 53) (ITA) to allow wives to elect for separate assessment of their income for tax 
purposes. This is to ensure that the wives’ rights are equal to those of the husbands, which 
are guaranteed by law. Previously, Section 45 (2) of the ITA stated that a wife had to be 
taxed jointly with her husband. I trace that, prior to this amendment, the law was gendered 
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and did not represent woman as a legal subject. Women were treated less favourably as 
they were not allowed to be assessed individually for in-come tax purposes, which 
amounted to discrimination against women. This might be an example of direct 
discrimination as explained by Bindman (1992: 52) and Fredman (2001: 160) earlier, and 
could be proved by forwarded evidence that the victim of discrimination has been or would 
be treated less favourably than another person and against the principle of equality as 
enunciated under Article 1 and Article 4 of the Women’s Convention as explained in 
Chapter Three. It was not until the year 2000 that Section 45 (2) was again amended to 
enable either spouse to elect for aggregation of his/her income with that of the other 
spouse. Section 45 (2) now reads; 
‘Subject to this section, where an individual and his wife were living together in the basis 
year for a year of assessment and did not in that basis year cease to live together or to be 
husband and wife of each other-  
(a) the wife may elect in writing (wife who elects) that her total income shall be 
aggregated with the total income of her husband and assessed in his name for 
that year of assessment; or 
 
(b) the husband may elect in writing (husband who elects) that his total income 
shall be aggregated with the total income of his wife and assessed in her name 
for that year of assessment:  
Provided that where the wife who elects or the husband who elects is not 
resident for the basis year for a year of assessment, such wife or husband, as the 
case may be, may elect under this subsection only if she or he is a citizen’. 
 
Later, Section 45A of the ITA was added to provide for deduction for the husband. Section 
45A stated that ‘Where (a) the husband has no source of income; (b) the husband has no 
total income which can be aggregated with that of his wife; or (c) an election has been 
made by the husband under paragraph 45(2) (b), there shall be allowed to the wife, for a 
year of assessment, in addition to the allowances or deduction (if any) to that wife under 
Sections 46, Section 48 and Section 49, a deduction of three thousand ringgit for the 
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husband and a further three thousand five hundred ringgit if he is a disabled person: 
Provided that this section shall only apply to one wife’. 
 
Moreover, according to the ITA, a wife and husband are legally entitled to choose who 
should claim their children’s tax relief, which is an indication of women’s financial 
independence. This clearly shows that woman is recognised as ‘sui juris’ and has the right 
to choose. Section 48 (4) stated that ‘Where two or more individuals are each entitled to 
claim a deduction for a year of assessment under this section for a payment made in 
respect of the same child, there shall be allowed to each of those individuals, in place of 
the whole deduction which would otherwise be allowed under this section, a reduced 
deduction which, in the case of any one of those individuals, shall bear the same 
proportion to that whole deduction as the payment made by that individual bears to the 
total of the payments made by all those individuals’. Similarly, under the same Act, either 
the wife or the husband may claim medical expenses for parents that were incurred in the 
year of assessment. In addition, either the wife or the husband can claim tax relief for 
medical expenses of a spouse or child suffering from a serious disease and for the purchase 
of medical support equipment for the individual’s own use, or for other family members, 
including parents, who are disabled. This recognises the financial independence of 
Malaysian women, who constitute an increasingly important proportion of the Malaysian 
work force, in both public and private sectors. These amended legal provisions denote that 
the laws are neutral and not a gendered product.  
  
Under the Pension Act 1980 (Act 227), workers are paid pensions based upon a 
predetermined formula irrespective of gender (Section 1). In the case of a male pensioner 
who dies, his widow and children will continue to receive his pension; the same principle 
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applies upon the death of a female prisoner (Section 15). The Government has also rightly 
recognised the problems faced by widows who remarry. Previously, under the Pensions 
Act 1980, widows lost their pensions if they remarried. In the Budget Speech of October 
2001, the Prime Minister announced that widows would continue to receive pensions even 
after they remarried (Budget Speech 2002: 48-49). The pension is paid directly to the 
widow and to the children until they attain the age of maturity (Section 16). This is a way 
of eliminating laws that have the effect or purpose of denying women’s exercise and 
enjoyment of their rights to remarry, which is against the principle of equality as 
enunciated under Article 1 of the Women’s Convention, as explained by Facio and Morgan 
(2009).  
 
Moreover, in 2004, Section 20A (1) (a) of the Employees’ Social Security Act 1969 (Act 
4) regarding survivors’ pensions was amended by Act A1232, and Section 20B was 
deleted. Under Section 20A (1), before the amendment, if an insured person who was in 
receipt of an invalidity pension died, a survivor’s pension was payable to widows only, and 
not widowers. This, I note was a gender-biased law and distinction that discriminates 
against women. As expressed by Bayefsky (1990: 34), distinction is discriminatory if it has 
no objective or reasonable justification; thus, I trace that excluding widowers from 
receiving their wives’ pensions is a kind of unjustified distinction which amounts to 
discrimination, not only against the wives, but also against the husbands. Now, Section 
20A (1) (a) reads as follows; 
‘If an insured person who is in receipt of invalidity pension, or if an insured person who 
has not attained 55 years of age but has completed a full or reduced qualifying period as 
specified under section 17A, dies, survivors’ pension at the rates specified in the Eighth 
Schedule shall be payable- 
 
(a) to the widow or the widower during life, and if there are two or more widows, the 
widow’s share of survivors’ pension specified in the Eighth Schedule shall be divided 
equally between the widows: 
165 
 
Provided that if a widow or widower is entitled to more than one survivors’ pension, she or 
he shall be paid only one pension, being the pension with the higher rate’. 
 
Likewise, the dependent’s benefit payable under Section 26133 was extended to widowers. 
Section 20B, which was deleted, stated that a widower was entitled to the survivor’s 
pension only if he was without adequate means of support and if he was wholly or mainly 
dependent on the earnings of such insured person at the time of her death. This provision 
was seen as disadvantaging women in that they could not transmit to their husbands a 
benefit equal to that which male workers could leave to their wives. This ‘discriminatory 
provision’ had to be eliminated to ensure that female workers were given rights equal to 
those of male workers, so that their dependents are guaranteed similar rights to be 
financially protected after the death of their ‘breadwinner’. 
 
Moreover, Bank Negara (Central Bank) Malaysia formally provides, on a gender-blind 
basis, various loan schemes to promote the development of certain sectors or activities 
including the Low Cost Housing Program, the New Entrepreneur Fund Scheme, the Fund 
for Tourism and the Entrepreneur Rehabilitation Scheme (Bank Negara Malaysia). Gender 
is not a consideration in assessing an applicant’s suitability for a housing or conveyance 
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 Section 26 (1) and (2) of the Employees’ Social Security Act 1969 (Act 4) stated that; ‘If an insured 
person dies as a result of an employment injury sustained as an employee under this Act (whether or not he 
was in receipt of any periodical payment for temporary disablement in respect of the injury) dependants’ 
benefit at the rates specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be payable to his dependants as follows: (a) to the 
widow or widower during life, and, if there are two or more widows, the widow’s share of dependants’ 
benefit specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be divided equally between the widows: 
Provided that if a widow or a widower is entitled to more than one dependants’ benefits, she or he shall be 
paid only one benefit, being the benefit with the higher rate (b) to each child until marriage or until he 
attains the age of twenty-one years, whichever occurs earlier: 
Provided that in the case of a child referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘child’ in section 2, 
dependants’ benefit shall continue to be paid so long as he is incapable of supporting himself: 
And provided further that the Organization may continue such benefit to any child who is in receipt of 
education in any institution of higher learning but not beyond the first degree until he completes or ceases to 
receive such education or until he marries, whichever occurs earlier (c) (Deleted by Act A675) 
(2) If an insured person who dies as a result of an employment injury does not leave a widow or child, 
dependants’ benefit shall be payable to the widowed mother and other dependants as specified in paragraph 




loan at the Bank Negara Malaysia; instead, factors such as the applicant’s years of service, 
seniority and ability to repay the loan are taken into account (Housing Loan Division and 
Treasury Malaysia). In the public sector, both female and male officers have equal access 
to government housing loans and conveyance loans under Section 5 of the Housing Loan 
Fund Act 1971 (Act 42).    
  
As Islamic and feminist jurisprudences have provided, to ensure gender equality; similar 
treatment will not necessarily guarantee equal outcomes if women are in an unequal 
position with regard to men to begin with (Bakar, 2003; Yaacob, 1986; Fletcher, 2002; 
Kingdom, 1991; Wolgast, 1980). As explained earlier, sameness will not necessarily 
produce equality, and treating women and men with similarity may simply perpetuate the 
difference between them (Fletcher (2002: 149). Women’s equality requires both the 
acknowledgement and accommodation of women’s actual differences and elimination of 
discriminatory treatment (Cook and Howard, 2006-2007: 1044). Thus, special measures 
are important to compensate women’s disadvantage in financial and economic activities. 
Special funds for women’s advancement are allocated by the Treasury and the Ministries134 
to reduce poverty among women by providing incentives for home-based industries and 
introducing marketing schemes for their products (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: 
Part 1, Article 3, para 83 (ii)). This was realised by allocating specific loans for women in 




 is among the best mechanisms for enabling poor and unskilled women to 
enter the economic arena, while entrepreneurship is developed by teaching entrepreneurial 
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 The Ministries are the Ministry of Entrepreneurial Development, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry, the Ministry of National Unity and Social Development and the Ministry of Rural Development and 
Youth and Sports 
135
 It is sometimes used interchangeably with micro enterprise 
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skills and business practices such as how to deal with clients, how to use profits, where to 
sell, the use of special discounts, credit sales, and what goods and services to produce 
(Malaysia Nurturing Women Entrepreneurs, 2008). It was reported in the Malaysia 
Nurturing Women Entrepreneurs in 2008 that microfinance in Malaysia had its roots in the 
Ikhtiar Project
136
, which was conducted with an allocation of only RM2,000; its success 
led to the establishment of the Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) as an independent trust 
body in 1987 to promote microcredit throughout the country in order to help eradicate 
hard-core poverty, which particularly affected women. By its 20th anniversary in 2007, the 
AIM had established 69 branches and was serving a total of 173,000 members, referred to 
as Sahabat (friends). The AIM is funded through interest-free loans from the Malaysian 
Government, starting with the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990). Under the Sixth Malaysia 
Plan (1991-1995), a loan of RM20 million was allocated to the AIM, with another RM300 
million added during the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000). To date, the Government has 
successfully trained 2,680 women entrepreneurs nationwide while an additional 2,000 are 
still in training (Economic Management and Prospects, 2011). 
 
Moreover, the Women Entrepreneurs Fund (WEF) was also established in 1998 to increase 
women’s participation in business, with an initial allocation of RM10 million and another 
RM10 million under the Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001-2005) (Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001). 
This would strengthen women’s position in the public sphere. Furthermore, in 1999, the 
Government allocated RM50 million from the National Budget to the Women’s Affairs 
Secretariat and, in 2002, the National Budget allocated RM59 million to finance 
programmes for women, increasing to RM105.4 million in 2004 (Economic Planning Unit, 
2005: 101). This adoption of special measures for women was intended to achieve ‘de 
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 The Ikhtiar Project pioneered by Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) in 1985 
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facto’ or substantive equality between women and men and should not be considered a 
kind of discrimination defined by Article 1 of the Women’s Convention, as explained in 
Chapter Three. These special measures are temporary in nature, as they are allocated from 
the annual Malaysian National Budget and will change accordingly, depending upon 
whether the objectives of equality of treatment have been achieved.   
 
Additionally, the amount approved for the Special Assistance Scheme For Women 
Entrepreneurs under the Small and Medium Industry Development Corporation (SMIDEC) 
also increased from RM11.5 million to RM18 million between 1999 and 2002 (U. N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: Part 1, Article 4, para 86 (ii)). In 2005, loans and grants 
amounting to RM8.5 million in total were approved to women entrepreneurs under this 
Scheme (Malaysia International Trade and Industry Report 2005: 147). Thus, even though 
it might not be the best way forward, the transformation of women from the margins to the 
centre in social and economic activities could accelerate the empowerment of women in all 
spheres of public life and could modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
women and men which are based on the idea of the superiority or inferiority of either of 
the sexes. 
 
5.2.1.2 Female Domination of Higher Education 
In terms of education, Article 10 of the Women’s Convention which affirms women's equal 
rights in education is consistent with Article 12 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution 
explained earlier in Chapter Four. In Malaysia, I trace that women are guaranteed similar 
conditions to men in the administration of any educational institution, admission, fees, 
curricula, examinations and opportunities to participate actively in sports and gain access to 
specific learning information. Scholarships are also being provided for those who have the 
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capacity to pursue tertiary education. In polytechnics as such, females received scholarships 
to take Diplomas and First Degrees in Education (Ministry of Higher Education).  
 
Article 12 mandates the revision of textbooks, school programmes and teaching methods 
with a view to eliminating stereotyped concepts in the field of education. As textbooks 
could be a hidden obstacle to achieving gender equality (Blumberg, 2007), efforts have 
been made by the Government to address gender-stereotyped images in school textbooks. 
The Government’s report to the CEDAW stated that the Ministry for Women and Family 
Development has requested the Ministry of Education to eliminate stereotypical images and 
representations of women in textbooks (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: Part 1, 
Article 5, para 95). The deadline in the National Plan of Action (NPA) for revision of 
textbooks and curriculum to remove gender biases and promote positive images of girls and 
women was set for 2000 for secondary education (National Plan for Action, 1998: Strategic 
Objective B.4, Action 2) and 2003 for primary education (National Plan for Action, 1998: 
Strategic Objective L.3, Action 2). The Malaysian Government’s provision of gender-
related guidelines to textbook producers has contributed to good practice in combating 
stereotypes and improving the quality of education (UNESCO Global Gender and 
Education Digest, 2010).   
 
Under the Malaysian education system, female and male students in schools are taught 
using the same common curriculum and sit the same national examinations conducted by a 
central body, the Examinations Syndicate of the Ministry of Education (Ministry of 
Education). Within the National Curriculum System, students in secondary schools are 
allowed to choose certain technical or commercial subjects and courses based on their 
interests and potential, not their sex; this indeed, ensures there is no distinction or exclusion 
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of women, which is against the principle of equality adopted by Article 1 of the Women’s 
Convention pertaining to this right. There are currently 20 public universities under the 
Ministry of Higher Education. Selection of students is based solely upon academic results 
and I note that there is no discrimination against females pertaining to enrolment in 
universities.  
 
Earlier, the CEDAW commended Malaysia for its achievements in women’s education (U. 
N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 5). I note that in Malaysia, women have 
recently made considerable progress in education, which has brought about changes in the 
widely accepted stereotypical roles of women and men in education. This can be seen from 
the enrolment of students in 2009; 48.5 per cent of students enrolled in primary schools 
were females, in secondary schools 49.9 per cent, in post-secondary schools 65.1 per cent, 
in colleges 49.7 per cent, and in public universities 60.1 per cent (Ministry of Higher 
Education). In 2010, females predominated in public universities, accounting for 58.6 per 
cent, whereas male students accounted for only 41.4 per cent. Female literacy also 
increased by 36 per cent between 1980 and 2004, and in 2008 the literacy rate for women 
aged between 15 and 24 was 98.5 per cent; this was higher than the literacy rate for men of 
the same age group, which was 98.3 per cent (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World 
Factbook, 2011).   
 
This success is, among other things, an effect of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) which aimed to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 
2005 and all levels of education by 2015. Its key indicators for monitoring the progress of 
women are the ratio of boys to girls in primary, secondary and tertiary education, the ratio 
of literate women to men in the 15-to-24 age group, the share of women in paid 
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employment in the non-agricultural sector and, lastly, the proportion of seats held by 
women in the national parliament (Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development, 2005). These special measures provided for women are intended to ensure 
that women are given equal and fair access to the public spheres.   
 
5.2.1.3 Main Beneficiaries in Healthcare 
According to Article 12 of the Women’s Convention, it is an obligation of the State Parties 
to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of 
health-care and to ensure that women have appropriate services in connection with 
pregnancy. In Malaysia, the development of the health sector was a key area of concern in 
national development initiatives during the two decades following independence (1957-
1977) (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: Part 1, Article 12, para 231). I note that 
access to healthcare is given equally to women and men in Malaysia, although women are 
given more attention and services because of their needs associated with maternity. This is 
what has been affirmed by Leng and Lin (2007: 137), that ‘women have specific health 
care needs even when they are not ill’. These specific needs include fertility control, 
pregnancy and childbirth.  
 
In Malaysia, Leng and Lin (2007: 137) have explained that women are accorded access to 
healthcare and appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the 
post-natal period. This different treatment might be intended to ensure equal outcomes and 
to eliminate substantive inequality of the disadvantaged. Facilities are well distributed 
throughout the various geographical localities of the country (Leng and Lin, 2007: 143-
144). From the same study, it was found that from the urban-centred and curative-based 
services of the pre-Independence era, the health system has evolved into a network of rural 
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and urban free services and has developed to provide preventive and curative health 
services. According to Pathmanathan and Dhairiam (n. d: 152), by 1978 there was a 
relatively well-developed public sector health service in Malaysia. 
 
I have found that, in the Second National Health and Morbidity Survey (NHMS2) 
conducted by the Ministry of Health in 1996, there was evidence that overall access to 
health services was good and that there was no gender inequality. The combined life 
expectancy for female and male Malaysians in 2007 was among the highest in the medium 
human development countries (Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, 
2007: 9). In 2011, the female life expectancy was 76.73 years, whereas for males it was 
71.05 years (Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, 2011). The focus was also on 
rectifying imbalances in the distribution of services and to identify and reach out to 
disadvantaged groups. Today, Malaysia provides a relatively well-developed public health 
service, consisting of a rural network of midwifery clinics and health clinics (Shepard, 
Savedoff and Hong, 2002: 4), including ‘1Malaysia Clinics,’ which could be considered as 
one of the success stories in the history of women’s rights in Malaysia. ‘1Malaysia Clinics’ 
are community clinics, which are part of the Government’s effort to apply the highest 
medical care methods and standards for all Malaysians. In the 2010 Budget, the Malaysian 
Prime Minister announced the RM10 million establishment of new ‘1Malaysia Clinics’ 
across the nation; they are strategically located and open daily for 12 hours. Qualified 
nurses and medical assistants with at least five years’ experience provide quality treatment 
for just RM1 (Official Portal of 1Malaysia). 
 
Furthermore, to provide special measures to women generally, the healthcare system in 
Malaysia is also concerned about conditions which threaten women’s health, a concern 
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which runs parallel with the principle of equality under the Women’s Convention. These 
include conditions that affect women exclusively, such as ‘female’ cancers or diseases, or 
conditions which, although not exclusive to women, have biological or socio-economic 
implications which are specific or particularly relevant to women, such as Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) (Ministry of Health). According to Dahlui, Ramli and Bulgiba (2011: 1633), a 
subsidy for mammogram screening was introduced in 2007 to promote early detection of 
breast cancer by the Ministry Of Women, Family and Community Development. The 
Ministry provides a RM50 subsidy for every mammogram done in private clinics and 
hospitals registered with the National Population and Family Development Board Malaysia 
(NPFDB). The HIV or AIDS diseases have been seen as increasingly affecting women. 
This is evidenced by the increasing numbers of women infected with HIV or AIDS in 
Malaysia, from 1.2 per cent of new cases in 1990 to 16.4 per cent in 2007. The number of 
AIDS deaths among women also increased from zero in 1986 to 114 cases in 2008. The 
Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development actively advocates the 
importance of incorporating gender perspectives in HIV or AIDS policy formulation and 
programme implementation (PT Foundation). Therefore, special focus has been placed on 
reducing HIV vulnerability among women, such as the establishment of a special task 
force of the National Advisory Council on Women to address the feminization of HIV
137
. 
Moreover, under the National Strategic Plan on HIV or AIDS (2006-2010), women found 
to be HIV-positive are provided with post-test counselling and free anti-retroviral 
treatment (Malaysia National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS 2006-2010, 2006: 12-13). Thus, 
the healthcare system in Malaysia recognises the importance of addressing the needs of 




 Session General Assembly on Agenda Item 28 (b) reaffirmed the Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS, and the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS adopted at the High-level Meeting on HIV/AIDS, 
held on 2 June 2006, acknowledged the feminization of the pandemic. See A/RES/65/192, 65
th
 Session 
General Assembly Resolution, Agenda Item 28 (b), 3 March 2011 
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women as patients more than those of men due to their needs associated with maternity and 
conditions that affect women exclusively.  
 
5.2.2 Marriage and Family Relations 
In marriage and family relations, the CEDAW expressed concern that there are still 
countries where women are prevented from enjoying equality of status in the family 
(General Recommendation No. 21, 13th Session, 1994: Comment para 12). The CEDAW 
identified forced marriage as constitutive of this unequal enjoyment; thus, according to 
CEDAW, women’s rights to choose must be protected and enforced by law (General 
Recommendation No. 21, 13th Session, 1994: Comment para 16). According to Article 16 
(1) (b), the Women’s Convention secures women and men ‘the same right freely to choose 
a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent’.  
 
In this Section, I argue that Malaysia has moved towards eliminating gender inequality by 
prohibiting forced marriage and securing women’s rights to choose a spouse. Betrothal and 
marriage of a child have no legal effect in Malaysia, as Section 8 of the Islamic Family 
Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984 (Act 303) (IFLA) states that marriage may not be 
solemnised where the man is under the age of 18 and woman under the age of 16. 
According to Noor (2007: 137), the practice of forced marriages had been prevalent in 
Malay society, and the existing customs, prior to the legislation of Section 13 of the IFLA 
that both parties must consent to their marriage, considered marriage of a daughter as 
‘generated income family businesses138’ which enhanced the practice of forced marriage. 
Therefore, the prohibition of forced betrothal and marriage is indeed important to protect 
                                                 
138
 One of the marriage conditions in Islam is for the groom to pay a dowry to the bride and the dowry 
payment should be the property of the bride. However, the previous practice among Malay families was to 
take the dowry and treat it as the father’s or family’s property. Therefore, to generate the family’s income, a 
father would ask the groom to pay a large dowry, which contradicts the principles of marriage in Islam 
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girls, and the provision of specification of a minimum age for marriage as regulated under 
Section 8 of the IFLA might have been intended to reconcile the principle of women’s 
rights protection under Article 16 (2) of the Women’s Convention.   
 
In Islam, women, like men, have rights to choose a husband and enter into a marriage 
contract (Yusuf, 2005: 6). Muslim women in Malaysia are guaranteed by law the freedom 
to choose a spouse and enter into marriage with full consent; however, this right comes 
with a unique requirement. Under Section 13 of the IFLA, marriage shall not be 
solemnised
139
 unless either wali
140
 by nasab or (in the absence of wali by nasab) wali raja 
has consented. Wali or guardian is someone who possesses or has been granted the 
authority to perform a marriage contract (Awang Teh, n.d). A question might arise as to 
whether the presence of wali in the marriage contract is intended to restrict the ‘bride’s’ 
consent to her own marriage or to protect the bride from being discriminated against. 
 
In Malaysia, wali by nasab refers to wali akrab and wali ab’ad. Wali akrab is the father or 
paternal grandfather and above on the father’s side whereas wali ab’ad are the siblings 
(brothers) of the bride, the bride’s father’s siblings (brothers), the bride’s brother’s son, the 
bride’s uncle and the bride’s cousin on the father’s side (Mohd Awal, 2006: 32). I note that 
Wali raja is a Shariah Court Judge who has jurisdiction in the place where the bride 
resides or can be any person generally or specially authorized on that behalf by the Shariah 
Court Judge (Section 13 (b) of the IFLA). Awang Teh (n.d) has explained that wali akrab 
must be given priority over wali ab’ad, and in cases where a woman who wants to enter 
into a contract of marriage appoints wali ab’ad as her wali even though her wali akrab is 
                                                 
139
 Marriage shall be solemnised only in the presence of the Registrar or with the permission of the Registrar 
(Section 7 of the IFLA) 
140
 Wali is authorized by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, in the case of the Federal Territories, Penang, Sabah 
and Sarawak, or by the Ruler, in the case of any other States, to give away in marriage a woman who has no 
wali from nasab 
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still alive and able to perform his duty as wali, the marriage contract is void
141
. The consent 
of wali raja may be given wherever there is no wali by nasab, in accordance with Shariah, 
available to act (Section 7 (2)) or if the wali by nasab cannot be found or where the wali by 
nasab withholds his consent without sufficient reason (Section 13 (b)). 
 
I trace that, even though women might choose a spouse and enter into marriage by 
themselves, women’s rights are strengthened by the fact that their wali is allowed to 
interfere in the marriage contract only when there is a possibility of women being treated 
unjustly by the contract. This is because, as I argued earlier, Muslim women have been 
historically disadvantaged (Yaacob, 1986: 89-91) and they need special measures to 
guarantee their equal outcomes with men in terms of choosing a spouse. As Islam has 
commanded that a woman must marry someone who is her equal in terms of status or 
kufu’142, the function of wali is important in ensuring that the prospective husband of his 
daughter is of equal status to his daughter (Noor, 2007: 142). In general, Soleh (n.d), in his 
article on ‘Perkahwinan dan Perceraian di Bawah Tangan di Tinjau Dari Hukum Islam’ 
(marriage and divorce in Islam), has explained that, according to the Hanafi school of 
thought, marriage could be solemnised without wali. The consent of wali is required only, 
as I argued earlier, when there is a possibility that women might be treated unjustly by the 
marriage contract. In the Hanafi school of thought, according to Soleh, wali is required for 
child marriage when females who are entering into marriage have not yet reached baligh
143
 
or are of unsound mind, or if the marriage is between a woman and a man who are not 
kufu’ or equal in status. Therefore I trace that, according to the Hanafi school of law, 
                                                 
141
 See Ismail bin Abdul Majid v Aris Fadilah and Insun binti Abdul Majid (1990) Jil. V, II. JH  
142
 Kufu’ means having the same social standing. The rationale for kufu’ is to ensure compatibility and 
suitability between the parties and consequently to avoid problems in the intended marriage. It involves 
matters such as morality, education, religion, race and standing in society 
143
 According to Section 2 of the IFLA, baligh means the age of puberty according to Shariah  
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women who have reached puberty and are of sound mind can marry without the presence 
of wali.    
 
On the other hand, Soleh (n.d: 8) clarified, the majority of schools of law have agreed that 
the presence and consent of wali is one of the marriage requirements that must be taken 
into account in order for the solemnization of the marriage and for it to be valid. 
Considering that Malaysia applies the Shafie school of thought, which is one of those that 
consider wali to be a requirement, I submit that, according to the IFLA, marriage cannot be 
solemnised without wali (Article 7). The view that women may solemnize their marriage 
without wali is not accepted, according to local tradition of Malaysian society (Zainul 
Abidin, 2007).  
 
However, the existing Malaysian laws do not give absolute power to a wali in solemnizing 
a marriage and, as researched by Zainul Abidin (2007) and Abd. Rahim, Ismail and Mohd 
Dahlal (2008), even a forced marriage or an arranged marriage is not part of the practice of 
Muslim society in Malaysia today. Using force or threat to compel a woman to marry 
against her will or to prevent her from contracting a valid marriage once she has attained 
the age of 16 is an offence punishable with a fine of up to RM1, 000 or imprisonment for 
up to six months or both (Section 37). This means that, if a woman does not give consent 
to her marriage, her wali has no right to solemnise the marriage as marriage can only be 
solemnised by wali if both parties consent to the marriage contract. Hence, because a 
marriage contract could still proceed without the consent of wali by nasab (father or 
grandfather and above on the father’s side), if the wali refuses to give consent without 
sufficient reason, it is clear that, according to Malaysian laws, women have rights to enter 
into marriage with their full consent. I trace that wali’s role in Malaysian Muslim marriage 
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contract according to the IFLA is not to restrict the bride’s autonomous rights to choose a 
spouse or enter into marriage, but to protect a bride from possible discrimination in the 
marriage contract. This does not defeat the woman’s rights to marry freely because, if wali 
by nasab refuses to give consent without sufficient reason, the woman may still proceed 
with the marriage using wali raja.  
 
Indeed, the concept of wali, which has always been understood as a means of precluding 
women from entering into marriage, seems to be very paternalistic as a man could marry 
anyone without consent of wali; the implication is that women have no capacity to contract 
themselves into marriage. However, as argued earlier, it is important to understand that the 
notion of wali in Islam is as a protective instrument to ensure women’s equal rights to 
enjoyment of marriage and family life (Etty Murtiningdyah, 2005: 55-56), not to to restrict 
the ‘bride’s’ consent to her own marriage. Certainly, I argue that the requirement for a 
wali, whether in the category of wali by nasab or wali raja, is very important if a woman is 
not to be unfairly treated in her choice of a husband. This protective instrument is to ensure 
justice for women as a historically and currently disadvantaged group, which is consistent 
with the principle of equality in Islam and which is addressed by the Women’s 
Convention. Thus, this shows that, under the Malaysian laws, Muslim women not only 
have the right to choose but have also secured special measures in exercising their rights, 
and this may change the stereotyped pattern of marriage and family relations of Muslims. 
This special measure, which is the interference of wali when there is a possibility that 
woman might be treated unjustly by the marriage contract, clearly indicates that the law is 





In terms of rights and responsibilities as parents, the CEDAW expressed concern that some 
countries do not observe the principle of granting the parents equal status (General 
Recommendation No. 21, 13th Session, 1994: Comment para 19). Article 16 (1) (d) 
provides that wives and husbands are entitled to ‘the same rights and responsibilities as 
parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all 
cases the interests of the children shall be paramount’. Here, I argue that Muslim wives 
and husbands in Malaysia have equal rights and responsibilities as parents, which could 
eliminate the gender stereotype that only husbands can provide maintenance or only wives 
can bear and raise children; however, as stated in Article 16 (1) (d) that the interests of the 
children shall be the paramount consideration, their rights as parents are divided 
accordingly to accommodate their different strengths.    
  
Section 72 of the IFLA imposes a duty on a father to maintain children whether they are in 
his custody or not, and Section 81 of the IFLA states that the mother shall be, of all 
persons, the most entitled to the custody of her infant children during the connubial 
relationship as well as after its dissolution. The maintenance by the father includes 
provision of accommodation, clothing, food, medical attention and education (Section 72 
(1)). In theory, Islam confirms that a husband is responsible for providing for the family 
(Raja Mamat, 1992: 60), and this responsibility is not only for the material needs as 
mentioned above, but also for the good teaching and guidance of wife and children (Abd. 
Majid and Azahari, 1989). However, in practice, Islam and Malaysian laws do not prohibit 
women from maintaining the family, or men from raising the children, and it is up to the 
parents to decide who will have duties to maintain or raise children, provided that, as stated 
in Section 81 (2), it does not affect the welfare of the children. Therefore, a mother could 
be the provider for the family and a father could raise the children, as long as priority is 
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given to the welfare of the children. I trace that this practice is not prohibited either by 
Islam or in the Malaysian context, by IFLA. The equal rights of women under the Income 
Tax Act 1967 (Revised 1971) (Act 53) (ITA) to elect for separate assessment of their 
income for tax purposes (Section 45 (2)) and the provision under the Employees’ Social 
Security Act 1969 (Act 4) that widowers are entitled to a pension if an insured person who 
was in receipt of an invalidity pension has died (Section 20A (1) (a)) as discussed earlier, 
might indicate that women’s role as breadwinners is recognised by laws in Malaysia. 
 
The CEDAW has stressed in the General Recommendation No. 21 that the domestic 
responsibilities that women have to bear affect their rights to public life such as education 
and employment; thus, women are to be entitled to decide on the number and spacing of 
their children (General Recommendation No. 21, 13th Session, 1994: Comment para 21). 
Article 16 (1) (e) provides that wives and husbands have ‘the same rights to decide freely 
and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the 
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights’. Both wife and 
husband in Malaysia have the same rights to decide on the number and spacing of their 
children as there are no laws in Malaysia restricting the wife’s rights to this. Thus, 
women’s and men’s equal freedom and right to decide on the number and spacing of their 
children indicates that there is no superiority of men in marriage and family relations in 
this aspect, which might eliminate the gender stereotype that women, as wives, have no 
right to choose. 
 
Article 16 (1) (h) further provides that wives and husbands have ‘the same rights for both 
spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment 
and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration’. 
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Similar rights are further guaranteed in Islam for both spouses in respect of the rights to 
property (Yusuf, 2005: 7). For Muslims, Abdullah, Martinez and Mohd Radzi (2010: 162) 
wrote, ‘what the wife earns is never the right of the husband, it is hers to dispose of as she 
herself deems appropriate’. Buang (2001: 27) has stressed that restrictions on the wife’s 
rights to personal control over her property were the practice of ancient Western society,
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and not the Islamic tradition. According to Malaysian laws, both Muslim wife and husband 
have rights to ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and 
disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration, as discussed 
in Chapter Four on Malaysian fundamental liberties. According to Article 13 of the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution; 
‘‘1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law 
 
2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate 
compensation’. 
 
Thus, the gender strereotype that a wife does not have the right to own and control her 
property is not a practice in Malaysia according to the Federal Constitution, which might 
indicate that the social and cultural pattern of conduct of women and men based on the idea 
of the superiority and inferiority of either of the sexes in this aspect has been eliminated by 
the legal provision.  
  
5.3 30.5 PER CENT OF TOP PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS 
 
                                                 
144
 Buang demonstrated that Napoleonic law in France stated that a wife did not have rights to property 
because she was under the ‘marriage power’, and her property transaction was void, except with the 
husband’s consent. This restriction was only abolished in 1882 in England by the introduction of the Married 
Women’s Property Act 1882, and in France a wife was conferred full rights over her property in 1938. See 
Buang, Ahmad Hidayat. 2001. ‘Keupayaan Wanita untuk Berkontrak di Dalam Undang-Undang Islam’ in 
Raihanah Abdullah (ed.) Wanita dan Perundangan Islam. Ilmiah Publishers Sdn. Bhd.  
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The CEDAW expressed concern in its concluding comment made against Malaysia about 
the low level of representation of women in public and political life and in decision-
making positions, including in the foreign office (CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 17 
and 18). Globally, the legal status of women is receiving the broadest attention, as concern 
over the basic rights of political participation has not diminished since the adoption of the 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women in 1952. Its provisions, therefore, are 
restated in Article 7 of the Women’s Convention, whereby women are guaranteed the 
rights to vote and be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, to participate in the 
formulation of government policy and hold public office, to exercise public functions and 
to participate in non-governmental organizations. I trace that, in Malaysia, there are no 
laws that discriminate against a person on the basis of gender with respect to participating 
in the electoral process and holding elected offices. Active women voters, who accounted 
for about 54 per cent of registered voters and 59 per cent of voter turnout in the 1998 
general elections (Mansor and Ghazali, 1998), have demonstrated women’s active 
participation in the electoral process. Therefore, women in Malaysia are not prohibited 
from participating in elections at any level of office and are free to participate in political 
movements.   
 
The Malaysian Parliament is modelled on the Westminster
145
 system with a Lower House 
of elected representatives (Dewan Rakyat) and an Upper House of appointed senators 
(Dewan Negara). I have found that, since Independence in 1957 and the first election to 
the then Federal Legislative Assembly in 1959, the number of female candidates elected to 
                                                 
145
 Westminster model can be said to mean a constitutional system in which the effective head of government 
is a Prime Minister presiding over a Cabinet composed of Ministers, in which the effective executive branch 
of government is parliamentary inasmuch as Ministers must be members of the legislature and in which 
Ministers are collectively and individually responsible to a freely elected and representative legislature. See 
De Smith, SA. 1961-1963. ‘Westminster’s Export Models: The Legal Framework of Responsible 
Government’ in 1 Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies. pp. 2-16 
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Parliament has increased at a moderate rate. For example, in the 1959 election, only 2.9 per 
cent (three out of 104) of the candidates elected to office in the Lower House were female. 
This increased to 4.1 per cent in 1986, 7.3 per cent in 1995, and 9.6 per cent in 2008 when 
17 out of the 68 senate seats went to females (Malaysia Human Rights Report, 2008). The 
Report disclosed that the number of women elected to the various State Assemblies during 
this period also increased gradually, rising from only 2.7 per cent in 1986 to 4.8 per cent 
and 5.5 per cent in 1995 and 2000 respectively. This might be due to the active 
participation of women in the public spheres which influence their awareness to become 
involved in political life. 
 
I note that the 12th General Elections in 2008 resulted in an increased number of women as 
elected representatives, both within the Federal Parliament as well as in the respective 
State Legislative Assemblies. In positions of decision-making, the number of female 
Members of Parliament increased from 5.3 per cent to 10.4 per cent between 1990 and 
2009 (Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, 2011: 4). According to the Report on Economic 
Management and Prospect 2011 issued by the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, women 
accounted for 30.5 per cent of top public sector management positions in 2010, an increase 
from 6.9 per cent in 1995. Opportunities for qualified women to hold top positions in the 
civil service continued to be made available by the Government, and today 31.5 per cent of 
the key positions in the public sector are held by women (Economic Management and 
Prospect, 2011: 4). Even though women are given similar rights and equal opportunities to 
men to stand as candidates for election, their number is still disappointing. Thus, I note that 
giving similar rights for women and men to be involved in political life is not adequate as 
women need special measures to stand as candidates for election. The ‘dual burden’, 
juggling domestic responsibilities with careers, has been one of the obstacles that hinder 
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women’s active involvement in politics (Wan Ismail, 2002: 3-4). However, Wan Ismail has 
stressed that ‘a more relaxed attitude is discernible among the younger generation and 
men now appear to be more willing to see women as partners in both the domestic and 
professional spheres’, which might balance the numbers in the future.   
  
In non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with public and political 
life, I argue that women are also participating actively (Zakaria, 2008: 379-382). However, 
until recently, there have been no comprehensive data analysing the position of women in 
non-governmental organisations concerned with the public and political life of the country. 
Yet, according to the Women’s Centre for Change (WCC) in 2008, there were no less than 
45 active women’s NGOs engaged in a range of activities from giving free counselling and 
legal advice to advocating the realisation of human rights of women through the lens of the 
Women’s Convention (Women’s Centre for Change (WCC)). This is indeed helpful in 
order for society at large to understand the notion of women’s rights as underpinned by the 
Women’s Convention.   
 
I have also found that recruitment of personnel to represent the Government at the 
international level and to participate in the work of international organizations is primarily 
based on the qualifications of the applicants, not their gender. With suitable credentials, 
women and men can be assigned as Foreign Service Officers after taking a mandatory pre-
service course (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). I trace that the number of women officers in 
the Malaysian Foreign Service has increased significantly over the years. In 2002, 20.7 per 
cent of officers were female (69 out of 333) as compared to 18.8 per cent (64 out of 340) in 
2001. Five per cent of the 69 female officers in 2002 were in top postings i.e. Ambassador/ 
High Commissioner/Head of Mission. Women now comprise a third of the officers in the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and occupy 15 per cent of the top posts in over 100 Malaysian 




The above data show that women in Malaysia are equal with men in accessing the 
opportunity to represent Government at the international level and to participate in the 
work of international organizations. However, I suggest that women must be accorded 
more appropriate measures to ensure that their numbers as elected representatives and in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increase and reach a balance with male officers. To be 
assigned as Foreign Service Officers, they may need flexible training hours and more 
women-friendly coaching methods during service.  
  
5.4 ‘MALAYSIAN WORKING WOMEN ARE MORE CONFIDENT AND SELF-
ASSURED’ 
 
In the concluding comments made against Malaysia, CEDAW expressed concern that, 
despite the high level of education attained by girls and women, there is still a lack of 
employment opportunities for women in Malaysia (CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 
19). Article 11 of the Women’s Convention affirms women’s rights in the field of 
employment in order to ensure the same rights to work, the same employment 
opportunities, right to free choice of profession, promotion, job security and all benefits, 
and the right to receive vocational training. Unlike in other Muslim countries where 
women do not have the right to choose a profession, I trace that the rights of Muslim 
women in Malaysia are secured and they are entitled to the right to equal remuneration, 
social security, and protection of health and safety in working conditions. In Malaysia, 
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 See detail in ‘Malaysian Women Taking On More Prominent Roles In Foreign Service’ in Sarawak News, 
Bernama, October, 12, 2009. Online: http://www.mysarawak.org/2009/10/12/malaysian-women-taking-on-
more-prominent-roles-in-foreign-service.html. Retrieved on 23/07/2010 
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women’s equal rights in employment are guaranteed under Article 8 (2) of the Federal 
Constitution, as discussed earlier in Chapter Four. Article 8 (2) provides that ‘Except as 
expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens 
on the ground only of religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender in any law relating 
to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of 
any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment. In order to prevent discrimination 
against career women on the grounds of marriage or maternity, dismissal on the grounds of 
marital status, pregnancy or maternity leave is prohibited.     
 
However, I have found that, even though there are equal rights and opportunities for 
employment assured by laws and Malaysian women have contributed to the development 
of the country, the labour force participation rate among women has remained rather low. 
Female employers are still scarce and the majority of working women are employees. This 
may be because, as I mentioned earlier regarding the involvement of women in political 
and public life, domestic responsibilities have been one of the obstacles to women actively 
participating in public spheres. In 2004 only 36.97 per cent of employees were women 
while more than 69 per cent of unpaid family workers were women (Malaysian 
Department of Statistic). This trend continued through 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, when 
labour force participation of males was higher than females in every age group. In 2006, 
only 45.8 per cent of females were employed compared to 79.9 per cent of males. In 2007, 
the figure increased slightly, with 46. 4 per cent of females in work compared to 79.5 per 
cent of males (Analysis of Labour Force in Malaysia, 2006-2007). In 2008, only 44.6 per 
cent of females participated in the labour force compared to males at 79.9 per cent, while 
in 2009 only 46.4 per cent of females participated in the labour force compared to males at 
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78.9 per cent. As of 2010, the total number of women in employment was only 46.1 per 
cent compared to 78.7 per cent of men (Malaysian Department of Statistics).  
 
Despite the low numbers, however, I note that the data show that labour market 
participation among women is gradually increasing year by year. To ensure women’s 
empowerment in this public sphere, the Malaysian Government has taken various measures 
to improve women’s participation in the labour market, which includes the provision of 
special measures to women in economic and social mainstream activities, as discussed 
earlier, to ensure equal outcomes with men pertaining to women’s rights in labour force 
participation. This includes parental access to childcare facilities (Chiam, 2008: 34), a 
subsidy for childcare costs (Chiam, 2008: 36-37), and the promotion of part-time or 
flexible working (Subramaniam, 2011: 82-83). As stated by Ariff and Abu Bakar (n.d: 8), 
employers were also encouraged to provide facilities such as proper housing schemes or 
benefits, transportation and healthcare benefits for all workers, especially rural migrants, 
the majority of whom are women. As stated in the Malaysian Country Profile at the 
Johannesburg Summit 2002, improvements were also recorded in the occupational 
structure, with more women moving into higher-paying occupations during the Seventh 
Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) (United Nations: Malaysian Country Profile of World Summit 
on Sustainable Development-Johannesburg Summit, 2002: 37). 
 
In fact, in Malaysia, I trace that women play significant roles in the socio-economic arena. 




‘Malaysia continues to be a key market in encouraging the evolution of women as 
consumers and as influencers changing the socio-economic dynamics across Asia/Pacific 
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 Which released Fourth Annual MasterCard Worldwide Index of Women’s Advancement 2008 
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and seems to be closing the gap with men in the socio-economic arena. These are 
subjective indicators which gauge how positive the respondents feel about their place in 
the workforce. The scores indicate that Malaysian working women are more confident and 
self-assured and as they become more educated and qualified, evolving in tandem, the 
workplace has become more inclusive with greater opportunities for women to attain roles 
in management and leadership
148.’  
 
The Employment Act 1955 provides a comprehensive legal framework governing matters 
such as payment of wages (Section 18-23), rest days (Section 59-60), hours of work 
(Section 60A), holidays (Section 60D), termination (Section 60J) and all other matters 
pertaining to employment which apply equally to women and men. Additionally, some of 
the provisions in the Act apply exclusively to women, according them special treatment to 
guarantee equal outcomes to those of men. These relate to the employment of women at 
night (Section 34), underground work (Section 35) and the provision of maternity leave 
and other maternity benefits (Part IX). Protection of women employees under the Act 
means that they are not allowed to work in any industrial or agricultural undertaking 
between the hours of ten in the evening and five in the morning or to commence work for 
the day without having had a period of eleven consecutive hours free from such work 
(Section 34 (1) of the Employment Act 1955). Section 35 of the same Act also prohibits 
women from carrying out underground work. This is indeed substantively equal to men’s 
conditions, because female workers are given other opportunities to work between the 
same hours, although not in industrial or agricultural settings.    
 
I have found that the Ministry of Human Resources ensures that provisions for the health 
and safety of pregnant women and women employees generally are complied with. 
Recommendations were also made to amend the Employment Act 1955 to increase 
maternity leave from 60 days to 90 days in the public and private sectors and to ratify ILO 
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=2.Retrieved on 08/08/2010 
189 
 
Convention No. 183. Recently, the Prime Minister of Malaysia has declared, in the 2011 
Budget Speech, that female civil servants will be entitled to fully-paid maternity leave not 
exceeding 90 days, an increase from the previous 60 days, subject to a maximum of 300 
days of maternity leave throughout the tenure of service (Budget Speech, 2011). The leave 
can be taken at any time during the 30 days immediately preceding her confinement or no 
later than the day immediately following her confinement. The employers must be 
informed of the expected confinement date and of the expected date of commencement of 
leave within 60 days preceding the expected confinement date, either orally or in writing 
(Official Portal of the Public Service Department of Malaysia). Also, the Government was 
recommended to amend the Employment Act 1955 to include the provision of paternity 
leave to be extended to 15 days for male workers in both the public and private sectors so 
that they can care for their wives and new-born babies.   
 
In terms of childcare facilities, a proposal was made to the Government to provide 
community-based childcare facilities or set up childcare centres at the workplace 
(Roketkini.com, 27 November 2012). Moreover, considering that career women might face 
the difficult situation of having to perform and cope with multiple roles as a mother and 
worker if their husbands are also working, the Malaysian Prime Minister has proposed that 
local employers employ part-time female workers who could work during lunch breaks or 
after office hours (Utusan Malaysia, 26
 
August 2010). To assist career mothers, the 
Government provides a subsidy of RM180 per child to civil servants whose monthly 
household income is less than RM3000.  
 
I note that the most contentious issue between the Government and the women’s 
movements in terms of women’s labour rights is sexual harassment. Incidences of sexual 
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harassment at the workplace are covered by both the civil and criminal laws. The 
Government, through the Ministry of Human Resources, has introduced a Code of Practice 
on the Prevention and Handling of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (Kamaruddin, 
2006: 22). The Code provides working definitions of sexual harassment and guidelines for 
employers on how to deal with it. For instance, employers are encouraged to set up 
grievance procedures in line with the principles set out in the Code. However, as this Code 
of Practice is not a legally binding instrument, employers are not obliged to adopt it. This 
may be a reason why many employers have failed to adopt it
149
. As no legislation exists to 
deal with sexual harassment, victims of sexual harassment have to resort to the Penal 
Code
150
, sue in tort for assault and battery or claim for unfair dismissal should their 
employment be terminated
151
.   
  
In a study carried out by the All Women's Action Society and the Women's Development 
Collective on the impact of the Code, it was found that, while the Code sets out exemplary 
procedures and encourages the establishment of comprehensive in-house mechanisms to 
prevent and eradicate sexual harassment, these mechanisms do not exist everywhere (Ng, 
Mohd Noor and Abdullah, 2003). Even where there are mechanisms in place, if different 
procedures and features still exist, this reflects a lack of uniformity in the implementation 
of the Code. Another important factor forwarded by Ng, Mohd Noor and Abdullah (2003) 
is the lack of counselling facilities available to both the complainant and the perpetrator; 
furthermore, the measures to protect the complainant against retaliation are also found to 
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 Section 509 of the Penal Code reads: ‘Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any women, utters any 
words, makes any sound or gesture or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, 
or such gesture or object shall be seen by such woman, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to five years or with a fine, or with both’ 
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 It is a most unsatisfactory manner of dealing with the problem as it is difficult to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Sexual harassment is also often repetitive, which could make the charges lengthy as each 
act of harassment constitutes a separate charge. There is also no room to provide preventive measures and 
employers cannot be held liable 
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be inadequate. Sanctions against the harasser are not set out, and the employer cannot be 
held responsible for failing to provide a working environment safe from sexual harassment 
because the adoption and implementation of the Code is entirely voluntary. As proposed by 
Abdul Aziz and Ng (2001: 12), a comprehensive action plan is just as important as 
legislation in eradicating sexual harassment in the work place, in which education, training 
and outreach programmes are essential. Hence, the Ministry of Women and Family 
Development, in consultation with the Ministry of Human Resources, NGOs, the 
Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF) and the Federal Malaysian Manufacturers 
(FMM), is currently studying a proposal to formulate specific sexual harassment legislation 
(Berita Harian, 23 Februari 2012). 
 
5.5 ADEQUATE SANCTIONS FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
 
I trace that, in response to the CEDAW’s recommendation to include adequate sanctions 
for acts of discrimination against women (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 
8), the Malaysian Penal Code was amended to increase the penalties for rape. Under the 
Malaysian Penal Code, rape is defined as a man having sexual intercourse with a woman 
against her will or with her consent obtained under duress, misconception or under 
circumstances where she gives consent without understanding the consequences of it or is 
under 16 years of age (Section 375). The punishment for those who commit rape is 
imprisonment for a term of not less than five years and not more than 20 years; they shall 
also be liable to whipping (Section 376).  
 
Moreover, as young women have been continuously suffering from the crime of incest, 
there was an urgent need for an amendment of the laws governing incest. It has been 
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reported that there were 334 cases of incest in Malaysia in the year 2008; this figure 
increased in 2009 with 385 cases being reported. The majority of the victims were under 
16 years of age and were mostly raped by their fathers (Perangkaan Wanita, Keluarga dan 
Kebajikan Masyarakat). According to the Penal Code, rape and incest are different, as rape 
is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent (Section 375 (a) 
and (b)), while incest is sexual intercourse with a person without her consent whose 
relationship to the perpetrator is such that she is not permitted to marry that other person 
under the law, religion or custom (Section 376A). It has been reported that there were 334 
cases of incest in Malaysia in the year 2008; this figure increased in 2009 with 385 cases 
being reported. The majority of the victims were under 16 years of age and were mostly 
raped by their fathers (Perangkaan Wanita, Keluarga dan Kebajikan Masyarakat). Section 
376B (1) provides, for the punishment of incest, imprisonment for a term not less than six 
years and not more than 20 years; the perpetrator shall also be liable to whipping.    
 
I trace that the Government’s commitment to eliminate discrimination against women in 
Malaysia has been achieved not only by amending ‘gender-biased laws’ but also by 
legislating new laws to protect women. In 1994, the Domestic Violence Act (Act 521) 
(DVA) was legislated to provide protection for battered wives and other victims of 
domestic violence (Official Portals of the Attorney General’s Chambers of Malaysia). 
According to Section 2 of the DVA, domestic violence refers to the commission of any of 
the following acts: ‘(a) wilfully or knowingly placing or attempting to place, the victim in 
fear of physical injury (b) causing physical injury to the victim by such act which is known 
or ought to have been known would result in injury (c) compelling the victim by force or 
threat to engage in any conduct or act, sexual or otherwise, from which the victim has a 
right to abstain (d) confining or detaining the victim against her will or (e) causing 
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mischief or destruction or damage to property with intent to cause or knowing that it is 
likely to cause distress or annoyance to the victim’.  
 
Even though the DVA does not exist solely for the protection of women, they have gained 
more attention as they are more likely to be victims in the domestic sphere in Malaysia. In 
2006, there were 463 cases of domestic violence involving women as victims, but only 22 
cases in which men were the victims. The margins increased in 2007 with 517 female 
victims and only 12 cases with male victims, while in 2008 there were 513 female victims 
and only 12 male victims (Social Welfare Department of Malaysia). This DVA is a kind of 
‘substantive equality statute’ that has been introduced and enforced by the Government to 
provide additional protection for women as a disadvantaged group. The extension of the 
definition of domestic violence under Section 2 of the DVA to include psychological abuse 
was realised on 21 December 2011 (Utusan Malaysia, 22 December 2011). The 
amendment bill was tabled for the first reading in the Dewan Rakyat (House of 
Representatives) on 30 June 2011. 
 
 
5.6 ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT 2007 
 
The CEDAW expressed concern that Malaysia has not enacted legislation on trafficking 
(CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006, para 23) in its concluding comments made against 
Malaysia in 2006. According to Article 6 of the Women’s Convention, a State Party has to 
‘take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in 
women and exploitation of prostitution of women’. I note that, in 2006, an official from the 
United States Department of State alleged that Malaysia had not done enough to combat 





; this allegation may have been made because Malaysia did not have its own 
legislation on anti-human trafficking. Malaysia has also been downgraded to Tier 3 from 
Tier 2 in the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report 2009 released by the United States 




Women and their status might not be empowered if laws are patriarchal or biased in favour 
of men, including if there is no law to protect women from all forms of trafficking. 
According to Busby (1993) and Chen (1997), law is patriarchal in the way it frames issues 
and defines problems. Thus, laws or legal systems which cannot adequately express 
women’s experience and needs might be biased too (Kiss, 1997). In this Section, I trace 
that Malaysia, as a State Party, is committing itself to taking appropriate measures against 
all forms of trafficking in women and the exploitation of women. The Government has 
been using a variety of laws to prosecute traffickers, such as the Child Act 2001 (Act 611) 
on trafficking of children, as immediate action is needed to protect women from violence 
(George, 1994). Indeed, because violence against women has been legitimised by social 
practices historically (Amirthalingam, 2003: 4), the Government has to work hard to 
provide laws that can protect women from violence and exploitation.   
 
Article 6 (1) of the Federal Constitution provides that no person shall be held in slavery 
while Article 6 (2) prohibits all forms of forced labour except compulsory service for 
national purposes prescribed by federal laws. I note that, as a protection, Section 55A of 
the Immigration Act 1959/1963 (Act 155) makes it an offence for any person to be 
involved, directly or indirectly, in conveying to Malaysia in or on any vehicle, vessel or 
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 See detail in ‘Enforcement Agencies Serious in Combating Human Trafficking–Musa’. Bernama.com. 20 
June 2009. Online: http://www.humantrafficking.org/updates/860. Retrieved on July 22/07/2010  
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aircraft any person in contravention of the Act. Moreover, Section 55B makes it an offence 
to employ one or more persons, other than a citizen or holder of an ‘Entry Permit’, who is 
not in possession of a valid Pass, whereas Section 56 (1) (d) makes it an offence to harbour 
any person whom one knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has acted in 
contravention of the Act. The Royal Malaysian Police have successfully invoked the 
Restricted Residence Act 1933 (Act 377) to prosecute traffickers in order to control 
activities that are a threat to public order (CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: 30), such as 
smuggling or immoral activities. The rationale is to take the person out of the area where 
undesirable activities are being conducted or prohibit him from entering such an area so 
that he will not be able to carry out such activities.  
 
The Malaysian Government presented its first Anti-Human Trafficking Bill in 2007 to 
provide the legislative means to fight the trafficking in human beings, particularly women 
and children. Once the Bill was passed, the Government could ratify the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, 
which supplements the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
154
. Today, 
‘trafficking in persons’ is specifically criminalized in Malaysia under the Anti-Trafficking 
in Persons Act 2007 (Act 670). Offences under these laws include the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring and receipt of persons by means of threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of 
vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to gain consent (of the 
victim) for the purpose of exploitation by way of prostitution and other sexual activities, 
forced labour, servitude and slavery. The scope of the Act was extended on 3 August 2010 
when it was amended by Parliament to introduce a new section entitled ‘Smuggling of 
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Migrants’. As well as the laws, the capacity of enforcement agencies is also being 
developed through training programmes and the Government is also working towards 
strengthening cooperation with other Governments (Laporan Pemerdagangan Manusia, 
2011: 1-7). 
 
Previously, there were no special provisions relating to violence against a sex worker; 
therefore, the offence would be covered by the Penal Code, which legislates against acts 
such as assault, using criminal force, wrongful restraint or confinement and causing hurt or 
grievous hurt. Section 370 of the Penal Code makes it an offence to import, export, 
remove, buy, sell or dispose of any person as a slave or to accept, receive or detain any 
person against his/her will as a slave. Also, Section 371 makes it illegal to habitually 
import, export, remove, buy, sell, traffic or deal in slaves. I note that the DVA, which 
provides legal protection for victims of violence in the home, supplements the offences 
under the Penal Code in terms of protection for the victims.     
 
Here, I have discovered that the Royal Malaysian Police Force is the main law 
enforcement agency, while the Social Welfare Department (SWD) is responsible for the 
protection and rehabilitation of women below the age of 21 who have been victimized, 
coerced or forced into prostitution. The SWD is responsible for providing protection, 
rehabilitation and counselling to girls and women under the age of 18 who have been 
involved in prostitution (Social Welfare Department). Together with the other local 
agencies, the Royal Malaysian Police Force has taken all possible measures to enforce the 
laws, continuously monitor the situation, undertake preventive actions and instigate 
criminal proceedings against those who traffic or exploit women for the purpose of 
prostitution (Royal Malaysian Police Force). Thus, with the legislation of the Anti-
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Trafficking in Persons Act 2007 (Act 670), Malaysia is moving towards progressive 
achievement in terms of combating human trafficking, which could protect women from 
being disadvantaged simply for being women. Women and their status could be 
empowered when the laws governing them reflect their need and experience, as expressed 
by Busby, Chen and Kingdom, and in this perpective, when women’s need for the law 
against anti human-trafficking is realised.   
  
5.7 DECLINATION OF LOW LITERACY TO EMPOWER THE ECONOMY 
OF RURAL WOMEN 
 
The CEDAW expressed concerns that Malaysia did not present a current picture of the 
situation of rural women and information on the ‘de facto’ position of rural women in its 
Combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of Malaysia in 2006 (U. N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 29 and 30). Rural women of Malaysia comprise a 
significant proportion of the county’s population even as the country undergoes a rapid rate 
of industrialization, aimed at achieving a developed status by the year 2020. The 
Malaysian Department of Statistics (MDS) revealed that 10,340,900 out of a total 
population of 28,250,500 people were residing in rural areas in 2010 and that there were 
4,997,800 women among the rural populace. I note that there are demands for special 
attention to be paid to the situation of rural women, whose particular struggles and vital 
economic contributions, as noted in Article 14 of the Women’s Convention, warrant more 
attention in policy planning. This will ensure their participation in the elaboration and 
implementation of development planning at all levels. The MDS defines rural areas as ‘all 
other gazetted local authority areas with a population of less than 10,000 persons and 




The incidence of poverty is a matter of concern in the rural areas (Siwar, 1996). However, 
as explained in ‘Rural Development Model in Malaysia’ by Mohd. Arshad and 
Shamsuddin (1997), the agricultural and rural infrastructure programmes carried out since 
Independence have significantly improved living conditions in the rural areas. The Deputy 
Prime Minister has declared in his keynote address at the Women’s Summit 2010 that, in 
the long term, education will be the Government’s way of creating the necessary impetus 
to uplift rural Malaysia (Borneo Post Online, 9 December 2010). According to him, one of 
the six National Key Result Areas (NKRAs) in the Government Transformation 
Programme is to improve the level of education across the board. This is an important 
strategy, considering that women can be empowered by allowing their equal access to 
education (Gender and Development Group, World Bank, 2003: 11-13). 
 
Pertaining to the low literacy level among women, I note that it has declined with 
improved educational services which also empower women in the economy. I trace that the 
role of Malaysian rural women in the economy has been carved up into two perspectives: 
formal (labour force participation
155
) and non-formal (micro enterprise activities
156
). 
Government programmes to incorporate functional literacy curricula into socio-economic 
programmes for rural populations addressed some of the educational needs of rural 
women
157
. Indeed, rural women’s involvement in decision-making at all levels of policy 
and programme planning was also vital to ensure that their needs were addressed and that 
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they were given opportunities to be partners in development. However, in terms of the 
ways in which women are involved, I find that rural women’s participation was limited to 
their ‘private world’; which is a monopoly on leadership only in women’s organizations, 
which are mainly social and welfare-based in nature. As such, the scope is limited for 
women leaders to make decisions pertaining to economic participation, control of 
resources and planning for mainstream activities, especially in the context of village 
development (Khaled, 1997). In the political arena, rural women have always been the 
major supporters of political parties. Conversely, as Kamaruddin (2006: 23) argued, the 
involvement of rural women in the decision-making bodies of the various political parties 
is minimal compared to their numbers because a vast majority of rural women tend to be 
followers and not leaders.   
 
To increase participation of rural women at decision-making level, courses and training 
have been conducted by various agencies such as the Department of Women’s 
Development, the Ministry of Rural Development and the Department of Agriculture to 
build the skills or capacity of rural women, improve their access to knowledge, particularly 
information and communication technology (ICT) literacy, and enhance their motivation 
and leadership ability (Ali, 2010: 2). According to Ali, gender sensitisation courses for 
policymakers, programme implementers and community leaders have also been conducted 
by the Department of Women’s Development and the Institute of Public Administration. 
Additionally, skill and capability-building services for women are also provided by various 
agencies in the rural areas (Ali, 2010: 2) Basically, training programmes focus on 
enhancing women’s role in homemaking and family life by teaching them skills such as 
cooking, sewing and caring for children (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: 96). 
Some women, however, are able to develop and commercialise their skills by venturing 
200 
 
into micro enterprise projects and other such economic activities, which I discussed earlier, 
pertaining to special measures accorded to women in economic and social mainstream 
activities. The courses and training programmes for rural women have been diversified to 
include entrepreneurship, motivation and leadership training to empower rural women in 
the public sphere (Ministry of Women and Family Development, 2003: 65). According to 
the Report on the Progress of Malaysian Women since Independence (1957-2000), 
religious classes, literacy and family development programmes are mainly targeted at 
women too. Furthermore, rural women also play an active role in community activities, 
especially welfare and socially-oriented activities (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: 
99).   
 
Indeed, the development of the rural areas and the concerted efforts by all agencies serving 
rural communities, among others, are intended to achieve the objective of empowering 
rural women and eliminating discrimination against them. Gender sensitisation 
programmes at all levels, as discussed above, have been intensified to remove stereotypical 
assumptions about the role of women by policymakers, programme implementers and 
community leaders as well as the women themselves to ensure that rural women have 
equal outcomes with rural men and with urban women and men. 
  
5.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  
Through this Chapter, I have argued that the Government of Malaysia is committed to 
eliminating women’s disadvantages by legislating and amending gender-biased laws and 
has taken appropriate measures, including laws, policies, administrative decisions and 
programmes, to eliminate discrimination against Muslim women based on the principal 
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areas of concern and recommendations of the CEDAW in the concluding comments made 
against Malaysia following the Thirty-Fifth Session in New York. They are in regard to the 
elimination of gender stereotypes, public and political life, employment, adequate 
sanctions for acts of violence against women, trafficking, and empowerment of rural 
women. I argued that Malaysia has incorporated the substance of the Convention, which is 
the principle of equality, to provide special measures for women to ensure gender equality 
in its national legislation, policies, administrative decisions and programmes. As women 
have been historically disadvantaged (Ahmad, 2007), substantive equality is a tool to 
eliminate substantive inequality of disadvantaged groups (Kapur and Cossman, 1996: 17). 
 
I argued that efforts such as providing temporary special measures have been made by the 
Malaysian Government to facilitate the assimilation of women into the mainstream of 
social and economic activities to eliminate gender stereotype norms that constrain women 
in their private life only, which could modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
women and men. I traced that the Government has progressively empowered women and 
eliminated gender stereotypes by ensuring women’s financial independence and providing 
special measures in economic activities, education, healthcare and marriage and family 
relations. 
 
As special measures are important for women, I have found that women are entitled to 
more financial rights to compensate for their previous economic disadvantages in 
Malaysia. I noted that women are guaranteed similar conditions to men in the 
administration of any educational institution, admission, fees, curricula, examinations, 
scholarship and opportunities to participate actively in sports and access to specific 
learning information. I discovered that access to healthcare is given equally to women and 
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men, although women are given more attention and services because of their needs 
associated with maternity. I discovered that many gender stereotypes in terms of marriage 
and family relations of Muslims in Malaysia have been eliminated and women now have 
the following rights: the right to choose a spouse, equal rights and responsibilities as 
parents, equal rights to decide on the number and spacing of their children, and equal rights 
to property.  
 
I have found that, in Malaysia, women are guaranteed the rights to vote and be eligible for 
election to all publicly elected bodies, to participate in the formulation of government 
policy and hold public office, to exercise public functions, and to participate in non-
governmental organizations. The right of Muslim women in Malaysia to choose a 
profession is secured and they are entitled to the right to equal remuneration, social 
security, and protection of health and safety in working conditions. I traced that, in 
response to the CEDAW’s recommendation to include adequate sanctions for acts of 
discrimination against women, laws were amended to increase the penalties for rape and 
incest. The Government’s commitment to eliminating discrimination against women in 
Malaysia has been achieved not only by amending ‘gender-biased laws’ but also by 
legislating new laws to protect women. Pertaining to the low literacy of rural women, I 
noted that it has declined with improved educational services which also empower women 
in the economy. 
 
However, there are a few areas that need specific improvement for the betterment of the 
laws, policies and administrative decisions and programmes in protecting women’s rights 
which I have proposed throughout the discussion. Indeed, having gender equality laws 
could be regarded as being in the best interest of women even though social construction to 
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eliminate gender stereotyping is equally important. Moreover, to ascertain whether there is 
a possibility of harmonising the Women’s Convention with the Malaysian Muslim 
women’s rights laws, an analysis of the reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) is 
extremely important and will be discussed in the next Chapter. If the reservation does not 
conflict with the object and purpose of the Women’s Convention and is consistent with the 
principle of equality informed by the Women’s Convention, I will argue that the two 























 ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF MALAYSIA’S 




In order to develop the previous Chapter’s argument that Malaysia has taken appropriate 
measures, including laws, policies, administrative decisions and programmes, to eliminate 
discrimination against Muslim women based on the principal areas of concern and 
recommendations of the CEDAW in the concluding comments made against Malaysia 
following the Thirty-Fifth Session in New York, my concern in this Chapter is to analyse 
whether the reservation to Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) entered by the Government of 
Malaysia goes against the object and purpose of the Women’s Convention. This is 
significant as the question of whether the Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights might 
possibly be harmonised with the Women’s Convention could be best constructed if the 
Article reserved by the Government of Malaysia does not conflict with the object and 
purpose of the Convention. As I mentioned earlier in this thesis, the Government of 
Malaysia reserved Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) and Article 9 (2) of the Women’s 
Convention, but I shall not include Article 9 (2) in my analysis here, as the basis of 
reservation to this Article is not because of its non-conformity with Shariah practised in 
Malaysia, but with the Malaysian Federal Constitution.  
 
I trace that the substance of Article 16 is to ensure equality of women and men in marriage 
and family relations by securing ‘similar’ rights and ‘similar’ legal entitlements to rights. 
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For instance, if men are given the legal right to marry, women are also accorded the same 
right. And if men have the legal right to marry at 18 years of age, women are also given the 
right to marry at the age of 18. In this Chapter, I argue that both Muslim women and men 
in Malaysia are given similar rights by laws in matters relating to marriage and family 
relations, but their entitlements to rights differ. Taking a similar example which will be 
discussed in detail in this Chapter, Shariah applied in Malaysia gives Muslim women and 
men the right to marry, but the ages at which they can marry differ. Women have the right 
to marry at 16 years of age, but the age for men is 18. This divergence, I argue, does not 
show that women are not accorded equal rights (right to marry) by law to those accorded to 
men, but that the law has conferred different entitlements (dissimilar ages) on women and 
men to enter into marriage. This divergence is intended to ensure that the law secures equal 
outcomes for both women and men.  
  
As I explained in Chapter Three, similar treatment or formal equality might result in 
gender equality; however, yet in certain circumstances, similarity may bring about 
inequalities. In this Chapter, I analyse whether different entitlements to the right to enter 
into marriage, rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution, right to 
guardianship and personal rights for Muslim women and men disadvantage women. Based 
on the conception of equality under the Women’s Convention informed by Facio and 
Morgan (2009), as explained earlier in Chapter Three that disadvantaged people are 
guaranteed special measures to achieve equal results similar to those of advantaged people, 
an act or omission does not have the ‘effect’ or ‘purpose’ of denying women’s exercise and 
enjoyment of all rights and prohibit total discrimination in all aspects of life. I answer the 
question of whether the reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) entered by the 
Government of Malaysia makes Muslim women’s rights laws in Malaysia incompatible 
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with the Women’s Convention. I analyse whether the reservation disadvantages Muslim 
women and argue in this analysis that, if a woman is in an unequal position with regard to 
a man to begin with, then treating them with total equality will simply perpetuate the 
difference between them.    
 
I argue that, in Muslim marriage and family relations according to Malaysian laws, wives 
and husbands are guaranteed equal legal rights, yet their entitlements to rights differ. This 
is to ensure that, in marriage and the family sphere, wives are given special measures by 
laws to accommodate their disadvantages. I find that Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of 
the Women’s Convention marks a ‘unique approach’ to rights for Muslims. I argue that 
Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights are capable of harmonisation with the 
Women’s Convention and that the reservation to Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) is not 
against the object and purpose of the Women’s Convention if it ensures Muslim women’s 
equal outcomes in terms of justice.     
  
There is a view that all provisions enunciated under the Women’s Convention must be 
adopted to ensure maximum implementation of the law, although there is no general 
consensus on this
158
. This stance may have merit because equality, as a principle in the 
Women’s Convention, is a major concern in international, Islamic and Malaysian human 
rights laws too; therefore, as Yaacob (2006) has stressed, equal rights for women in all 
fields existing in the human rights instruments must be implemented. In contrast, in a 
working group set up during the Meeting of International Experts on Human Rights in 
Islam (MIEHRI) held in Malaysia in 2006, which I attended as an observer, only a small 
group agreed to the incorporation of the Women’s Convention into Islamic countries while 
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 Read earlier discussion on this issue in Chapter One 
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the larger group resisted it. In this regard, the majority opined that rights should apply to 
cultural activities and show respect for cultural diversity. A majority of the experts agreed 
that women’s equality rights are a major concern in Islam and need to be implemented in 
the national laws, but this should be done according to Islamic principles (The Rt. Hon. 
Justice Tan Sri Dato’ Siti Norma Binti Yaakob, Chief Judge of High Court of Malaysia, 
2006: 28-29). 
 
My argument is, however, that maximum implementation of the laws might not necessarily 
be achieved by incorporating all provisions stated in the Women’s Convention into 
national laws, because the rights protection might be achieved not only by applying the 
same legal terms, wordings, provisions, rights or formal equality, but also by applying the 
same understanding of the principle of equality and its results, which I shall employ in my 
analysis in this Chapter. Thus, even though I have stated earlier that it is necessary for a 
law be passed at the national level to give effect to the international commitments entered 
into, however, the interpretation of the legal provisions has to take into consideration the 
principle or substance of the law, rather than only the form. As stated by the Former Chief 
Justice of Malaysia, Dato’ Abdul Hamid Mohamad, to harmonise laws attention must be 
paid to the substance of the laws, rather than just the form (Mohamad, 2003). This means 
that, to be harmonised, laws do not necessarily have to be uniform, a point addressed by 
Sir Anthony Mason, the Former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, 
‘harmonisation of rules does not necessarily mean uniformity of rules’ (Mason, 1997). 
Thus, it might be sufficient for two different rules to co-exist conveniently. Practical 
realization of women’s human rights might be achieved upon application of formal and 





Drawing on an earlier critique that two things that are unalike could be treated differently 
to ensure equal outcomes, I argue that the CEDAW is not consistent in enhancing this 
principle of substantive equality by ‘asking’ State Parties to ensure Muslim women and 
men have the ‘same right to enter into marriage (Article 16 (1) (a)’, ‘same rights and 
responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution (Article 16 (1) (c)’, ‘same rights 
and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of 
children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all 
cases the interests of the children shall be paramount (Article 16 (1) (f)’,  and ‘same 
personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a 
profession and an occupation (Article 16 (1) (g)’. For substantive equality standard, 
application and achievement, I propose that, even though the term used in these provisions 
is ‘same rights’ or ‘same personal rights’, women and men can have different entitlements 
to rights to ensure equal outcomes. Were the term to be changed accordingly, all Muslim 
or non-Muslim State Parties which reserved Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) might 
withdraw their reservations. 
  
6.2 IS THE RESERVED ARTICLE AGAINST THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE 
OF THE WOMEN’S CONVENTION? 
 
The CEDAW, in its concluding comments to Malaysia’s Combined Initial and Second 
Periodic Report submitted in 2004, urged Malaysia to review and withdraw reservation to 
Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) due to its contradiction of the object and purpose of the 
Convention (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2, 2006: para 10). According to Hamid 
(2006: 9), Western countries also believe that the reservations entered by Muslim countries 
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are not in accord with the object and purpose of the Women’s Convention. I trace that, 
while the concept of equality in the Women’s Convention is coherent with Islamic 
doctrine, the application of rights to equality by the Women’s Convention, which is 
Western-based, and by Malaysian Muslim women’s rights laws, which are Islamic-based, 
are not necessarily similar. The question might arise as to whether Islam or other traditions 
which confer similar rights on women and men but different entitlements to rights due to 
their different strengths disadvantage women and are against the principle of equality 
informed by the Women’s Convention.    
 
Hamid (2006), while analysing the reservations made by the Islamic countries, the 
objections to these reservations by other State Parties, and pressure applied by the 
CEDAW to withdraw these reservations, has drawn this conclusion: 
‘It is an extremely difficult and sensitive issue and the solution will largely depend on to 
what extent CEDAW can accommodate Muslim countries to be able to comply with the 
most fundamental precepts of Shariah and to what extent Muslim countries are prepared to 
accept the liberal interpretation of the Islamic family law without affecting the most 
fundamental precepts of Shariah.’ 
 
Indeed, when State Parties become parties to the Women’s Convention, they are required 
to ensure that their domestic laws are in line with the Convention, even though they may 
have entered reservations to the Women’s Convention. I note that, even though 
reservations are allowed,
159
 the CEDAW and Western countries always claim that the 
reservations entered by Islamic countries are not in accord with the ‘object and purpose’ of 
the Convention. For instance, the Netherlands objected to Malaysia’s reservations to the 
Women’s Convention, 
                                                 
159
 Currently, out of the 187 State Parties to the Women’s Convention, 56 States have entered reservations to 
the Convention and the majority of them are non-Islamic countries. Only 25 of them are Islamic countries. 
Nauru is the most recent State Party, which ratified CEDAW on 23 June 2011. See: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en. 
Retrieved on 01/07/2011  
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‘The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers……that such reservations, 
which seek to limit the responsibilities of the reserving state under the Convention by 
invoking the general principles of national law and the Constitution, may raise doubts as 
to the commitment of this state to the object and purpose of the Convention……The 
Government of Netherlands further considers that the reservations made by Malaysia 
regarding Article 2 (f)
160
, Article 5 (a)
161
, Article 9 and Article 16
162
 of the Convention are 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. The Government of 
Netherlands therefore objects to the above reservations. This objection shall not preclude 





I note that, even after the Government of Malaysia had withdrawn reservation to Article 2 
(f), Article 9 (1), Article 16 (b), (d), (e) and Article 16 (h) on 6 February 1998, there were 
still objections from the Governments of France and the Netherlands
164
 relating to the said 
partial withdrawal.  
 
I argue that the problem in examining whether Malaysia’s reservations are incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the Convention is that there is no single objective criterion 
to determine whether any reservations are compatible with the object and purpose or not. 
Even though the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Advisory 
Opinion Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention Case) has devised the ‘object and purpose test’, which 
requires each state to individually determine whether it perceives a proposed reservation as 
being against the object and purpose of the treaty (International Court of Justice, 1951, ICJ 
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 On 6 February 1998, the Government of Malaysia notified the Secretary-General of a partial withdrawal 
of Article 2 (f)   
161
 On 19 July 2010, the Government of Malaysia notified the Secretary-General of a partial withdrawal of 
Article 5 (a) 
162
 On 19 July 2010, the Government of Malaysia notified the Secretary-General of a partial withdrawal of 
Article 16 (2) 
163
 See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Part I, Chapter IV, Objections Made by 
Netherlands. Online: http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/ publications/MTDSG/2009/ English-I.pdf. Retrieved 
on 01/01/2010 
164
 France on 20th July and Netherlands on 21st July, 1998. See Declarations and Reservations. Para 36, 
Chapter IV, Human Rights. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
Online: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en 
#36. Retrieved on 01/10/2010 
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Rep 15, 21, General List No. 12), according to Hamid (2006: 13) this test remains quite 
subjective.  
 
Hence, I employ the definition of ‘object and purpose’ as stated in the General 
Recommendation No. 25 on Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Women’s Convention on 
temporary special measures and the one which is offered by the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Guidelines on ‘Reservations to Treaties’ (U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.685, 
2006: Comments on Draft Guidelines: para (i)). In the General Recommendation No. 25, 
the overall object and purpose of the Women’s Convention is ‘to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women with a view to achieving women’s de jure and de facto 
equality with men in the enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms’ 
(Paragraph 3). The Draft Guidelines define the ‘object and purpose’ as ‘the essential 
provisions of the treaty, which constitutes its raison d’etre165’. According to the Draft 
Guidelines, ‘when evaluating the impact of a reservation considered to be contrary to the 
object and purpose of a treaty, consideration should be given to whether the impact of the 
reservation would be limited to the provision itself or whether it would have a broader 
effect on the substantive content of a treaty’. Thus, to ensure that the reserved Article does 
not go against the Women’s Convention, it is important to consider in this analysis whether 
the reservation prevents women from having equal rights with men and whether the 
reservation has a broader impact on the substantive concept of the Women’s Convention.  
 
The CEDAW considered Article 2 and Article 16 to be core provisions and that ‘neither 
traditional, religious or cultural practice nor incompatible domestic laws and policies can 
justify violations of the Convention. The Committee also remains convinced that 
                                                 
165
 Raison d’etre means ‘the most important reason for the existence of something’ 
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reservations to Article 16, whether lodged for national, traditional, religious or cultural 
reasons, are incompatible with the Convention and therefore impermissible and should be 
reviewed and modified or withdrawn (Reservations to CEDAW, Division for the 
Advancement of Women: Impermissible Reservations). Therefore, as Malaysia reserved 
Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) subject to the Shariah applied in this country, from the 
above analysis it might be seen as incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention. 
 
However, I argue that, by correctly understanding the essence of equality (formal and 
substantive), one might see the compatibility of the Women’s Convention with Malaysian 
laws on Muslim women’s rights, even though Malaysia reserved Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) 
and (g). This is a valid option for the State Party’s Government rather than strictly 
complying with the Convention’s provisions and ignoring Shariah or maintaining the 
status quo of Shariah and ignoring the Convention. I will argue that, if gender equality 
could be achieved by reserving this Article and if the reservation does not have a broader 
impact on the substantive concept of the Women’s Convention, then the reservation would 
not be against the object and purpose of the Women’s Convention.     
 
6.3 SIMILAR RIGHTS, DIFFERENT ENTITLEMENTS: EQUAL OUTCOMES 
  
 
In this Section, I argue that the Government of Malaysia’s initial refusal to accept all the 
provisions of Article 16 of the Women’s Convention as binding upon it does not 
necessarily restrict Muslim women’s equal rights with men or indicate its apparent 
reluctance to extend full equality to Muslim women in this sphere. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, Malaysia operates a dual legal system based on both English common laws and 
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Islamic textual sources. Article 121 (1A) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution, introduced 
in 1988 by constitutional amendment, stated that the civil courts have no jurisdiction in 
matters that fall within the Shariah Court’s jurisdiction. Civil courts have jurisdiction over 
the majority of laws, including contracts, torts, property, criminal, constitutional and 
administrative matters. Family matters are governed by a combination of civil, Shariah and 
customary laws. In most cultural practices of the ethnic groups in Malaysia, the concept of 
family also includes the extended families of the wife and husband (Abd. Rahim, Ismail 
and Mohd. Dahlal, 2008: 188).  
 
The Government of Malaysia reserves Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) due to its 
inconsistencies with Shariah as practised in Malaysia. The non-recognition of similar 
entitlements to rights for Muslim women and men on issues of rights to enter into marriage 
(Article 16 (1) (a)), rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution 
(Article 16 (1) (c)), rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, 
trusteeship and adoption of children (Article 16 (1) (f)) and personal rights as wife and 
husband (Article 16 (1) (g)) has led to the Government being criticized for not protecting 
Muslim women’s rights and therefore discriminating against them on the basis of gender. 
Throughout my analysis in this Chapter, however, I argue that Muslim women might be 
guaranteed similar rights to those of men, although their entitlements to the rights differ. I 
trace that there is no specific reason for reserving this Article because Malaysia entered a 
general reservation, which uses justification of supremacy of religion and the country’s 
constitution as explained earlier, except to Article 16 (1) (a), which is more specific.  
 
Even though Muslim wives’ and husband’s entitlements to rights differ in the above 
matters, my argument, as informed by equality scholarship is that their rights may be 
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equal. Treating women and men differently in family relations, as alleged by Kapur and 
Cossman (1996: 174), is not discriminatory but protects individual roles in the family. 
Before I proceed with the analysis, I note that, in Islam, when women and men enter into 
marriage agreements, the laws and their rights, roles and responsibilities will treat them as 
wife and husband, not merely as an ordinary woman and man. I submit that they have to 
adhere to the concept of joint rights and joint duties, even though both have their exclusive 
rights and duties according to their own strengths. That is why Elmalmad (2002: 244) has 
averred that, when dealing with women in Islam, the most important thing is to distinguish 
between married and non-married women. 
 
I note that, in Islam, only a man can be a husband and only a woman can be a wife. 
Because of their different strengths, generally the husband will perform the task of 
providing for the family whereas the wife’s task is to give birth and breastfeed (Abd. 
Ghani, 2003: 2-3). On the other hand, the situation could be otherwise; in the matters that 
are demonstrated by Abd. Ghani as ‘murunah’ (flexibility), in the sense of caring for and 
loving each other, a wife could provide for the family and the husband could be 
responsible for raising the children although, of course, a husband could not give birth and 
breastfeed. Therefore, drawing on a range of feminist scholarship, it seems ‘unfair’ for the 
wife to be given similar tasks to her husband, working and supporting the family and, at 
the same time, performing her biological tasks of giving birth and breastfeeding, although 
women are not prohibited from working if they wish to. Riffat Hassan, according to Ali 
(2000: 65), has argued that, in the Muslim world, wives should not have additional 
obligations of providing for the family when bearing and raising children at the same time. 
However, a wife might provide for her family if her husband is unable to do so, is 
imprisoned, unknown, or refuses to support the family; she may simply prefer to be the 
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breadwinner, which, as Yusuf (2005: 7) asserted, would be considered an act of charity. 
One can be a wife without being a mother and be a husband without being a father in such 
cases, both wife and husband could work because the general rule in Islam is that a wife is 
permitted to work (Buang, 2001: 33-37).  
 
6.3.1 Right to Enter into Marriage 
6.3.1.1 Female 16 and Male 18: Are They Going To School? 
With respect to Article 16 (1) (a) on the issue of rights to enter into marriage, the 
Government of Malaysia declared that, under the Shariah practised in Malaysia, the age 
limit for marriage for Muslim women is 16 and for men it is 18. The principal right in this 
Article is the similar right to enter into marriage, which is conferred on both Muslim 
women and men, but the ‘age’ of entitlement differs. Thus, the law does not have an effect 
or purpose of denying women’s exercise and enjoyment of their rights to enter into 
marriage; neither does it prevents women from having equal rights with men. The different 
entitlement could be a special measure accorded to women to compensate for their 
disadvantages, which could result in equal outcomes with men. Because equality should 
not be reduced to sameness (Fletcher, 2002; Bakar; 2003; Yaacob; 1986), this different 
entitlement could be one way of achieving the aim of equality, as Fredman (2003: 43) 
explained; equality could be achieved by providing an alternative choice to pursue a good 
life.  
 
In Malaysia, different age limits for Muslim women and men to enter into marriage are 
provided under Islamic Family Law Enactments of every State. I note that women are 
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permitted to marry at a younger age than men, under both the civil laws
166
 and Islamic 
family laws. Section 8 of the IFLA states that ‘no marriage may be solemnized or 
registered under this Act where either the man is under the age of 18 or the woman is 
under the age of 16 except where the Shariah Judge has granted his permission in writing 
in certain circumstances.’ Therefore, the Government of Malaysia reserves Article 16 (1) 
(a) that Muslim women and men must have the same ‘age limit’ to enter into marriage in 
order that Section 8 mentioned above might prevail.  
 
I note that, under Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), every 
human being below the age of 18 is considered a child. This is why the CEDAW has 
stipulated a minimum age of 18 years for people to contract into marriage (General 
Recommendation No. 21, 13th Session, 1994: Comment para 36). In Islam there is no 
fixed age for marriage; due to these circumstances, Noor (2007: 138) has explained that the 
Rector of Al-Azhar, the Grand Qadhi, the Grand Mufti and a group of religious scholars 
who were invited by the Government of Egypt to take part in a discussion in response to 
the demands of the Feminists’ Union,167 set the minimum age for marriage at 16 for 
Muslim girls and 18 for Muslim boys
168
, a decision that later inspired Malaysian 
legislators. This minimum age of marriage seemed to follow the Hanafi school of thought 
on the presumption of puberty (Noor, 2007: 143). In Islamic theory, Elmalmad (2002: 243) 
affirmed that a girl attains the age of majority generally at around ten to 12 years of age.    
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 Under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1991 (Act 1976) (LRA), while the minimum age for 
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By the age of 18, a man is no longer considered a child (General Recommendation No. 21, 
13th Session, 1994: Comment para 36) and is deemed competent to fulfil his duty as a 
husband and the family maintainer. In contrast, a wife may not be the breadwinner in the 
family, so she may not necessarily be physically competent to work to support the family. 
Yet, she might need to reach a biological maturity to fulfil her reproductive duty; therefore, 
to enter into a contract of marriage having reached the age of at least 16 might be sensible 
for a woman in Malaysia, as Abu Bakar, Majumdar and Ann (1983) have claimed that 
women in Malaysia are biologically mature at 15.6 years of age. Saudi Arabia, in its 
responses to the list of issues and questions prepared by the CEDAW, recommended that 
the CEDAW acknowledge that each country has environmental and physiological 
particularities and that the age of majority in cold Western countries is higher than in hot 
Eastern countries (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SAU/Q/2/Add. 1, 2007: Phase 10, para 31). 
Because a woman and a man could fulfil their duties as wife and husband according to 
their different strengths, I submit that this difference is equal. Preventing women from 
entering into marriage when they are biologically competent to marry might amount to a 
discrimination against them.  
  
Moreover, for Muslims, sexual intercourse outside marital relationships is totally 
prohibited (Al-Qardhawi, 2001: 146). Muslim women and men are allowed to have sex 
only when they are religiously recognised as wife and husband. Because boys of 18 years 
of age and girls as young as 16 might be biologically mature enough to have a sexual 
relationship as mentioned earlier, and if the sexual relationship cannot be prevented, as 
Muslims they are encouraged to legalise their relationship by marriage. Thus, allowing 
boys of 18 and girls of 16 to enter into a marriage contract might reduce illegal sexual 
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intercourse and illegal pregnancy which might contribute to the rejection of unwanted 
babies. There have been many cases in Malaysia of new-born babies being thrown out and 
almost all of them were found dead (Pak, 2010). Statistics from the Royal Malaysian 
Police Force have shown that 67 babies born out of wedlock were reportedly cast aside in 
2005; there were 83 cases in 2006, 65 cases in 2007, 102 cases in 2008, 79 cases in 2009 
and 91 cases in 2010, almost all of which involved Muslim babies. I note that the situation 
worsened in 2011 when 34 cases were reported in January alone.    
 
From data gathered by the Malaysian Department of Social Welfare, I note that, between 
2004 and 2009, 20.4 per cent or 99 babies were thrown into housing areas, 15.8 per cent or 
77 babies were thrown into dustbins and the rest were thrown into coppices, rivers, drains, 
mosques, hospitals and latrines. Most of the cases were due to unwanted pregnancies, 
which resulted from early-age illegal sexual intercourse, and most of the ‘illegitimate 
parents’ involved in these cases were teenagers, some of them under 18 years old (girls) 
and 20 years old (boys) (Royal Malaysian Police Force). Therefore, an age limit of 16 for 
girls and 18 for boys is ideal in the Malaysian local context to protect Muslim girls from 
committing criminal offences due to illegal sexual intercourse. Although babies are still 
being cast aside even though the Government of Malaysia reserved Article 16 (1) (a) to 
allow girls to marry at 16, this age limit might at least reduce the number of cases. Hence, 
allowing women as young as 16 to marry could eliminate women’s disadvantages. 
 
Age limit for marriage is important because early marriage has profound ‘physical, 
intellectual, psychological and emotional impacts, cutting off educational opportunity and 
chances of personal growth’ (UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 2001: 2). Those who marry 
at a younger age frequently forfeit their opportunities for further education (Oyorti and 
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Pobi, 2003: 6) at secondary school and are not ready to fulfil their duty as wife, husband or 
parents. Menon-Sen (2005: 3) has stressed that both female and male students who drop 
out of school have lower employment opportunities and lower bargaining powers in 
marriage, making them more vulnerable to economic dependency and further inequalities 
within the marriage. In fact, education is an important strategy to empower women and 
advance towards gender equality (Gender and Development Group, World Bank, 2003: 11-
13). I submit that those who argue that marriage does not prevent women from receiving 
an education are possibly unaware that the world is still far from achieving gender equality 
in study completion rates. The UNESCO reported in 2004 that an estimated 54 to 57 per 
cent of all children who drop out of school are girls (UN Millennium Project 2005). This is 
due to what Menon-Sen (2005: 3) has described as ‘patriarchal attitudes that define girls’ 
destiny in terms of marriage and family’. I note that early marriage and pregnancy forces 
girls to drop out of education before its completion, which is not the case with boys. 
Moreover, young couples who marry and become saddled with heavy responsibilities are 
more likely to have marital problems, which may lead to divorce. Early childbearing, 
according to research conducted by UNICEF in 2001, is likely to lead to a lifetime of 
domestic and sexual subservience over which women have no control.  
  
Even though I have argued that those who marry at an age below the limit provided by the 
laws frequently forfeit their opportunities for further education, the situation in Malaysia is 
different. Here, I submit that there may be no risk of married girls forfeiting their 
opportunities for further education, because they will be permitted to continue their studies 
as usual. The problem is that they themselves may abandon their education due to the 
greater burden of being a wife and mother at the same time. However, the Government of 
Malaysia provides ‘special schools’ for pregnant girls as a special measure to compensate 
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for their weaknesses. The Government of Malaysia has recently provided ‘Sekolah 
Harapan’ and ‘Rumah Harapan’ in Jasin, Malacca, in September 2010 for pregnant girls 
to prevent them from being indirectly discriminated against due to their condition 
(Shamsuddin, 2011). I note that this provision is also intended to discourage pregnant 
(married or unmarried) girls from forfeiting their studies, to inhibit unmarried pregnant 
girls from casting aside their babies, and to gradually educate society into accepting them 
as members of society. Up to December 2011, 80 unmarried pregnant girls between the 
ages of 14 and 18 were enrolled in the schools and 59 babies were safely delivered by their 
young mothers; 45 of them were extradited to the girls’ mothers (Kosmo, 8 December, 
2011).   
 
It is important to note that the ideal age for marriage should be determined not only by 
biological criteria but also by all aspects of human significance, such as emotional, mental 
and financial aspects. While acknowledging the importance of setting girls’ and boys’ age 
limits at 16 and 18 years respectively, early marriage, or a marriage involving parties 
below the age of 24, could be problematic. Abdullah (2001: 96) has explained that, 
according to the studies conducted by Swift (1963), the number of dissolved marriages was 
increasing during the 1950s and 1960s due to early marriages. It was the culture in society 
at that time for daughters to marry at 16 or 17 years of age. From the 1970s to the 1990s, as 
explained by Abdullah, the usual age range for marriage extended to encompass those aged 
in their early 20s, which reduced the divorce rate in Malaysia. However, most divorced 
wives were still aged between 20 and 24
169
 (Abdullah, 2001: 105). Hence, a person aged 
around 24 or 25 might be considered financially and biologically ready for marriage. 
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However, if, for any reason, a person needs to marry at an early age, they should at least do 
so after they have attained biological maturity. At this age, a woman is able to fulfil her 
responsibilities and reproductive duties as a wife.  
  
Therefore, dissimilar age limits for Muslim women and men to enter into marriage are 
important in Malaysia due to their different biological natures, different rates of 
development and the need to protect against unwanted pregnancies resulting from illegal 
sexual intercourse by young girls. Even though Section 8 of the IFLA treats women and 
men differently, the difference does not necessarily amount to discrimination because the 
different entitlement, which is an earlier age for marriage conferred on women as 
compared to men, could be considered a special measure to protect women from having 
illegal sexual intercourse and unwanted pregnancies. Furthermore, women’s right to pursue 
education is secured even after their marriage and special measures are provided for them 
to guarantee equal outcome in the educational right.  
 
However, to protect women from unwanted pregnancies and at the same time, to accept the 
fact that the ideal age for marriage should be determined not only by biological criteria but 
also by emotional, mental and financial aspects, it might be better if the age limit for 
women is made 18 rather than 16. It is not against the Shariah too, as Maliki school of law 
determined that the age of puberty for both male and female is 18 (U. N. Doc. 
CRC/C/MYS/1, 2006: 37). Other Muslim states, such as Jordan and Morocco have 
recently raised the minimum age limit of marriage for both female and male to 18. The 
Jordanian Parliament increased the legal age of marriage for both girls and boys, from 15 
and 16 to 18, to avoid early marriages and subsequent school drop out for married girls 
(World Bank, 2005: 47). Labadi (2004: 81) has stressed that Article 279 of the Jordanian 
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Penal Code criminalizes anyone involved in the marriage of girl under 18. In Morocco 
too, the national government has raised the age of marriage for girls from 15 to 18. As 
stated in the Moroccan Family Code (Moudawana) 2004, ‘men and women acquire the 
capacity to marry when they are of sound mind and have completed eighteen full 
Gregorian years of age’ (Article 19).  
 
Hence, throughout the above analysis, it seems that the law is inadequate for social change 
and might disadvantage girls when they are treated differently as a wife, which amounts to 
‘less favourably’ than men. It is important to note that discrimination could still occur even 
if different people are treated differently, unless the disadvantaged people are guaranteed 
special measures to achieve equal results similar to those of advantaged people. If different 
entitlement does not bring about equal outcomes, it might amount to discrimination 
(Bindman, 1992). Thus, I propose in this perspective that a range of special measures 
provided by laws in education and health are important as effective strategies for 
protecting married girls as a disadvantaged group in Malaysia. As Facio and Morgan 
(2009) explained, Article 1 of the Women’s Convention defines equality and non-
discrimination as a prohibition of total, not partial, discrimination in all aspects of life. 
Without special measures in education and health, women might not have equal rights with 
men in relation to their different entitlements of the right to enter into marriage.  
 
6.3.2 Rights and Responsibilities During Marriage and at Its Dissolution 
 
In this Section, I explain that, pertaining to Article 16 (1) (c) on the issue of rights and 
responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution, even though the Government does 
not set out in detail the reasons for this reservation, it is understood that the reservation is 
subject to Shariah on the issue of maintenance, polygamous marriage and dissolution of 
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marriage. In the Malaysia’s combined initial and second periodic report submitted to the 
CEDAW, the report has explained that there are dissimilarities in rights between women 
and men pertaining to polygamous marriage (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: 108-
109), maintenance (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: 109), dissolution of marriage 
(U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: 111-113), guardianship of children (U. N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: 114-115) and the wife’s rights to retain her name (U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: 109). The NGO Shadow Report on the initial and second 
periodic report of the Government of Malaysia also elucidated on the same issues about 
different entitlements of women and men in Malaysia by reason of Shariah (NGO Shadow 
Report Group, 2005: Articles 16: Equality in Marriage and Family: 116-130). 
 
Here, I argue that the principal rights of this Article concern similar rights and 
responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; which are in fact, conferred on 
Muslim women and men in Malaysia according to the laws, yet only the entitlements to 
rights during marriage and at its dissolution, differ. I argue that this does not show that 
Muslim women are not given equal rights to men.  As mentioned earlier, according to the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Guidelines on ‘Reservations to Treaties’, the 
reservation could be against the object and purpose when it prevents women from having 
equal rights with men (U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.685, 2006: Comments on Draft Guidelines: 
para (i)). According to the IFLA, Muslim women and men do not have the same 
entitlements to rights and responsibilities during marriage in providing maintenance for the 
households, the practice of polygamous marriage and dissolution of marriage. This sounds 
unfair at first glance; however, similar to the application of rights in the UIDHR and 
CDHRI, I will argue that these different entitlements to rights during marriage do not 
necessarily make Muslim women and men unequal. The difference is intended to enable 
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wife and husband to complement each other (Abd. Ghani, 2003: 3) which results in 
equality of outcomes. 
  
6.3.2.1 Wives’ Entitlement to ‘Wife Duties’ 
Malaysia, following the Islamic-based rule, pointed out the responsibility of a husband to 
provide for the family whereas a wife is under no such obligation (U. N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2, 2004: Part 1, Article 16, para 410). The basis of a Muslim wife’s 
right to maintenance is provided in the Quran and is translated as ‘men are the managers 
of the affairs of women for that God have preferred in bounty one of them over another, 
and for that they have expended of their property.
170’ The UIDHR, as explained in Chapter 
Three, also stresses the sharing of obligations and responsibilities between wife and 
husband in the family and, in terms of the paying of maintenance, an obligation imposed 
on the husband only (Article XIX (c)). Article XIX (c) expresses that ‘Every husband is 
obligated to maintain his wife and children according to his means’.  
 
However, a Muslim wife’s rights to support and maintain her family are not restricted by 
any laws in Malaysia; therefore, I submit that their right is equal to that of men. I trace that 
entitlements to rights differ due to special measures accorded to women to compensate for 
their disadvantages, which could result in equal outcomes with men in terms of marital 
responsibilities. Even though ‘giving birth’ is a biological strength of women, women are 
in a disadvantaged position at the time of giving birth and cannot continue to provide for 
themselves or the family. Even though fully-paid maternity leave may be available to 
support the women and family, not all women work and earn salaries. Hence, the 
‘obligatory’ entitlement of right to maintain a family, which is given to the husband alone, 
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does not discriminate against Muslim women but could be a special measure to 
compensate for women’s disadvantage. Also, this will not restrict women’s rights and 
choice to work or maintain a family because women are not prohibited by laws from doing 
so. 
 
I note that maintenance in Islam refers to material provisions and conjugal rights of wives 
from husbands; here, material provisions include basic necessities such as food, clothing, 
accommodation, protection and security (Yusuf, 2005: 7). Meanwhile, conjugal rights, 
according to Yusuf (2005: 13), include meeting the needs of sexual desire to ensure the 
continuity of lineage and psychological aspects that result in a happy family according to 
the Islamic perspective. For Muslims, the Quran and the Prophetic tradition made it clear 
that there is such a duty which imposes an obligation upon a husband to maintain his 
wife,
171
 coupled, according to Stowasser (1987: 293), with an authority over the family 
members. Therefore, Muslim women and men do not have similar entitlements to rights 
and responsibilities pertaining to the issue of maintenance even though they share a similar 
principal right, which is similar rights and responsibilities during marriage. Even though 
women are not prohibited from providing for their family, there is no obligatory duty to do 
so. 
 
Ali (2000: 61 and 2006: 33) has agreed that a Muslim wife’s right to maintenance is a kind 
of protective right, which is afforded to women to ensure justice for them. I submit that all 
Muslim wives are entitled to this right regardless of how wealthy they are or even if they 
can support themselves, because the right to maintenance is the right conferred due to their 
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status as ‘wife’, not because they are ‘poor’. In the words of Singh, Musharraf and Mollah 
(2006: 178), ‘it is well known that Quranic stipulations command a Muslim husband to 
maintain his wife if she has means to maintain herself and even if the husband is without 
any means’. Singh, Musharraf and Mollah have stressed that maintenance of a wife is a 
husband’s debt and prevails over other persons’ rights to receive maintenance. Mahmuda 
Islam (2006: 130) has demonstrated in his research on ‘CEDAW and Bangladesh: A Study 
to Explore the Possibilities of Full Implementation of CEDAW in Bangladesh’ that some 
respondents even objected to giving women the right to maintenance because, according to 
them, it discriminates against men. Thus, this different entitlement does not disadvantage 
women or prevent women from having equal rights with men.  
 
A Muslim wife’s right to maintenance commences upon the conclusion of her valid 
marriage to her husband and expires on the death of the person against whom (husband) or 
in whose favour (wife) the order was made, whichever is the earlier (Section 64 of the 
IFLA) or on the wife being nusyuz (Section 59 (2)) or on the expiry of the period of iddah 
(Section 65 (1)). Nusyuz, according to Section 59 (2), is when the wife;- 
‘……unreasonably refuses to obey the lawful wishes or commands of her husband, that is 
to say, inter alia- 
(a) when she withholds her association with her husband; 
(b) when she leaves her husband’s home against his will; or 
(c) when she refuses to move with him to another home or place, without any valid reason 
according to Hukum Syarak’. 
 
Shafie school of thought provides that the husband’s obligation to maintain his wife may 
continue even after the marriage has been ended by divorce during the period of iddah. 
Therefore, Jaising’s (1996: 7) allegation according to his research on the laws of India, that 
the position of Muslim women under the laws is very unequal compared to men because 
divorced wives are not entitled to maintenance, is problematic. The period of iddah is a 
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period of time following the dissolution of marriage by divorce or death during which the 
divorced wife or widow is not permitted to enter into another marriage (At-Tuwaijiry, 
2000: 34). According to At-Tuwaijiry, the iddah for a divorced woman who has not 
reached menopause is three menstrual cycles; for a divorced woman who has reached 
menopause or whose menstrual cycles are irregular, it is three lunar months. On the other 
hand, the iddah for wives whose husbands die is four months and ten days. For a woman 
who is pregnant, the iddah period lasts until she delivers the child. However, no iddah is 
prescribed for those women whose marriage has not been consummated. The wisdom of 
iddah is to show respect to and honour for the sanctity of the marriage bond, to determine 
the paternity of the offspring and to provide a period of time for reconciliation (At-
Tuwaijiry, 2000: 34).  
 
Even though the obligation of maintenance is provided in the Quran, the amount and 
nature of it has not been clearly provided. Thus, this is naturally left to Islamic scholars to 
define. According to Section 61 of the IFLA, the Shariah Court will base the assessment 
for maintenance on the means and needs of the parties, ‘regardless of the proportion the 
maintenance bears to the income of the person against whom the order is made’. The 
means and needs could be defined as all those things which are necessary to support a 
wife; these include the three basics of food, clothing and lodging as well as any other 
essential services and articles pertaining to the wife’s contentment. According to the 
provision from the Quran which says that ‘A woman must be retained in honour or 
released in kindness
172’, a Muslim woman is even entitled to petition for divorce if the 
husband does not fulfil this duty (Section 52 (1) (c)).   
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Acknowledging the above fact that maintenance is the Muslim wife’s right during marriage 
and not the husband’s, and accepting that, at the same time, she could possess means of her 
own without an obligation to pay towards the upkeep of the household, there is clearly a 
dissimilar entitlement to rights between Muslim wife and husband in a family. A Muslim 
wife is confined by her duty to obey the husband as long as the husband fulfils his duty 
(Roberts, 2003: 64; Musawah, 2011: 13-14) and by her duty to perform biological 
functions which balance the husband’s duty and otherwise. Indeed, a husband could be 
superior to a wife due to his responsibilities to maintain the family; as Stowasser 
mentioned earlier, he could be more authoritative. This is a common notion, as a leader of 
a state is also superior to the people of the state, considering that the leader has to bear 
more responsibilities for the nation. However, that this does not necessarily suggest that a 
wife is inferior or could not be superior by any means.  
 
From the above analysis, it is understandable that the concept of qiwamah or superiority of 
the husband derived from Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 228, and Surah An-Nisaa, Verse 34 in 
Islam is only applicable in a familial context, which is limited to the husband’s 
responsibilities to provide for the family. Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 228, stated that: ‘And 
women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable, 
but men have a degree over them’. Additionally, Surah An-Nisaa’, Verse 34, stated that: 
‘Men are the protectors and maintainers of women because Allah has given the one more 
(strength) than the other and because they support them from their mean’. However, as I 
argued earlier, according to the Islamic faith, a husband’s superiority comes from his 
responsibilities to maintain the family; thus, the qiwamah concept does not necessarily 
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disadvantage the wife. As stressed by Sayyid Sheikh Al-Hadi,
173
 the concept of qiwamah, 
which is confined to the family sphere, does not render Muslim women unequal to men
174
 
(Noor, 2007). Qiwamah is synonymous with the superiority of the husband only because it 
connotes ‘support’ and ‘protection’, and has come to signify authority (Safi, 1998). If the 
husband fails to provide for the family, he no longer retains superiority in the family. 
Again, by referring to the concept of rights and duties which balance entitlements and 
performance as discussed in Chapter Two, it can be seen that superiority comes with duties 
to perform and inferiority comes with rights to claim. Therefore, both Muslim wives and 
husbands could be superior and inferior at the same time, thus balancing their status.   
 
6.3.2.2 Women’s Rights to be Protected: How do the Islamic Family Laws on Polygamous 
Marriage Work? 
With regard to polygamous marriage, Malaysia permits the practice, yet it is limited by 
restrictions and preconditions set out in laws. The CEDAW regularly expresses its concern 
over the persistence of polygamous marriage by recalling its General Recommendation 
Number 21, which stated that polygamous marriage contravenes Muslim women’s equal 
rights with men and must be abolished (General Recommendation No. 21, 13th Session, 
1994: Comment para 14). This assertion was based on the view that polygamous marriage 
causes problems in the distribution of property and custody of children. Interestingly, the 
CEDAW has recommended the State Parties that reserved Article 16 to adopt measures 
that will bring religion and marriage in line with the Women’s Convention. While 
appreciating the notion of adopting measures that will make religion and marriage comply 
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with the Women’s Convention, the CEDAW needs to be more flexible in accepting the 
views and practices of ‘others’ and ‘others’ traditions’, and how they define equality. I 
argue that measures to be adopted to ensure that religious and marriage practices in 
Malaysia are in line with the Convention should allow the practice of polygamous 
marriage with restrictions, rather than abolishing it.   
 
Thus, even though polygamous marriage is allowed in certain circumstances, it should not 
be practised unless all the wives have access to justice with regard to the distribution of 
property and custody of children; otherwise, polygamous marriage might amount to 
discrimination against women. Even though it is not easy to equally divide tangible matters 
and love, the meaning and concept of equality as discussed earlier could be applied in this 
situation. Equality is not about dividing something into similar quantities to give to all 
parties (Fletcher, 2002; Bakar, 2003, Kingdom, 1991); it is about distributing something 
according to people’s needs (Yaacob, 1986), which might not involve similar quantities, 
but will produce equal satisfaction and outcomes. As Unterhalter (2005) stressed, equality 
is no longer a matter of equal amount.  
 
Muhammad Abduh has advocated that the practice of polygamous marriage should be 
permitted within a limited context only, not as a general rule (Noor: 2007, 144). If 
polygamous marriage practised by any particular person is likely to bring injustice to 
wives, it must be prevented
175
. This is significant considering that, in the Islamic debate, 
even though polygamous marriage is permitted, this practice is neither encouraged nor 
prohibited (Noor, 2007: 143). Based on the interpretation of verse 129 of Surah an-Nisa’ 
that justice rendered between the wives was something conceded as almost impossible to 
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achieve, Noor demonstrated Abduh’s argument that the original intention of the Quran was 
monogamy, not polygamy. I note that Abduh’s idea obviously did not prohibit polygamous 
marriage but was intended to provoke awareness of the theme of responsibility and 
introduce strict regulations for those who intended to engage in polygamy. Prohibition of 
polygamous marriage will deny females’ rights to protection because some women have 
been protected by polygamous marriage (if a woman marries a married man). Polygamous 
marriage might protect unmarried women who are unable to support and provide for 
themselves except by husbands and could protect widows with children whose their 
breadwinners had passed away. There should at least be protection of their right to have 
legal and ‘religiously approved’ relationships with men. The President of Islamic 
Friendship Association of Australia, Keysar Trad has alleged that ‘recognising polygamous 
unions would help protect the rights of women in the relationship’ (Brisbanetimes.com.au., 
24 June 2008).    
 
The IFLA allows Muslim men in Malaysia to practise polygamy (Section 23). Although 
polygamous marriage is permitted for Muslims (Yusuf, 2005: 7), the Government has 
introduced laws and procedures in order to control the practice (Abd. Rahim, Ismail and 
Mohd Dahlal, 2008: 201). The main reason for the introduction of these laws and 
procedures is to ensure equality for all wives in a polygamous marriage, because, as 
stressed by Yaacob (1986: 93), if a man is not able to provide justice for all his wives, he is 
enjoined to marry only one. In fact, I submit that subjecting polygamous marriage to strict 
conditions shows that the Government is promoting monogamy as the preferred form of 
marriage. Therefore, the right to practise polygamous marriage may only be exercised with 
the Court’s permission (Section 23 (1)). Traditionally, polygamous marriage was 
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considered the husband’s right and could be freely practised in Malaysia among Muslims 
(Noor, 2007: 143), which was not desirable according to Islam.   
 
Today, I consider that justice and equality are incorporated in the Islamic family laws in 
Malaysia in terms of polygamous marriage. Muslim men who want to contract a 
polygamous marriage have to complete an application to marry and specify their income, 
financial obligations, number of proposed dependants and the views of the existing wife 
(or wives) on the marriage (Section 23 (3) of the IFLA). Thereafter, a judge will evaluate 
the application and grant permission for the marriage if satisfied that the proposed 
marriage is just and necessary, having regard to such circumstances as sterility, physical 
infirmity, physical unfitness for conjugal relations, wilful avoidance of an order for 
restitution of conjugal rights or insanity on the part of the existing wife or wives (Section 
23 (4) (a)). According to Section 23 (4), the court must also be satisfied that the applicant 
will be able to support all his wives and dependants and be able to treat them equally, and 
that such intended marriage will not cause harm to the present wife/wives. This provision 
indicates that the application for polygamous marriage will not be approved by the court 
should the applicant be unable to support all his wives and dependants equally.   
 
The standard practice in the Malaysian courts nowadays is to record the existing property 
belonging to the husband and the existing wife when the husband’s application to contract 
polygamous marriage is granted. This is to ensure that the wife has a just and adequate 
share of the property acquired prior to the husband’s marriage to another women. It is still 
left to the discretion of the judges to grant the proportionate amount depending on the 
contribution of the parties to the property. Indeed, polygamous marriage is not allowed if 
its practice will discriminate against women, be they the first, second, third or fourth wives 
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(Yaacob, 1986: 90). Thus, the CEDAW’s concern in the General Recommendation No. 21 
that polygamous marriage causes problems in the distribution of property might be 
resolved.  
 
Furthermore, in Malaysia polygamous marriage might offer protection to Muslim women 
by legalising their relationships with men; this is preferable to them forming illegal 
relationships or being illegal wives, which could result in them being disadvantaged. 
Polygamous marriage might represent a female’s choice of protection, as there are some 
women who have not been ‘approached’ by any men, apart from the husbands of other 
women. The situation becomes difficult when the women need protection from a husband, 
who could maintain, provide and support them as breadwinner. Keysar Trad, the President 
of Islamic Friendship Association of Australia, believed that polygamous marriages should 
be recognised to protect the rights of women (The Daily Telegraph, 25 June, 2008). 
Moreover, some women enter into polygamous marriages of their own choice; they enjoy 
living in larger families, as in Burkina Faso (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR. 696, 2005: para 
34).  
 
On the other hand, polygamous marriage could be an alternative for a Muslim man who 
needs more than one wife due to his higher sexual drive (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.816, 
2008: para 75) because, as mentioned earlier, illegal sexual intercourse is totally prohibited 
in Islam. In a study conducted by Sisters in Islam between 2007 and 2010, it was found 
that ‘to avoid adultery’ was among the top reasons for practising polygamous marriage in 
Malaysia (Ann, 2010). 46.3 per cent of polygamous marriage practices in this country, 
according to the research, were due to this reason. Polygamous marriage could also be 
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practised if the wife is afflicted with a chronic disease that prevents her from fulfilling her 
marital obligation,
176






Thus, polygamous marriage has the potential to bring about justice for women, but not for 
all women. Musawah has demonstrated in its 2011 Report that polygamous marriage as 
practised today is largely harmful to women and children (Musawah, 2011: 35). Musawah 
based its assertion on the ground-breaking research conducted by the Malaysian non-
governmental organisation, Sisters in Islam, and by academics from three Malaysian 
universities on the impact of polygamous marriage in Malaysia. This project included 
surveys and interviews with husbands, first and second wives and the children of the first 
and second wives. The research reported that 80 per cent of husbands thought that they 
could be fair to all their wives and children and, of these, only 30 per cent of first wives 
agreed that this was possible. The research also discovered that, compared to the 30 per 
cent of husbands who were very satisfied with their polygamous marriages, only seven per 
cent of the first wives and 13 per cent of the second wives reported that they were ‘very 
satisfied’ with polygamous marriage. In Musawah’s report, it was also stated that 44 per 
cent of the first wives had to take additional jobs to support the family after their husbands 
married the second wives. This may indicate that the first wives have to be responsible for 
the financial burden in the family as the breadwinner (husband) needs to maintain two 
families, which might contribute to the women’s disadvantages. 
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One might suggest that total prohibition of polygamous marriage could protect Muslim 
women from being disadvantaged and discriminated against; however, I argue that such 
prohibition may be insufficiently effective or appropriate to prevent women’s 
disadvantages. For example, even though the laws in Turkey and Tunisia
178
 (Roberts, 
2003: 63; Donini, 2009), Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Musawah, 2011: 
36) prohibit polygamous marriages, polygamous marriages occur secretly. In Turkey, for 
instance, polygamous marriage remains widespread in the deeply religious and rural 
Kurdish region of South-Eastern Anatolia, home to one third of Turkey's 71 million people 
(Bilefsky, 2006). A report prepared by academics at the University of Hacettepe in Ankara 
has revealed that nearly 187, 000 women in Turkey are in polygamous marriages despite 
the practice being illegal in this country (EurActiv Networkd, 2011). Bilefsky further 
explained that, since polygamous marriage is illegal, the Imam who conducts the marriage 
will be punished and the second wife (or third or fourth) will have no legal status, ‘making 
them vulnerable when marriages turn violent’. In Tunisia, polygamous marriage is 
forbidden under the 1956 laws based on the understanding that it is impossible for a man to 
be able to deal justly with more than one wife (Musawah, 2011: 34). In fact, it is a criminal 
offence punishable by a year’s imprisonment or a fine of 240, 000 Tunisian Dinars or both 
for the wife and husband. In this perspective, even though polygamous marriage is totally 
prohibited by law, this will not necessarily bring justice to all women. Rather, women who 
contracted into ’illegal’ marriage as second, third or fourth wives might be disadvantaged 
by their illegal status as wives.  
 
In situations where polygamous marriage occurs secretly, a wife is not treated justly and is 
not protected by laws as the husband has married another woman without her knowledge 
                                                 
178
 Turkey and Tunisia are countries with majority Muslim populations that do not apply Shariah 
236 
 
or authority. In Malaysia, for instance, even though the practice of polygamous marriage is 
allowed with strict legal conditions to ensure equality of all wives, it was reported that an 
average of four Malaysian Muslim couples solemnised their marriage without the first 
wife’s knowledge in Southern Thailand every day during the first quarter of 2010179 (The 
Star, 13 May 2010). This situation not only threatens the rights of legal wives but also 
jeopardizes the legal status of children born of such unions. I submit that the prohibition of 
polygamous marriage by law is not only ineffective in restraining polygamous marriage 
but also gives rise to other marital problems which, to a certain extent, are disadvantageous 
to women. Here, the most important thing is to have laws and special measures that 
substantively protect the first
180
 wife and children rather than prohibit polygamous 
marriage.  
 
Hence, I submit that polygamous marriage does not necessarily disadvantage Muslim 
women but could protect both women and men. Even though I agree that polygamous 
marriage might disadvantage women, I suggest that it is a ‘choice’ for women that cannot 
be denied by laws. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa has recognised in its Article 6 that ‘monogamy is encouraged 
as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of women in marriage and family, 
including in polygamous marital relationships are promoted and protected’ (Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
2003). Polygamous marriage is unfair to women when it is wrongly practised and 
understood as a right of men only. Therefore I argue that, even though Muslim women are 
not allowed to marry more than one husband, considering that a wife is not a maintenance 
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provider this dissimilar entitlement to rights does not disadvantage women. The most 
important idea is that justice, dignity and the greatest happiness in life can be equally 
attained by both parties. Thus, by applying the principle of equality as informed by the 
Women’s Convention and Shariah practised in Malaysia, and considering that the IFLA 
takes into account equal and just distribution of property between parties of the existing 
marriage and custody of children before granting permission for polygamous marriage, I 
argue that, if properly practised, and if special measures are accorded to wives by laws, 
polygamous marriage will not disadvantage Muslim women in Malaysia. 
 
6.3.2.3 Talaq vs. Fasakh, Khulu’ and Ta’liq 
Divorce is permitted in Islam to avoid greater evil which might result from the 
continuation of the marriage (Ahmad, 1978: 4). In Malaysia, I note that Muslim women 
and men are given equal rights to dissolve their marriage but the methods of dissolution are 
not similar. The reason why the Government of Malaysia reserves Article 16 (1) (c) of the 
Women’s Convention is because the Article confers similar entitlements to rights for wife 
and husband to dissolve the marriage; I will argue that similar entitlements may not protect 
the wife as a disadvantage person. According to the IFLA, Muslim women have the right 
to dissolve their marriage on the grounds of fasakh, khulu’ and ta’liq whereas men may 
dissolve it on the ground of talaq. 
 
In Malaysia, I trace that, due to their increased awareness of their own rights and their right 
to demand that their husbands fulfil their responsibilities, Muslim women have become 
more open to the idea of not confining family crises within the private (familial) sphere. 
Unlike poor Muslim women in other Muslim countries such as Egypt, who consider 
reconciliation a better option than divorce in cases of marital conflict (Watson, 1994), in 
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Malaysia Muslim women are not reluctant to petition for divorce should the marriage 
promise to bring them unhappiness. In Egypt, two interrelated reasons which enforce 
marital reunion are ‘the economic costs imposed by legal dissolution of marriage and the 
high value attached to the security and stability of family life and conflict resolution’ 
(Watson, 1994: 37). In Pakistan, according to Ihsan and Zaidi (2006: 208), women who 
petition for divorce in court have been killed or injured.  
 
On the other hand, in Malaysia women are the ‘main clients’ in the Shariah Courts dealing 
with petitions for divorce (Azahari, 2008: 266). Abdullah (2001: 101-102) has stated that, 
according to her research on Muslim women and divorce in Malaysia, 56.6 per cent of the 
plaintiffs in divorce cases are women
181
. Earlier, Mohamad (1999: 241) found that 60 to 62 
per cent of applications for divorce in Shariah Courts were made by women
182
. This shows 
that, according to Malaysian laws, women have equal entitlement to men to marry and to 
end marriage, as explained earlier. Thus, I note that Malaysia’s situation is the reverse of 
that in other Muslim countries, which might explain why Muslim women can easily decide 
to marry by their own choice or to dissolve their marriages in case of marital conflict. 
Among other reasons, Muslim women in Malaysia are able to provide for the financial 
costs of petitioning for divorce and, because of the wide involvement of women in the 
public sphere (social and financial) which I discussed earlier, the value of security or 
stability of family life might no longer prevail over the ‘single’ life.  
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 Abdullah has conducted research on 60 divorce files in Perlis Shariah Court in 1999. See Abdullah, 
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Generally, a Muslim husband can divorce his wife unilaterally, ‘without assigning any 
cause and without the interference of the court’ (Ali, 2006: 31) or, as stressed by Islam 
(2006: 116), without reason or divorce proceedings. However, in Malaysia, a husband’s 
right to dissolve marriage cannot proceed without the court’s intervention and restrictions. 
Under the Islamic Family Law Enactments of all states, the Shariah Court can make an 
order relating to divorce by allowing a husband to pronounce a talaq (repudiation of 
marriage) in court after hearing the application (Section 47 of the IFLA). I note that, in 
such cases, the court may only issue a decree of divorce if satisfied that proper provision 
has been made for the wife and the children. However, judges usually do not intervene in 
mutual consent divorces (Section 47 (3)). If talaq is pronounced outside court, the parties 
may still refer the matter to court for verification of the termination of the marriage, and 
the law provides that men will have to pay up to RM1, 000 or be imprisoned for up to six 
months (Section 124), as pronouncement of divorce outside court is an offence.  
 
On the other hand, I note that Muslim women in Malaysia may petition the court for 
fasakh, khulu’ and ta’liq, which has the effect of dissolving the marriage. Fasakh means 
‘to cancel a contract’ (I. Doi, 1984: 171) and, according to the IFLA, fasakh is the 
annulment of a marriage by reason of any circumstance permitted by Shariah (Section 2). 
A wife is entitled to obtain an order for fasakh on any one or more of the following 
grounds (Section 52 (1) of the IFLA): 
(a) that the whereabouts of the husband have not been known for a period of more than 
one year 
 
(b) that the husband has neglected or failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of 
three months 
 





(d) that the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable cause, his marital 
obligations (nafkah batin) for a period of one year 
 
(e) that the husband was impotent at the time of marriage and remains so and she was not 
aware at the time of the marriage that he was impotent 
 
f) that the husband has been insane for a period of two years or is suffering from leprosy 
or vitilago or is suffering from a venereal disease in a communicable form 
 
(g) that she, having been given in marriage by her wali mujbir before she attained the age 
of baligh, repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years, the marriage 
not having been consummated 
 
(h) that the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say, inter alia- 
(i) habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct; or 
(ii) associates with women of evil repute or leads what, according to Hukum 
Syarak, is an infamous life; or 
(iii) attempts to force her to lead an immoral life; or 
(iv) disposes of her property or prevents her from exercising her legal rights over 
it; or 
(v) obstructs her in the observance of her religious obligations or practice; or 
(vi) if he has more wives than one, does not treat her equitably in accordance with 
the requirements of Hukum Syarak 
 
(i) that even after the lapse of four months the marriage has still not been consummated 
owing to the wilful refusal of the husband to consummate it 
 
(j) that she did not consent to the marriage or her consent was not valid, whether in 
consequence of duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind, or any other circumstance 
recognized by Hukum Syarak 
 
(k) that at the time of the marriage she, though capable of giving a valid consent, was, 
whether continuously or intermittently, a mentally disordered person within the meaning of 
the Mental Disorders Ordinance 1952 [Ord. 31 of 1952] in the case of the Federal 
Territory of Kuala Lumpur, or the Lunatics Ordinance of Sabah [Sabah Cap. 74] in the 
case of the Federal Territory of Labuan, and her mental disorder was of such a kind or to 
such extent as to render her unfit for marriage 
 
(l) any other ground that is recognized as valid for dissolution of marriages or fasakh 
under Hukum Syarak’. 
  
I argue that the wide and reasonable grounds of fasakh stated above would be very helpful 
to any wives wishing to apply for dissolution of marriage. Therefore, Nawaz’s (1996: 15) 
assertion that a Muslim woman cannot divorce her husband easily can be challenged as 




A wife can also divorce her husband on the ground of khulu’ or redemption according to 
Islamic family laws in Malaysia. Khulu’ is a right accorded to women to dissolve their 
marriage by ‘agreeing to give up her dowry’ (Islam, 2006: 116). According to Maliki 
school of thought, khulu’ means ‘to return something’ (I. Doi, 1984: 192-197). Section 49 
(1) of the IFLA stated: ‘Where the husband does not agree to voluntarily pronounce a 
talaq, but the parties agree to a divorce by redemption or cerai tebus talaq, the Court 
shall, after the amount of the payment of tebus talaq is agreed upon by the parties, cause 
the husband to pronounce a divorce by redemption, and such divorce is bain sughra or 
irrevocable’. I note that Muslim wives are allowed marital separation under very simple 
laws such as the requirement for wives to pay redemptions to husbands.  
 
Other than fasakh and khulu’, a wife can dissolve the marriage based on the prescribed 
ta’liq or stipulation on the ground of the husband’s failure to keep the promise (Abd. 
Rahim, Ismail and Mohd Dahlal, 2008: 200) he made during the solemnisation of marriage 
according to Malaysian family laws. Section 2 of the IFLA states that ta’liq means ‘a 
promise expressed by the husband after solemnisation of marriage in accordance with 
Hukum Syarak’. The promise or prescribed particulars shall be entered by the Registrar in 
the Marriage Register immediately after the solemnisation of marriage (Section 22 (1) of 
the IFLA). The declaration or promise by the husband states that;  
‘I [name] solemnly declare that I have made ta’liq as follows: 
 
Every time I leave my wife [name] for a period of four months continuously; 
 
(1) or that I do not give her the compulsory maintenance for a period of four months or 
more; 
 




or that I neglect her for four months, my wife can complain to any Kadi or Shariah Judge 
which if found to be true by the Kadi or Shariah Judge I shall be deemed to have divorced 
her by one talaq; and every time I ruju’ her without her consent then I shall be deemed to 
have divorced her by another talaq’. 
 
The court, after hearing the application made by the wife, may order the husband to 
pronounce talaq (Section 50). Under the IFLA, if the husband wishes to ruju’,183 the 
recohabitation must take place by mutual consent and without force (Section 51).    
  
Hence, I argue that, even though Muslim wives and husbands are accorded different 
grounds and methods to dissolve the marriage, they have equal rights in doing so. This 
different entitlement does not have the effect or purpose of denying women’s exercise and 
enjoyment of rights. Facio and Morgan (2009) stressed that according to Article 1 of the 
Women’s Convention, any act or omissions which have the effect of denial of right amount 
to discrimination. The most important idea is that both have equal rights to determine 
whether they can end their marriage using particular reasons allowed by the laws if the 
marriage seems unlikely to bring happiness to their lives. As a husband has a right of talaq, 
a wife has rights of fasakh, khuluk and ta’liq, the objectives of which are equal, to dissolve 
the marriage. I note that similar entitlements to rights to dissolve the marriage as stated in 
Article 16 (1) (c) might not necessarily bring justice to women because a woman’s right to 
divorce is permissible simply due to the failure of the husband to maintain her; this 
privilege is not given to the husband. Thus, different entitlements to rights in this 
perspective are important to uphold equal dignity and justice for women, because similar 
entitlements are likely to bring them unequal outcomes. 
 
6.3.3 Right to Guardianship 
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The Government of Malaysia reserves the provision pertaining to similar entitlements to 
rights in terms of guardianship of children (Article 16 (1) (f) of the Women’s Convention). 
In this Section, I explain that the principal element in Article 16 (1) (f) on the issue of 
guardianship of children is the provision of similar rights and responsibilities with regard 
to guardianship, which are conferred on both mother and father according to Malaysian 
laws, but the entitlements to rights and responsibilities to ensure that the interests of the 
children are paramount differ. I argue that this is a different entitlement which will bring 
about justice to both mother and father, and also to children.  
 
Islam considers that the mother is the best person to have custody of a son up to seven 
years of age (Syed Mohammad, 2001) and, according to Hanafi school of thought, a 
daughter until she attains puberty (Ali, 2000: 63). Shafie school of thought, however, 
allows custodianship of a daughter until she is married (Ihsan and Zaidi, 2006: 230). I find 
that, under Section 81 of the IFLA, a mother is considered the best person to have custody 
and guardianship of her infant children. In a study conducted by Abdullah in 1999 in 
Perlis
184
 Shariah Court, only 5 per cent of guardianship rights were given to fathers 
(Abdullah, 2001: 113). The custody of illegitimate children
185
 remains exclusively with the 
mother and her relations (Section 85). However, the father may also apply to the Shariah 
Court for custody of the legitimate children and the Court will generally consider the 
welfare of the child as the paramount consideration before deciding on the issue of custody 
(Section 86). The father, on the other hand, is required to pay maintenance during marriage 
and after the dissolution of the marriage for his children irrespective of whether the child is 
in his custody or in the custody of another person, including the mother and her relations, 
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185
 Section 2 of the IFLA refers illegitimate child to a child born out of wedlock but not as a result of 
‘syubhah intercourse’. Syubhah intercourse means intercourse performed on erroneous impression that the 
marriage was valid or intercourse by mistake and includes any intercourse not punishable by Shariah 
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or under the guardianship of another person (Section 72). A mother will only be required to 
pay for or contribute towards the maintenance of her child if the court finds that it is 
reasonable given her means (Section 72). To ensure that women are accorded the right of 
equal guardianship, a ‘Cabinet Directive’ was issued in September 2000 which also allows 
mothers to sign all documents relating to their children (Malaysian Women’s Aid 
Organisation, 2001).   
  
Because the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration before a decision is made 
on the issue of guardianship, the question of whether mother and father are given equal 
rights to custodianship does not arise. Islam considers that the mother is the best person to 
have custody of children of up to seven years of age due to the biological nature of the 
mother, who can breastfeed; later, the father can apply to the court for custody of the 
children. At first glance, this seems unfair to the father; however, as the father is the one 
who is obligated to pay maintenance for his child irrespective of whether the child is in his 
custody, it is fair for the father not to bear the responsibility of raising the child. Moreover, 
the relationship between the father and child will continue as the father pays maintenance 
and has the right to spend time with his child, as specifically ordered by court. The 
situation might not be the same were the child under seven years of age to be in the 
custody of the father, because the mother is not the one who pays maintenance and the 
father cannot breastfeed. Therefore, this positive distinction would be equal for mother and 
father. Reservation entered by the Government of Malaysia in regard to this issue to serve 
justice and equality of outcome is parallel with the principle of equality under the 
Women’s Convention’s and Islamic principles. As noted by Unterhalter (2005: 30), 
‘equality is no longer a matter of equal amounts, but a more substantive idea associated 




6.3.4 Personal Rights 
The Government of Malaysia reserves Article 16 (1) (g) of the Women’s Convention 
which confers similar personal rights on Muslim women and men as wives and husbands, 
including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation. Article 16 (1) 
(g) states that women and men must be ensured ‘the same personal rights as husband and 
wife, including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation’. 
Muslim women retain their own names after marriage, as do men (Yusuf, 2005: 6-7). As 
practised in Malaysia too, married Muslim women and men retain their own names after 
marriage. The principal provision of this Article, which confers similar personal rights on 
wives and husbands, is guaranteed for both Muslim women and men in Malaysia, although 
their entitlements to rights differ. I note that the difference involves their personal 
entitlements to the right to work.  
  
Unlike a husband, in Islam a wife can choose not to work if she does not wish to do so. 
However, it is an obligation for a husband to work or earn money, because, as discussed 
earlier, a husband must maintain and provide for the family. For a husband there is no 
choice, unlike for a wife, who can choose. As argued earlier, a wife is entitled to 
maintenance and is responsible for performing biological ‘mother tasks’, to become 
pregnant, to give birth and to breastfeed. However, Islam does not prohibit a wife from 
working as long as she does not neglect her duties as mother and wife (Al-Qardhawi, 
1998). In fact, in Malaysia and according to Malaysian laws, as I discussed in Chapter 
Five, there is a fair equality of opportunity for the woman (wife) and man (husband) to 
work. The commitment to employment opportunities for both wives and husbands is 
common practice in Malaysia as fair equality of opportunity. As of 2010, the total 
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percentage of women in employment had increased to 46.1 per cent (Malaysian 
Department of Statistics). I note that most working wives/mothers will have a helper or 
maid at home to assist them in managing the household duties; this helper will also be paid 
for their work. Moreover, women may wish to work not necessarily to maintain their 
families but for their own satisfaction or because their expertise is needed. Indeed, as 
explained earlier, a working wife is not responsible for providing for the family; however, 
if the wife is willing to do so, she is not prohibited from performing this function. 
Therefore, in Malaysia, Muslim wives and husbands have equal rights to choose a family 
name, a profession and an occupation. Even though the entitlements to rights are different, 
because a wife could choose not to work, this does not cause any gender inequalities.   
 
6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As Malaysia ratified the Women’s Convention and entered reservation to Article 16 (1) (a), 
(c), (f) and (g) in order to seek gender equality as understood from the Convention and in 
the Malaysian local context, I argued that the Malaysian legislation pertaining to the 
Islamic conception of equality for women is compatible with the objectives and principles 
contained in the Convention. Shariah’s and the Women’s Convention’s notion of equality 
is equal dignity, equal access to justice and equal outcome; this might not locate women 
and men at the same ‘starting’ place. Ali (2006) and Abdul Aziz (2005) have mentioned 
that the struggle for equality must come from within those societies. Different global 
visions of justice and specific visions in local contexts cannot be reconciled unless the 
CEDAW recognises the alternative conception of social justice and accepts ways in which 
local arrangements can promote human rights, particularly those relating to gender equality 




I argued that different age limits for entering into marriage contracts according to 
Malaysian laws might not render Muslim women unequal because the laws could protect 
them from being disadvantaged. As, in Malaysia, girls mature earlier than boys, it is indeed 
reasonable to allow girls to enter into marriage contracts at 16 years of age. Girls can also 
continue their secondary education instead of committing themselves to marriage in their 
earlier teens. However, I argued that, to ensure that women will not be disadvantaged, the 
ideal age for marriage should be determined not only by biological criteria but also by all 
aspects of human significance, such as emotional, mental and financial aspects. While 
acknowledging the importance of setting girls’ and boys’ age limits at 16 and 18 years 
respectively, however, I argued that early marriage might be problematic. As explained by 
Abdullah (2001: 96), according to the studies conducted by Swift (1963), the number of 
dissolved marriages was increasing during the 1950s and 1960s in Malaysia due to early 
marriages. It was the culture in society at that time for daughters to marry at 16 or 17 years 
of age.  
 
Thus, the age limit of 16 provided by law might be inadequate to protect women from 
being disadvantaged. Throughout the above analysis, it seems that the law is insufficient 
for social change and might disadvantage girls when they are treated differently, which 
amounts to ‘less favourably’ than men. Different treatment might amount to discrimination 
when it does not bring about equal outcomes. In terms of education, for instance, girls tend 
to forfeit higher education to give priority to their domestic and marital life, which might 
not necessarily happen to boys. Thus, I propose in this perspective that a range of special 
measures in education and health are important as effective strategies in protecting married 




Pertaining to maintenance, I argued that a Muslim wife is not responsible for supporting 
her family because she might become pregnant, give birth and be required to breastfeed. 
That is why according to Malaysian laws, the duty to provide for a household’s needs is 
only imposed on the husband. However, Islam does not prohibit a wife from maintaining 
her family if she is willing to do so, or to work, even though she is not responsible for 
providing for her family. The ‘husband’s only duty’ (here, I prefer to say that to maintain a 
family is a duty, not a right) is to not disadvantage the wife by making her carry the extra 
burden of working and at the same time performing her biological tasks.  
  
I argued that polygamous marriage rights, which are only given to Muslim men, do not 
necessarily disadvantage Muslim women, because a wife is not a maintenance provider. 
Thus, a wife must not be burdened with the task of providing for a family because she has 
to perform her biological functions. Therefore, I argued that to allow a wife to marry more 
than one husband would defeat the purpose or wisdom of polygamous marriage. The 
circumstance in which polygamous marriage is unfair to women is when it is wrongly 
practised. That is why the Government of Malaysia has introduced laws and procedures in 
order to control the practice (Abd. Rahim, Ismail and Mohd Dahlal, 2008: 201). The 
Malaysian laws on polygamous marriage require Muslim men who want to contract a 
polygamous marriage to complete an application to marry and specify their income, 
financial obligations, number of proposed dependants and the views of the existing wife 
(or wives) on the marriage (Section 23 (3) of the IFLA). The most important idea of 
equality here is that justice, dignity and the greatest happiness in life can be equally 
attained by both parties. However, a wife might not be treated justly and is not protected by 
laws if polygamous marriage occurs secretly. Thus, by applying the principle of equality as 
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informed by the Women’s Convention and Shariah practised in Malaysia, and considering 
that the IFLA takes into account equal and just distribution of property between parties of 
the existing marriage and custody of children before granting permission for polygamous 
marriage, I argue that, if properly practised, and if special measures are accorded to wives 
by laws, polygamous marriage will not disadvantage Muslim women in Malaysia. 
  
In terms of dissolution of marriage, I argued that a Muslim wife has the right to divorce her 
husband on the grounds of fasakh, khulu’ and ta’liq, whereas a husband can do so by a 
pronouncement of talaq; each has the same objective, which is to dissolve the marriage. 
According to Malaysian laws, a wife has the right to dissolve the marriage simply because 
of the husband’s failure to maintain her (Section 52 (1) of IFLA). Regarding guardianship, 
I traced that the Malaysian laws see the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration 
before the issue of custody is decided upon (Section 86). Islam considers that the mother is 
the best person to take custody of children of up to seven years of age due to her biological 
ability to breastfeed (Syed Mohammad, 2001); later, the father can apply to the court for 
custody of the children. At first glance, this seems unfair to the father; however, as the 
father is the one who pays maintenance for his child irrespective of whether the child is in 
his custody, I would say that it is a positive distinction and fair for the father not to have to 
bear the responsibility of raising the child.  
 
On the other hand, a husband may be relieved not to have to raise the children, although he 
will be aware that paying maintenance is not an easy task. Moreover, the relationship 
between the father and child will continue as the father pays maintenance and has the right 
to spend time with his child as specifically ordered by court. The same might not occur 
were a child under seven years of age to be in the custody of the father, because the mother 
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is not the one who pays maintenance and the father cannot breastfeed. With regard to 
personal rights as wife and husband, I argued that both have equal rights even though a 
wife might choose not to work. This does not necesarily discriminate against women, as 
Islam obligates only the husband to provide for the family, even though the wife could 
work if she wanted to, provided that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife (Al-
Qardhawi, 1998). 
 
I argued that, with the earlier understanding that the term ‘equality’ as used in the 
Women’s Convention is compatible with the Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights, 
the reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) entered by the Government of Malaysia 
will not conflict with the object and purpose of the Women’s Convention should the few 
areas that treat women less favourably which I discussed throughout this analysis be 
improved. I submitted that the terms used in the provision of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and 
(g) of the Women’s Convention are against the object and purpose of the Convention itself. 
This is because the Convention’s principle of equality is intended to ensure equal outcomes 
(Facio and Morgan, 2009). Muslim women and men might be treated differently or given 
different entitlements to rights, but the outcomes must be equal; however, conferring 
‘similar rights’ on both Muslim women and men in all matters relating to marriage and 
family relations as stated in Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) might defeat the principle of 
equality. I argued that the provision must be read as ‘equal rights’, not ‘same rights’, 
because similar is not necessarily equal. The most important task in the analysis of equality 
in this research is to attain equality of outcomes, even with dissimilar entitlements to 
rights. Therefore, conferring similar rights on women and men might cause discrimination 
against the disadvantaged group in this situation, women. As the Convention’s principles 
are intended to ensure equal outcomes, granting women and men similar rights and 
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responsibilities without considering local context and people’s choice in performing their 
tasks as wives and husbands is against the Convention’s idea of equality. This may be why 
Egypt has stated that withdrawal of reservation to Article 16 of the Women’s Convention 
would ‘diminish the rights of women under Islamic law’ (U. N. Doc. CEDAW/C/EGY/7, 





























In this concluding Chapter, I summarise the main arguments. I have argued that the human 
rights laws affecting Muslim women in Malaysia are not entirely irreconcilable with the 
Women’s Convention. Insofar as this is the case, I have argued that understanding the 
notion of ‘equality’ and how its value affects the laws and policies is important to construct 
the possibilities of harmonisation between the Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights 
and the Women’s Convention. Throughout the thesis, I have argued that formal equality is 
equally as important as substantive equality if women are to be guaranteed equality with 
men.    
  
In Chapter One, I set out the structure of this thesis and outlined the problem that the thesis 
would address. This Chapter concisely specified the principal aim of the research which 
was to explore the possibility of harmonisation of the Women’s Convention with 
Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights. I provided the general themes and background 
to the discussion, as well as the issues and the conceptual framework of the study. I 
explored the method of research regarding the harmonisation of laws and indicated the 
importance of synchronising the substance of the laws. According to the Former Chief 
Justice of Malaysia, Dato’ Abdul Hamid Mohamad, to harmonise laws, attention must be 
paid to the substance of the laws, as well as to the form (Mohamad, 2003). This Chapter 
briefly introduced the concept of rights and equality in the international and Islamic legal 
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jurisdictions and declarations and the positive attention to women’s rights in Malaysia. I 
concisely initiated a discussion on legal protection of women in Malaysia to sketch the 
main arguments and discussions for all the chapters. In Chapter One, I also highlighted the 
literature review, objective, the research’s significance and scope, the methodology and the 
structure of the thesis.   
  
Chapter Two examined the jurisdictional background of rights in international and Islamic 
human rights jurisprudences and deliberated on its conceptual analysis in the international 
and Islamic human rights instruments underpinned by the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI. I 
considered whether ‘rights’ exist in Islam. I applied the introductory concept of ‘rights’ by 
Mohammad (2003) to argue that the notion of ‘rights’ is not a concept foreign to the 
Islamic tradition. In the analysis of whether rights in Islam are harmonious with rights in 
Western terms, I drew upon Lacey’s (2004) and Mohammad’s (2003) ideas of rights to 
argue that international and Islamic human rights jurisprudences share similar meanings 
and principles of rights. The Islamic-based human rights jurisprudence has embodied a 
meaning of rights similar to that of international human rights to protect and promote 
values and ideals that reaffirm equal dignity and justice for human beings. The subject 
(individual and collective) and object (choice and interest) of rights in the international and 
Islamic human rights doctrines also share similar principles justifying human rights. The 
international and Islamic human rights doctrines focus on the correlative relationship 
between rights and duties and the non-absolute autonomy of individual choice to enable 
the interests of the community to be considered; this balances the rights of all individuals 




I discussed a range of feminist viewpoints of rights in an attempt to explore a wider 
understanding of rights from women’s perspective and to show how their critiques have 
informed the Women’s Convention. This was intended to critically review existing 
formulations of rights in these diverse traditions and to show that they share similar 
meanings and principles of rights as they have important implications when applied to 
Muslim women’s rights. Insofar as this is the case, I supported arguments that there are 
still differences, but the dissimilarities do not indicate that they contradict each other, as 
they are similar in concepts and principles. I analysed whether ‘rights’, as a legal subject, 
is gendered. I examined how the principle of rights might be reconstructed for the purpose 
of upholding gender equality should ‘rights determine the identity of the rights-bearer’ 
(Krishnadas, 2007: 161). From the theory that ‘rights’ are an individual entitlement, I 
considered the critique that individual entitlements are not absolute (Lacey, 2004). 
Through my analysis of the image of rights’ subject, I argued that the framework of non-
absolute individual entitlements constructs a value of interest and a wider coverage of 
rights, which limits the gendered nature of rights. This theoretical review developed a 
framework to analyse whether rights could inform equality.  
 
I critically examined how the conception of rights informs the international and Islamic 
human rights underpinned by the UDHR, the UIDHR and the CDHRI in an attempt to 
grasp an idea that reconciles international and Islamic human rights instruments on the 
notion of rights. I argued that both jurisprudences and all three Declarations present rights 
as an instrument for equality among human beings. The tenets of justice and dignity, rights 
and duties and non-absolutism of rights are the principles that accommodate similar values 
of the human rights concept underpinned by the UDHR, UIDHR and CDHRI. I argued that 
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the concept of rights in Islam underpinning the UIDHR and CDHRI is capable of 
harmonisation with the UDHR. 
 
Next, in Chapter Three, I analysed the jurisdictional background of equality in 
international and Islamic human rights debates and feminist arguments and deliberated on 
the conceptual analysis of gender equality in the international and Islamic human rights 
instruments underpinned by the UDHR, UIDHR, CDHRI and the Women’s Convention. 
This was intended to review existing formulations of the term ‘equality’ in these diverse 
traditions and to trace how the notion of equality is shared in the international, Islamic 
human rights and feminist points of view. I presented an analysis of the principle of 
equality in the Women’s Convention to consider whether the application of substantive 
equality (different entitlements to rights for women and men in marriage and family 
relations in order to address gender disadvantage) in the UIDHR and CDHRI is 
harmonious with the Women’s Convention.  
 
I drew upon Fletcher’s (2002) and Bakar’s (2003) ideas of equality to argue that Islamic 
human rights jurisprudence and feminist standpoints share similar meanings and principles 
of equality. I argued that similarity of legal treatment does not necessarily denote equality, 
because if a woman occupies a different position from a man to begin with, then treating 
them with total similarity will simply perpetuate the differences between them. I traced 
how an extended equality model which focuses on the subordinated group is rather 
significant in the analysis of gender equality. The central inquest of this model is into the 
‘disadvantage’, and whether the law contributes to the subordination of women 




I considered whether both formal and substantive notions of equality inform the UDHR, 
UIDHR and CDHRI. I argued that the UDHR is harmonious with the UIDHR and CDHRI 
in terms of the ‘language of equality’, but conflicting in terms of different entitlements to 
rights for women and men in marriage and family relations. I presented an analysis of the 
principle of equality in the Women’s Convention, drawing upon Facio and Morgan (2009), 
to consider whether the application of substantive equality (different entitlements to rights 
for women and men in marriage and family relations in order to address gender 
disadvantage) in the UIDHR and CDHRI, although irreconcilable with the UDHR, is 
harmonious with the Women’s Convention. I argued that dissimilar entitlements to rights 
for Muslim women and men in the UIDHR and CDHRI pertaining to marriage and family 
relations are consistent with the extended equality model which focuses on the 
disadvantaged group to ensure equal outcomes. The same battle has been fought in the 
feminist debates against ‘unequal’ liberal equality, which addressed the Women’s 
Convention. According to the Women’s Convention, inequality can arise from the 
distinction, exclusion or restriction of women, any act or omission that has the ‘effect’ or 
‘purpose’ of denying women’s exercise and enjoyment of all rights, or impairment of 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of women’s rights in all aspects of life, to be precise, in 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural life (Facio and Morgan, 2009). Hence, 
throughout my analysis, I argued that, on the application of substantive equality (that 
equality should not be reduced to sameness), the UIDHR and CDHRI are not entirely 
harmonious with the UDHR, but are reconcilable with the Women’s Convention. 
 
Chapter Four illustrated the broad historical background of the Malaysian legal system and 
offered an overview of the sources of human rights laws in Malaysia and an analysis of the 
contemporary legal protection with regard to the Federal Constitution and other 
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legislations. I provided an overview that Islamic textual sources have formed part of the 
sources of Malaysian laws on human rights and Muslim women’s rights, because the laws 
of the Malay land were Islamic-based, as can be traced in most of the digests. Kheng 
(2001) has argued that the idea of rights and freedom was already in place even before the 
colonial period and was not of Western origin. However, I traced that Malaysia has drafted 
its human rights provisions which are parallel with Western-based and Islamic-based 
Declarations. I examined Part II of the Federal Constitution to acquire a legal picture of 
Malaysian laws on fundamental liberties and to consider whether woman is a legal subject. 
In my exploration of the fundamental liberties of Malaysian citizens, I argued that woman 
is a legal subject under Malaysian laws. 
 
I considered Malaysia’s progress towards empowerment of women, women’s rights and 
gender equality laws in an attempt to trace whether Malaysia has been committed to gender 
equality as informed by global standards underpinning the Women’s Convention. I 
examined how the term ‘equality’ is interpreted under the Malaysian Federal Constitution 
and statutes, policies, administrative actions and programmes to determine a clear method 
of analysis in exploring whether Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights could be 
harmonised with the Women’s Convention. I argued that it is possible to admit that the 
notion of equality which informs the Women’s Convention is harmonious with the 
principle of right to equality as adopted by Article 8 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution, 
statutes and policies. I argued that Malaysia enacts laws on human rights (fundamental 
liberties) under the Federal Constitution purposely to prevent any forms of bias and 
intolerance among citizens with regard to the laws and policies of the government and to 
create positive opportunities for vulnerable groups to participate in development processes, 
which define how gender inequalities are to be eliminated. Apart from the laws, the 
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Government applies equality through appropriate means, such as policies, administrative 
decisions and programmes. 
 
I analysed whether ‘de facto’ equality is considered. I argued that the interpretation of 
‘equality’ is the key to constructing the possibilities of harmonisation between the 
Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights and the Women’s Convention. I argued that 
Malaysia has included sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination in its national laws and 
addressed the structural nature of violation of Muslim women’s rights through the 
Women’s Convention. I configured that Malaysian laws provide and secure equal dignity 
and justice for Muslim women’s rights and that equality is not only formal but also 
substantive. I examined how Muslim women’s disadvantages are taken into consideration 
while securing their equal dignity and justice.  
 
I considered the extent to which Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights are in line 
with the Women’s Convention based on the principles of equality in Chapter Five. I 
examined whether Malaysia has taken all appropriate measures, including laws, policies, 
administrative decisions and programmes, to eliminate women’s disadvantages based on 
the concluding comments of the CEDAW made against Malaysia in its Thirty-Fifth 
Session in New York in 2006 and application of equality informed by the Women’s 
Convention. These are in regard to the elimination of gender stereotypes, public and 
political life, employment, adequate sanctions for acts of violence against women, 
trafficking and rural women. I analysed whether the Government of Malaysia has amended 
or abolished existing laws, regulations and practices that constitute the disadvantaging of 
women and modified social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men which are 
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based on the idea of superiority and inferiority of either of the sexes in economic and social 
mainstream activities and marriage and family relations. 
 
I considered whether Malaysia is committed to undertaking a series of measures to end 
gender discrimination laws in all forms and to incorporate the principle of equality of 
women and men in its legal system. I argued that the Women’s Convention has provided a 
wide and general definition of the nature of rights, which might allow ratified State Parties 
to interpret every single provision in the light of their national circumstances and cultural 
and religious beliefs, provided that the domestic laws guarantee gender equality and do not 
conflict with the object, purpose and principle of the Convention. I argued that Malaysia 
has incorporated the substance of the Convention, which is the principle of equality, in its 
national legislation, policies, administrative decisions and programmes. I concluded that 
Malaysia has taken appropriate measures, including laws, policies, administrative decisions 
and programmes, to eliminate discrimination against Muslim women based on the 
principal areas of concern and recommendations of CEDAW in the concluding comments 
made against Malaysia following the Thirty-Fifth Session in New York. I argued that the 
latest enactments and amendments of laws to prevent women from being treated unequally 
evidence the sensitivity of the Government to gender equality. I argued that the 
Government of Malaysia has taken positive steps to empower Muslim women. However, 
to achieve congruity with the tenets of the Women’s Convention, there are a few areas that 
need specific improvements for the betterment of the laws in securing Muslim women’s 
equality rights. Like others, I agree that having gender equality laws could be regarded as 
being in the best interest of Muslim women even though social construction to eliminate 




In Chapter Six, I analysed the application of Muslim personal laws and their implications 
for Muslim women’s rights in Malaysia. I analysed whether, in the Malaysian Shariah 
local context, the reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) is against the object and 
purpose of the Women’s Convention. I did not include Article 9 (2) in my analysis, as the 
basis of reservation of this Article is not its non-conformity with Shariah but with Article 
14, Article 15, Article 24 (4), Article 26 (2) and Second Schedule Section 1 (d) of the 
Federal Constitution. I answered the question of whether the particular reservation entered 
by the Government of Malaysia has made Muslim women’s rights laws in Malaysia 
incompatible with the Women’s Convention. This is significant as the question of whether 
the Malaysian laws on Muslim women’s rights might possibly be harmonised with the 
Women’s Convention might be best constructed if the Article reserved by the Government 
of Malaysia does not conflict with the object and purpose of the Convention. I argued that 
Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g), which refers to the ‘same rights’ conferred on both 
Muslim women and men in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, is against 
the object and purpose of the Convention itself. I argued that the Convention’s principles is 
to ensure equality of outcome, but granting Muslim women and men similar rights and 
responsibilities without considering their differences is against the Convention’s idea of 
equality.     
 
I argued that the Malaysian legislation pertaining to the Islamic conception of equality for 
women is compatible with the objectives and principles contained in the Convention. 
Shariah’s and the Women’s Convention’s notion of equality is equal dignity, equal access 
to justice and equal outcome; this might not locate women and men at the same ‘starting’ 
place. The conflicting situation between these two doctrines concerns the application of 
laws only, which does not render them irreconcilable. However, again, there are a few 
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areas that need specific improvements because there are situations where women are 
treated differently and, thus, ‘less favourably’ than men. The general rule is that women 
and men can only have different entitlements to rights if different entitlements will achieve 
equal results. However, as stressed by Facio and Morgan (2009), women might be 
disadvantaged by a distinction that treats them less favourably than men. Thus, to ensure 
that the reservation of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) does not prevent Muslim women’s 
rights laws in Malaysia from being in harmony with the Women’s Convention, a few areas 
in which women are treated less favourably need to be improved.  
  
7.2 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
Firstly, I offer the view that the wording of Article 16 (1) (a), (c), (f) and (g) of the 
Women’s Convention must be amended from ‘same rights’ to ‘equal rights’ to synchronise 
it with the principle of the Convention itself. Having acknowledged that the principle of 
equality in the Women’s Convention is harmonious with the principle of equality in Islam, 
one might ask why the majority of Islamic nations reserve this Article. The answer is that 
the wordings used in this Article are not consistent with the Convention’s principle of 
equality. ‘Same rights’ is not similar in wording and meaning to ‘equal rights’. As I have 
argued throughout this thesis, similar is not necessary equal; therefore, women might be 
disadvantaged in the marriage and family domain were they to be given similar 
entitlements to rights as men.   
 
Secondly, I propose the idea that the meaning, concept and principle of equality according 
to the Women’s Convention and Shariah be widely understood and conveyed to people 
through education and public discourse by Islamic women legal scholars as an academic 
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contribution. So far, the term equality has commonly been understood as treating people 
similarly, without taking into consideration the possibility that similar application of rules 
to unequal groups or individuals might achieve unequal results. The problem in Malaysia 
nowadays is that women’s movements themselves do not have a pluralistic understanding 
of equality according to various cultures and religions; therefore they have tried to 
universalise the idea of equality based on their own definition. The women’s movements 
claim that placing women as the subject would settle the multicultural or multi-religious 
issues concerning women, but the movements ignore how people’s religions address their 
believers. I propose that ‘understanding equality’ be embedded in all teaching subjects in 
secondary schools and universities. Then men would respect women as human beings, as 
people similar to them, and they would realise that they have duties to perform for women. 
 
My third proposal is to explain that rights should be understood as being correlated with 
duties and that people should realise that rights can only be claimed if duties are performed 
for others. This means that individual rights are not absolute, because it is a matter of 
whether the community rights should be considered as well. Fourthly, I recommend that 
Malaysian society be aware of any kind of disadvantages due to gender that have been 
occurring or might occur. The most important point is that Muslim women themselves 
must able to differentiate between objective and patriarchal or impartial and male-biased 
laws, regulations or even social structures.   
 
Fifthly, I propose that developing a culture to respect and appreciate women's rights and 
encouraging men to participate in all actions towards equality would help eliminate 
discrimination against women in general (not necessarily just Muslim women). It is well 
understood that, anywhere in this world, women are always the likely victims of criminals. 
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This might occur due to a lack of respect for women’s right to protection, their social 
rights, and their right to be treated as human (or man) or possibly because men see women 
as second-class human beings who deserve second-class treatment and who can be 
victimised. Therefore, encouraging men to participate in all actions towards equality would 
be a new dimension in the efforts to empower women in Malaysia. This would not only 
empower women and their lives but would also create awareness among men to appreciate 
their masculinity by protecting and providing for women, especially in the family unit, 
rather than considering themselves superior to them. 
 
Lastly, I suggest that it is crucial to explain the objectives, functions and methods of 
feminism in terms of how they might apply to Malaysian society. Perceived resistance to 
feminism or womanism has so far been due to public misunderstanding that the interests of 
feminism are only suitable for Western people in Western countries, not for Muslims in 
Malaysia. This has resulted in ignorance of the women’s movement in Malaysia and the 
denial of its voice raised on behalf of Muslim women for their protection. However, the 
historical development of women’s rights in this country has proved that the situation of 
Malaysian Muslim women and their rights has been empowered due to the feminists’ 
struggles since the 1930s.    
 
The Malaysian scenario, in which society rejects the women’s movement, feminism and 
the ideas brought by them, has resulted in legal constraints that are hindering the 
development of women’s legal protection. To win over Malaysian society, I advise women 
activists in Malaysia to base their approach on reflecting local women’s voices and to 
engage in local cultural dialogue, rather than copying the ideas and thoughts of so-called 
‘universal’ standards that may not, in fact, be universal. According to Krishnadas (2007: 
264 
 
161), it was ‘only in the women’s groups that women could share their experiences and 
conceptions of rights to reflect each other’s identities’. Even defining Malaysian Muslim 
women’s rights and freedom is, according to Othman (1998: 176), a task that must proceed 
on a complex cultural and political battleground in the midst of acute polemical contests 
over Islamization, modernisation and cultural relativism, furthermore speaking on their 
behalf.   
 
The theory of feminisms is as important in Malaysia as it has been in other countries. It has 
been proved everywhere in the world, including in Malaysia, that legal reforms and 
women’s empowerment have been underpinned by feminists’ struggles towards equality. 
Therefore, to reject feminism is to deny women’s rights because not all women can address 
the processes that discriminate against them, especially when the social and legal 
atmospheres are impartial and objective. Feminism, on the other hand, can detect the 
gendered and patriarchal nature of laws, policies or societies and their institutions. Having 
said that, Muslim women’s rights and equality in Malaysia could be improved swiftly were 
feminists to enter into all spheres irrespective of gender and religious sectors, provided that 
the movements understand the substance of equality and non-discrimination in all cultural 
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CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
(WOMEN’S CONVENTION) 
INTRODUCTION 
On 18 December 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It entered into force 
as an international treaty on 3 September 1981 after the twentieth country had ratified it. 
By the tenth anniversary of the Convention in 1989, almost one hundred nations have 
agreed to be bound by its provisions. 
The Convention was the culmination of more than thirty years of work by the United 
Nations Commission on the Status of Women, a body established in 1946 to monitor the 
situation of women and to promote women's rights. The Commission's work has been 
instrumental in bringing to light all the areas in which women are denied equality with 
men. These efforts for the advancement of women have resulted in several declarations and 
conventions, of which the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women is the central and most comprehensive document.  
Among the international human rights treaties, the Convention takes an important place in 
bringing the female half of humanity into the focus of human rights concerns. The spirit of 
the Convention is rooted in the goals of the United Nations: to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women. The present document spells out the meaning of equality and 
how it can be achieved. In so doing, the Convention establishes not only an international 
bill of rights for women, but also an agenda for action by countries to guarantee the 
enjoyment of those rights.  
In its preamble, the Convention explicitly acknowledges that "extensive discrimination 
against women continues to exist", and emphasizes that such discrimination "violates the 
principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity". As defined in article 1, 
discrimination is understood as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis 
of sex...in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field". The Convention 
gives positive affirmation to the principle of equality by requiring States parties to take "all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and 
advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men"(article 3). 
The agenda for equality is specified in fourteen subsequent articles. In its approach, the 
Convention covers three dimensions of the situation of women. Civil rights and the legal 
status of women are dealt with in great detail. In addition, and unlike other human rights 
treaties, the Convention is also concerned with the dimension of human reproduction as 
well as with the impact of cultural factors on gender relations. 
The legal status of women receives the broadest attention. Concern over the basic rights of 
political participation has not diminished since the adoption of the Convention on the 
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Political Rights of Women in 1952. Its provisions, therefore, are restated in article 7 of the 
present document, whereby women are guaranteed the rights to vote, to hold public office 
and to exercise public functions. This includes equal rights for women to represent their 
countries at the international level (article 8). The Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women - adopted in 1957 - is integrated under article 9 providing for the 
statehood of women, irrespective of their marital status. The Convention, thereby, draws 
attention to the fact that often women's legal status has been linked to marriage, making 
them dependent on their husband's nationality rather than individuals in their own right. 
Articles 10, 11 and 13, respectively, affirm women's rights to non-discrimination in 
education, employment and economic and social activities. These demands are given 
special emphasis with regard to the situation of rural women, whose particular struggles 
and vital economic contributions, as noted in article 14, warrant more attention in policy 
planning. Article 15 asserts the full equality of women in civil and business matters, 
demanding that all instruments directed at restricting women's legal capacity ''shall be 
deemed null and void". Finally, in article 16, the Convention returns to the issue of 
marriage and family relations, asserting the equal rights and obligations of women and men 
with regard to choice of spouse, parenthood, personal rights and command over property. 
Aside from civil rights issues, the Convention also devotes major attention to a most vital 
concern of women, namely their reproductive rights. The preamble sets the tone by stating 
that "the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for discrimination". The link 
between discrimination and women's reproductive role is a matter of recurrent concern in 
the Convention. For example, it advocates, in article 5, ''a proper understanding of 
maternity as a social function", demanding fully shared responsibility for child-rearing by 
both sexes. Accordingly, provisions for maternity protection and child-care are proclaimed 
as essential rights and are incorporated into all areas of the Convention, whether dealing 
with employment, family law, health care or education. Society's obligation extends to 
offering social services, especially child-care facilities that allow individuals to combine 
family responsibilities with work and participation in public life. Special measures for 
maternity protection are recommended and "shall not be considered discriminatory". 
(article 4). "The Convention also affirms women's right to reproductive choice. Notably, it 
is the only human rights treaty to mention family planning. States parties are obliged to 
include advice on family planning in the education process and to develop family codes 
that guarantee women's rights "to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing 
of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them 
to exercise these rights". 
The third general thrust of the Convention aims at enlarging our understanding of the 
concept of human rights, as it gives formal recognition to the influence of culture and 
tradition on restricting women's enjoyment of their fundamental rights. These forces take 
shape in stereotypes, customs and norms which give rise to the multitude of legal, political 
and economic constraints on the advancement of women. Noting this interrelationship, the 
preamble of the Convention stresses "that a change in the traditional role of men as well as 
the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality of men 
and women". States parties are therefore obliged to work towards the modification of 
social and cultural patterns of individual conduct in order to eliminate "prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the 
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women" (article 5). 
And Article 10 (e) mandates the revision of textbooks, school programmes and teaching 
methods with a view to eliminating stereotyped concepts in the field of education. Finally, 
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cultural patterns which define the public realm as a man's world and the domestic sphere as 
women's domain are strongly targeted in all of the Convention's provisions that affirm the 
equal responsibilities of both sexes in family life and their equal rights with regard to 
education and employment. Altogether, the Convention provides a comprehensive 
framework for challenging the various forces that have created and sustained 
discrimination based upon sex. 
The implementation of the Convention is monitored by the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The Committee's mandate and the 
administration of the treaty are defined in the Articles 17 to 30 of the Convention. The 
Committee is composed of 23 experts nominated by their Governments and elected by the 
States parties as individuals "of high moral standing and competence in the field covered 
by the Convention". 
At least every four years, the States parties are expected to submit a national report to the 
Committee, indicating the measures they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of 
the Convention. During its annual session, the Committee members discuss these reports 
with the Government representatives and explore with them areas for further action by the 
specific country. The Committee also makes general recommendations to the States parties 
on matters concerning the elimination of discrimination against women.  
The full text of the Convention is set out herein 
 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
 
 
The States Parties to the present Convention,  
 
Noting that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women, 
Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the principle of the 
inadmissibility of discrimination and proclaims that all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth therein, without distinction of any kind, including distinction based on sex,  
Noting that the States Parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights have the 
obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social, 
cultural, civil and political rights,  
Considering the international conventions concluded under the auspices of the United 
Nations and the specialized agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women,  
Noting also the resolutions, declarations and recommendations adopted by the United 
Nations and the specialized agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women,  
Concerned, however, that despite these various instruments extensive discrimination 
against women continues to exist,  
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Recalling that discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights 
and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms 
with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries, hampers the 
growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more difficult the full 
development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of 
humanity,  
Concerned that in situations of poverty women has the least access to food, health, 
education, training and opportunities for employment and other needs,  
Convinced that the establishment of the new international economic order based on equity 
and justice will contribute significantly towards the promotion of equality between men 
and women,  
Emphasizing that the eradication of apartheid, all forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and domination and 
interference in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full enjoyment of the rights of 
men and women,  
Affirming that the strengthening of international peace and security, the relaxation of 
international tension, mutual co-operation among all States irrespective of their social and 
economic systems, general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament 
under strict and effective international control, the affirmation of the principles of justice, 
equality and mutual benefit in relations among countries and the realization of the right of 
peoples under alien and colonial domination and foreign occupation to self-determination 
and independence, as well as respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, will 
promote social progress and development and as a consequence will contribute to the 
attainment of full equality between men and women,  
Convinced that the full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world 
and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women on equal terms with 
men in all fields,  
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the family and to the 
development of society, so far not fully recognized, the social significance of maternity 
and the role of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and aware that 
the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the 
upbringing of children requires a sharing of responsibility between men and women and 
society as a whole,  
Aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society 
and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men and women,  
Determined to implement the principles set forth in the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women and, for that purpose, to adopt the measures required for 
the elimination of such discrimination in all its forms and manifestations,  




PART I  
Article I  
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against women" shall 
mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect 
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field. 
 
Article 2  
 
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by 
all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against 
women and, to this end, undertake: 
 
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national 
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, 
through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle; 
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where 
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;  
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to 
ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective 
protection of women against any act of discrimination;  
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to 
ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;  
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any 
person, organization or enterprise;  
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;  
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.  
Article 3  
 
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and 
cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to en sure the full 
development and advancement of women , for the purpose of guaranteeing them the 








Article 4  
 
1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto 
equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the 
present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of 
unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of 
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. 
 
2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in 
the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered 
discriminatory.  
Article 5  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: 
 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view 
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are 
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women; 
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a 
social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the 
upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the 
children is the primordial consideration in all cases.  
Article 6  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all 
forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women. 
 
 
PART II  
Article 7  
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to 
women, on equal terms with men, the right: 
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all 
publicly elected bodies; 
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof 
and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government;  
(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the 




Article 8  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal terms with 
men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments at the 
international level and to participate in the work of international organizations. 
 
Article 9  
 
1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their 
nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of 
nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of 
the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. 
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of 
their children.  
 
PART III  
Article 10  
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and in 
particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
 
(a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to studies and for 
the achievement of diplomas in educational establishments of all categories in rural as well 
as in urban areas; this equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general, technical, 
professional and higher technical education, as well as in all types of vocational training; 
(b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications 
of the same standard and school premises and equipment of the same quality;  
(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels 
and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation and other types of education 
which will help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and 
school programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods;  
(d) The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants;  
(e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing education, including 
adult and functional literacy programmes, particularly those aimed at reducing, at the 
earliest possible time, any gap in education existing between men and women;  
(f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organization of programmes for 
girls and women who have left school prematurely;  
(g) The same Opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education;  
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(h) Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and well-being 
of families, including information and advice on family planning.  
Article 11  
 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, the same rights, in particular: 
 
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings; 
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same 
criteria for selection in matters of employment;  
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job 
security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational 
training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and 
recurrent training;  
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of 
work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of 
work;  
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, 
invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;  
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the 
safeguarding of the function of reproduction.  
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or 
maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate 
measures: 
 
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of 
pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital 
status; 
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss 
of former employment, seniority or social allowances;  
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable 
parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public 
life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of 
child-care facilities;  
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to 
be harmful to them.  
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3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed 
periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, 
repealed or extended as necessary. 
Article 12  
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this article, States Parties shall ensure 
to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-
natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during 
pregnancy and lactation.  
Article 13  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure, on a basis of equality 
of men and women, the same rights, in particular: 
 
(a) The right to family benefits; 
(b) The right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit;  
(c) The right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life.  
Article 14  
 
1. States Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural women and 
the significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their families, 
including their work in the non-monetized sectors of the economy, and shall take all 
appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of the present Convention 
to women in rural areas. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they 
participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such 
women the right:  
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development planning at all 
levels; 
(b) To have access to adequate health care facilities, including information, counselling 
and services in family planning;  
(c) To benefit directly from social security programmes;  
(d) To obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal, including that 
relating to functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the benefit of all community and 
extension services, in order to increase their technical proficiency;  
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(e) To organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal access to 
economic opportunities through employment or self employment;  
(f) To participate in all community activities;  
(g) To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate 
technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement 
schemes;  
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, 
electricity and water supply, transport and communications.  
 
PART IV  
Article 15  
1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law. 
2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of 
men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give 
women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them 
equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals.  
3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with a 
legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed 
null and void.  
4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law 
relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and 
domicile.  
Article 16  
 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free 
and full consent;  
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution;  
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in 




(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their 
children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to 
exercise these rights;  
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship 
and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national 
legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;  
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family 
name, a profession and an occupation;  
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, 
administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a 
valuable consideration.  
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary 
action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to 
make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory. 
 
 
PART V  
Article 17  
1. For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation of the present 
Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) consisting, at the time of entry 
into force of the Convention, of eighteen and, after ratification of or accession to the 
Convention by the thirty-fifth State Party, of twenty-three experts of high moral standing 
and competence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts shall be elected by 
States Parties from among their nationals and shall serve in their personal capacity, 
consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the representation 
of the different forms of civilization as well as the principal legal systems. 
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons 
nominated by States Parties. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its 
own nationals.  
3. The initial election shall be held six months after the date of the entry into force of the 
present Convention. At least three months before the date of each election the Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to 
submit their nominations within two months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in 
alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have 
nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties.  
4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of States Parties 
convened by the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters. At that meeting, for 
which two thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the 
Committee shall be those nominees who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute 
majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting.  
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5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. However, the 
terms of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two 
years; immediately after the first election the names of these nine members shall be chosen 
by lot by the Chairman of the Committee.  
6. The election of the five additional members of the Committee shall be held in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this article, following the thirty-
fifth ratification or accession. The terms of two of the additional members elected on this 
occasion shall expire at the end of two years, the names of these two members having been 
chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee.  
7. For the filling of casual vacancies, the State Party whose expert has ceased to function as 
a member of the Committee shall appoint another expert from among its nationals, subject 
to the approval of the Committee.  
8. The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the General Assembly, 
receive emoluments from United Nations resources on such terms and conditions as the 
Assembly may decide, having regard to the importance of the Committee's responsibilities.  
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and 
facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the present 
Convention.  
Article 18  
 
1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for 
consideration by the Committee, a report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other 
measures which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the present 
Convention and on the progress made in this respect: 
 
(a) Within one year after the entry into force for the State concerned; 
(b) Thereafter at least every four years and further whenever the Committee so requests.  
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of 
obligations under the present Convention. 
 
Article 19  
 
1. The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
2. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years.  
 
Article 20  
 
1. The Committee shall normally meet for a period of not more than two weeks annually in 




2. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at United Nations Headquarters 
or at any other convenient place as determined by the Committee. (amendment, status of 
ratification)  
Article 21  
 
1. The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social Council, report annually to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make suggestions and 
general recommendations based on the examination of reports and information received 
from the States Parties. Such suggestions and general recommendations shall be included 
in the report of the Committee together with comments, if any, from States Parties. 
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the reports of the Committee 
to the Commission on the Status of Women for its information.  
Article 22  
 
The specialized agencies shall be entitled to be represented at the consideration of the 
implementation of such provisions of the present Convention as fall within the scope of 
their activities. The Committee may invite the specialized agencies to submit reports on the 
implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities. 
 
 
PART VI  
Article 23  
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to 
the achievement of equality between men and women which may be contained: 
(a) In the legislation of a State Party; or 
(b) In any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for that State.  
Article 24  
 
States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national level aimed at 
achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Convention. 
 
Article 25  
 
1. The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States. 
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated as the depositary of the 
present Convention.  
3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
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4. The present Convention shall be open to accession by all States. Accession shall be 
effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.  
Article 26  
 
1. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any 
State Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be 
taken in respect of such a request.  
Article 27  
 
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of 
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of 
ratification or accession. 
2. For each State ratifying the present Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the 
twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on 
the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or 
accession.  
Article 28  
 
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States the 
text of reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession. 
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall 
not be permitted.  
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall then inform all States thereof. Such 
notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received.  
Article 29  
 
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of 
the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the 
arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification of the present Convention or 
accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph I of this 
article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect to any 
State Party which has made such a reservation.  
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3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this 
article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.  
Article 30  
 
The present Convention, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts 
of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present 
Convention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
